

Canadian Diplomacy and the Hungarian Revolution  
1956-1957

La diplomatie canadienne pendant la révolution hongroise  
1956-1957

A kanadai diplomácia az '56-os magyar forradalom idején  
1956-1957



Un Aperçu · A Documentary Perspective · Dokumentumgyűjtemény

[magyar előszóval]

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Canadian Diplomacy and the Hungarian Revolution, 1956 - 1957/La diplomatie canadienne pendant la révolution hongroise.

Photo de la couverture: Des réfugiés hongrois attendent leur tour à la légation du Canada à Vienne, en Autriche. 1956. (Bibliothèque et Archives Canada. PA 124953)

Cover Photo: Hungarian refugees wait their turn to be processed at the Legation of Canada in Vienna, Austria 1956. (Library and Archives Canada, PA 124953)

## **ELŐSZÓ / INTRODUCTION**

## ELŐSZÓ

1956 januárjában az európai béke és biztonság szempontjából reménytelibbek voltak a kilátások, mint az előző tízegynéhány évben bármikor. Sztálin 1953-ban bekövetkezett halála, az 1954. májusi genfi konferencia és a szintén Genfben, 1955-ben megrendezett csúcsertekezlet, melyen 1945 óta először ültek tárgyalóasztalhoz a szovjet és a nyugati vezetők, mind a nemzetközi feszültségek enyhülését sejtették. Louis Saint-Laurent kormányfő kabinetjét azonban nem győzték meg ezek a fejlemények, ezért 1955 őszén elküldték Moszkvába Lester B. Pearson külügyminisztert, helyzetfelmérés céljából. A kanadai diplomácia vezetője nagyra értékelte mozgalmas találkozáját Nyikita Hruscov szovjet miniszterelnökkel, akiről később azt mondta, hogy csak egy – a világ egyik legnagyobb hatalmú emberévé lett – ukrán paraszt lehet egy személyben ennyire nyers és zabolátlan. A liberális és realista szemléletű Pearson, aki 1955 novemberében tért vissza Ottawába, óvatos optimizmussal fogadta a „békés egymás mellett élést”<sup>1</sup> szorgalmazó szovjet javaslatot.

Hruscov 1956 februárjában, a Kommunista Párt XX. Kongresszusán elhangzott, Sztálint „leleplező” beszéde jelentősen hozzájárult Kanada Moszkva szándékaiba vetett bizalmának megerősödéséhez. „Kétségtelen, hogy Sztálin mítosza szertefoszloban van – adott hangot elégedettségének Pearson, majd hozzátette: Minden esély megvan rá, hogy halála után Sztálin holttestét – Oliver Cromwelléhez hasonlóan – felakasztják és felnégyelik.”<sup>2</sup> A szovjet politika enyhülése és a liberalizáció egész kelet-európai térséget átjáró fuvallata arra készítette a külügyminisztériumi tisztviselőket, hogy felülvizsgálják a szovjet érdekszférába tartozó államokhoz fűződő viszonyukat. Robert Ford, az Európai Igazgatóság vezetője s egyben a Szovjetunióval kapcsolatos kérdések legnevesebb kanadai szakértője, határozottan amellett szállt síkra, hogy a kormány erősítse gazdasági, tudományos és kulturális kapcsolatait ezekkel az országokkal. „Ezek a diktatúrák nem fognak megdőlni – írta 1956 júniusában –, ezért inkább arra kellene törekednünk, hogy elfogadhatóbbá tegyük őket a magunk számára. Bátorítanunk kell Moszkvával szembeni önállósodási törekvéseiket, ugyanakkor világossá kell tennünk, hogy nincsenek háborús szándékaink, és a fennálló társadalmi és politikai berendezkedésüket sem szeretnénk radikálisan megváltoztatni.”<sup>3</sup>

Kelet-Európa népei mégis változásra vágytak, és azt szerették volna, ha ezekre minél előbb sor kerül. 1956 őszén a kanadai tisztviselőket alaposan meglepték a „nacionalista” színezetű lengyel és magyar kommunista rezsimeket megingató megmozdulások. A kanadai diplomaták hasonló csodálkozással fogadták, amikor október végén a magyar értelmiségiek és egyetemisták felkelése következtében a szovjet csapatok Budapest elhagyására kényszerültek. Amint az a kötet első dokumentumai bizonyítják, a kanadaiak kezdetben az ENSZ gyors beavatkozásában reménykedtek, mely véget vetett volna az erőszaknak és lehetőséget teremtett volna Nagy Imre miniszterelnök kormánya számára, hogy békés kompromisszumot kössön Moszkvával és megteremtse egy liberális államrend alapjait.

A remény azonban szertefoszlott, amikor néhány nappal később a szovjet katonák és harckocsik újra bevonultak a magyar fővárosba, majd kegyetlenül leszámoltak a gyengén

<sup>1</sup> 237. távirat, Bonnból (Pearsontól) Ottawába. (1955. október 15.) In: Donaghy, Greg (szerk.) 1999. Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 21: 1955. Canada Communication Group. Ottawa. 1167. o.

<sup>2</sup> Pearson, Lester B.: Memorandum for the Prime Minister (1956. március 27.) In: Donaghy, Greg (szerk.) 2002. Documents on Canadian External Relations, Volume 23: 1956-57 Part II. Canadian Government Publishing. Ottawa. 911. o.

<sup>3</sup> Ford, Robert: Memorandum by Head, European Division (1956. június 12.) In: *ibid.* 877. o.

felfegyverzett felkelőkkel és felállítottak egy bábkormányt. Mivel Magyarországról csak szórványos információkat kaptak, Pearson és munkatársai a távolból próbálták értelmezni az eseményeket. „A felkelők, és az ő követeléseiket mindenáron teljesíteni akaró Nagy Imre hibája az volt – magyarázta Jules Léger, akkori külügyminiszter-helyettes –, hogy túlságosan gyorsan, túlságosan messzire merészkedtek.” [12. dokumentum] Jules Léger hasonló szigorral ítélte el, hogy az általa „teljesen érzéketlennek” nevezett nyugati államok képtelenek voltak megfelelően reagálni [11. dokumentum]. A valóság még ennél is szomorúbb volt. Bár Léger azt nem állítja, hogy az újbóli magyarországi szovjet hatalomátvétel a Szuzei-csatorna visszafoglalása céljából október 29-én indított francia-brit offenzíva következménye volt, meggyőződése szerint a két meghatározó NATO-tag közel-keleti kalandja elfordította az ENSZ-ben az afro-ázsiai országokat a Nyugattól, amelynek emiatt nem sikerült kihasználnia Moszkva Budapesttel kapcsolatos kezdeti bizonytalankodását és egy Magyarország számára kedvező megoldást kialakudnia.

Az olvasókat talán meglepi, milyen sok dokumentum szól a magyarországi eseményekkel kapcsolatos indiai reakciókról. Ez nem véletlen. Az 1940-es évek végétől a kanadai döntéshozók hatalmas erőfeszítéseket tettek India és az el nem kötelezett afrikai és ázsiai országok vezetőjének tekintett indiai miniszterelnök, Jawaharlal Nehru megnyerésére<sup>4</sup>. A magyarországi forradalom e politika próbakövének volt tekinthető, és számos problémát felszínre hozott. India és követői csak vonakodva voltak hajlandók a magyar ügy mellé állni New Yorkban, ami számos kanadai diplomatának keserűséget és csalódást okozott. „Azt hiszem, be kell vallanunk – ismerte el Ford –, hogy az ENSZ Magyarországgal szemben tanúsított magatartása hatalmas kudarc volt. (...) Az arab és ázsiai országok egyszerűen nem akarták megérteni azt a leckét, amiből ők maguk is sokat tanulhattak volna a szovjet rendszer természetéről.” [55. dokumentum]

Bártökéletesnek nem voltak mondhatók, Kanadának a forradalom után egész Európát ellepő magyar menekültáradattal kapcsolatos intézkedései sokkal pozitívabb példának tekinthetők, mint az ENSZ-ben tanúsított közönye. Háború utáni virágzó gazdaságának köszönhetően Kanadában minden adott volt e probléma hatékony kezeléséhez, és Pearson mindent meg is tett annak érdekében, hogy a kormány hozzájárulását biztosítsa. Ideológiai és humanitárius megfontolásoktól vezérelve a külügyminiszter a menekültek irányába országos, illetve nemzetközi szinten megnyilvánuló szolidaritáshoz méltó bőkezűséget várt Ottawától. De nem volt könnyű a dolga. A kabinet e kötetben közreadott vitaanyagaiból kiderül, a menekültek befogadásával kapcsolatban milyen kényes kérdések vetődtek fel a föderális, illetve tartományi hatáskörök megoszlásáról, s ezek milyen óvatosságra intették a minisztereket. A kanadai politikusokban kétségek merültek fel afelől, vajon a Vöröskereszt képes-e felügyelni a kanadai segélyek célba juttatását, és emiatt nem akarták túl gyorsan növelni a támogatások mértékét. Mindezek ellenére a kormány végül eltörölte a bevándorlókkal szemben támasztott szokásos követelményeit és bőkezűen támogatta a magyarországi menekültek kanadai letelepedését. Ennek köszönhetően egy év leforgása alatt közel 30000 magyar talált otthonra Kanadában, és járult hozzá érezhetően az ország akkoriban kialakuló multikulturális arculatához.

Kanada méltányos hozzáállása a magyar menekültekhez megváltozott az 1957 júniusában megtartott választásokat követő kormányváltás következményeként. Az országban egyre

<sup>4</sup> Donaghy, Greg: „The Most Important Country in the World” Escott Reid in India, 1952-57. In: Donaghy, Greg és Roussel, Stéphane 2004. *Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar*. McGill-Queen's University Press. Montreal & Kingston. 67-84. o.

növekvő munkanélküliség aggodalommal töltötte el John Diefenbaker konzervatív kormányát és a magyar menekültek befogadását hamar azokra korlátozták, akikért már Kanadában élő rokonok vagy jövőbeli munkáltatók kezességét vállaltak. Az európai szövetségesek és az ENSZ menekültügyi főbiztosának sürgetése ellenére Ottawa vonakodott megnyitni kapuit és 1958 tavaszán sorra utasította el a további menekültek letelepítésére vonatkozó kérelmeket. Végül 1958 júliusában kompromisszum gyanánt a kabinet beleegyezett még 1100 menekült befogadására és ezzel véget vetett a példátlan bevándorlási hullámnak

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Az olvasó által kezében tartott rövid kötet, mely a kanadai diplomácia és az 1956-os magyar forradalom kapcsolatát igyekszik bemutatni, a Kanada külkapcsolatairól évente megjelentetett külügyminisztériumi dokumentumgyűjtemény, a *Documents on Canadian External Relations* (franciául: *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*) 23. és 25. kötetének részét képezi. A kanadai kormány külpolitikai és diplomáciai vonatkozású dokumentumainak alapvető forrásaként számon tartott sorozat első kötete 1967-ben látott napvilágot. Az azóta megjelent kötetek teljes részletességgel adnak számot Kanada legfontosabb külpolitikai döntéseiről, illetve ezek hátteréről. Az eddig kiadott 25 kötet az 1909-től (vagyis a minisztérium felállításának évétől) 1959-ig terjedő időszakot öleli fel. A sorozat részeként két különkiadás is napvilágot látott, az Új-Fundland Kanadai Államszövetséghez történő 1949-es csatlakozását megelőző 40 éves időszakról. A sorozat kötetekben ezidáig több mint 20 000 dokumentum kapott helyet, ami mintegy 35 000 oldalnyi szöveget és egy olyan nagy horderejű vállalkozást jelent, amely egyike a kanadai történelem legjelentősebb könyvkiadási projektjeinek<sup>5</sup>.

Ezek a kötetek, amint a sorozat teljes egésze is, a korabeli kanadai külügyminisztérium és a miniszterelnöki kabinetiroda dossziéin alapulnak. Szükség esetén a források kiegészültek a miniszterek és magas rangú tisztviselők magánjellegű dokumentumaival, illetve a többi minisztérium archívumaival. A Kanada és a magyar forradalom kapcsolatát bemutató kötet előkészítése során szabadon tanulmányozhattuk a külügyminisztérium valamennyi dossziéját és számos egyéb forrásból származó dokumentumgyűjteményt.

A további kutatások megkönnyítése céljából a forrás minden dokumentum jobb felső sarkában megtalálható. A nyomtatásban eddig meg nem jelent kanadai dokumentumokat egy kereszt (+) jelöli. A szerkesztő által kihagyott részeket három pont (...) jelzi. A „group corrupt” kifejezést azokon a helyeken használtuk, ahol gondot okozott az eredeti távirat szövegének kibetűzése. A szerzők által törölt szavak és szövegrészek, a lapszéli jegyzetek és a terjesztési listák csak azokban az esetben szerepelnek a dokumentumokban, lábjegyzetek formájában, ahol valamilyen jelentőséggel bírnak. Ha az ellenkezőjét külön nem jeleztük, feltételeztük, hogy a címzettek elolvasták a dokumentumokat. A tulajdon- és a földrajzi neveket normalizáltuk. A szerkesztő – mindenfajta jelölés nélkül – kijavította a helyesírási, központosítási és az átírásból adódó hibákat, amennyiben a szöveggörnyezetből egyértelműen kiderült az adott szövegrészlet értelme. Minden egyéb szerkesztői szövegbetoldást szögletes

<sup>5</sup> Donaghy, Greg: Documenting the Diplomats: The Origins and Evolution of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*. *The Public Historian*. 25/1. (2003. tél) 9-28. o.

zárójel jelez. A dokumentumok nyelve angol vagy francia, attól függően, hogy az eredeti szöveg milyen nyelven íródott.

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## INTRODUCTION

The prospects for peace and security in Europe seemed more hopeful in January 1956 than they had for more than a decade. Stalin's death in 1953, the Geneva Conference of May 1954, and the July 1955 summit in Geneva, where Soviet and Western leaders gathered for the first time since 1945, seemed to herald a period of reduced global tension. Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent's cabinet, however, was uncertain, and in the fall of 1955, it despatched Canada's secretary of state for external affairs, Lester B. Pearson, to Moscow to survey the situation. The foreign minister enjoyed his spirited encounter with Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, whom he later described as being "as blunt and volatile as only a Ukrainian peasant, turned one of the most powerful men in the world, can be."<sup>6</sup> A liberal realist in outlook, Pearson returned to Ottawa in November 1955 cautiously optimistic about Soviet offers of "competitive co-existence."

Canadian confidence in Moscow's intentions was reinforced in early 1956, when Khrushchev denounced Stalin during the 20<sup>th</sup> Communist Party Congress in February 1956. "There can be little doubt that the myth of Stalin is being completely demolished," exulted Pearson, adding that "the body of Stalin like that of Oliver Cromwell, is, post-mortem, likely to be hanged, drawn and quartered."<sup>7</sup> The relaxation of Soviet policy and the gentle winds of liberalization that rippled through Eastern Europe encouraged officials in the Department of External Affairs to revise their attitude toward the satellite states of Eastern Europe. Robert Ford, head of the European Division and Canada's foremost Soviet expert, urged the government to engage these states more actively in economic, scientific, and cultural exchanges. The regimes are not going to be overthrown, so we had better concentrate our efforts on trying to make them more acceptable to us, he wrote in June 1956. "Our policy should be directed toward encouraging independence from Moscow while making it clear that we have no aggressive intentions and no intentions of radically altering their present social and political systems."<sup>8</sup>

East Europeans, however, wanted change, and they wanted it quickly. This surprised Canadian officials, who watched in amazement as popular unrest threw up nationalist Communist governments in Poland and Hungary by the fall of 1956. Canada's diplomats were equally astounded in late October, when rioting Hungarian intellectuals and students forced Soviet troops to retreat from Budapest. Initially, as the opening documents in this collection demonstrate, they hoped that a speedy intervention by the United Nations would end the violence and allow Premier Imre Nagy's government to work out a peaceful and liberal accommodation with Moscow.

This hope was dashed when Soviet troops and tanks re-entered the Hungarian capital a few days later, brutally crushing the poorly armed rebels and installing a puppet government. With only sketchy reports from Hungary, Pearson and his officials tried to make sense of what had happened. "The mistake of the rebels, and of Nagy for trying to keep pace with their demands,"

<sup>6</sup> Bonn (From Pearson) to Ottawa, Telegram 237, 15 October 1955, reprinted in Greg Donaghy (editor), *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Volume 21: 1955 (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group, 1999), p.1167.

<sup>7</sup> L.B. Pearson, "Memorandum for the Prime Minister, 27 March 1956, reprinted in Greg Donaghy (editor), *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, Volume 23: 1956-57 Part II (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing, 2002), p.911.

<sup>8</sup> Robert Ford, Memorandum by Head, European Division, 12 June 1956, reprinted in *ibid*, p.877.

explained the under-secretary of state for external affairs, Jules Léger, “was in trying to go too far and too fast. [Document12] But Léger was just as severe in judging the inadequate Western reaction, which he described as “completely impassive.” [Document11] Indeed, it was worse. Though Léger stopped short of blaming the Soviet reconquest of Hungary on the Anglo-French assault on the Suez Canal of October 29, he thought the Mideast misadventures of two of NATO’s leading members had alienated the Afro-Asian bloc at the United Nations and cost the West a chance to exploit Moscow’s early hesitations in Budapest to seek a negotiated solution favourable to Hungary.

Readers might be intrigued by the number of documents that focus on India’s reaction to the events in Hungary. This was no accident. Since the late 1940s, Canadian policy-makers had made a sustained effort to court India and its prime minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the acknowledged leader of the non-aligned Afro-Asian bloc.<sup>9</sup> The Hungarian Revolution tested this policy and found it wanting. India and its followers were slow to rally to the Hungarian cause in New York, leaving many Canadian officials feeling bitter and betrayed. “I think we must agree,” concluded Ford, “that the action of the UN on Hungary was largely a failure. ... The one lesson that might profitably have been learned by the Arab-Asian group concerning the natures of the Soviet system has been obstinately refused.” [Document55]

Though imperfect, Canada’s response to the flood of Hungarian refugees that spilled across Europe in the wake of the crisis was more inspiring than its detached posture at the United Nations. Here was a problem that Canada, with its booming postwar resource economy, could address effectively, and Pearson made sure the government contributed its share. Moved by a combination of ideological and humanitarian motives, the foreign minister insisted that Ottawa match the outpouring of domestic and international support for the refugees. But the going was tough. The Cabinet discussions reprinted in this collection show how the resettling of refugees raised tricky questions of federal-provincial responsibilities, making ministers cautious and wary. Canada’s politicians also worried about the Red Cross’s capacity to oversee Canadian aid and hesitated to increase it too quickly. Even so, the government eventually removed most of the usual immigration requirements and heavily subsidized the movement of Hungarian refugees to Canada. Within a year, almost 30,000 Hungarians had moved to Canada, where they made their presence felt in the country’s emerging multicultural mosaic.

Canada’s generous policy towards the Hungarian refugees did not survive the change in government that followed the federal election of June 1957. Worried by mounting domestic unemployment, Prime Minister John Diefenbaker’s Conservative government quickly restricted the intake of Hungarians to those sponsored by close relatives in Canada or prospective employers. Despite pressure from its European allies and the UN high commissioner for refugees, Ottawa remained reluctant to adopt a more forthcoming posture and repeatedly rejected pleas in early 1958 that it help resettle the remaining refugees. As a compromise, Cabinet agreed to accept a final group of 1,100 refugees in July 1958, bringing the unprecedented refugee operation to an end.

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<sup>9</sup> Greg Donaghy, “‘The Most Important Country in the World:’ Escott Reid in India, 1952-57,” in Greg Donaghy and Stéphane Roussel, *Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2004), pp.67-84.

The documents in this small book on Canada and the Hungarian Revolution are extracted from Volumes 23 and 25 of the series, *Documents on Canadian External Relations*, published annually by Foreign Affairs Canada. First issued in 1967, *Documents on Canadian External Relations* represents the basic published record of the foreign policy and foreign relations of the Government of Canada, and provides a comprehensive, self-contained record of the country's major foreign policy decisions and their underlying rationale. To date, the series totals twenty-five volumes, covering the period from 1909, when the department was established, to 1959. It also includes two special volumes on relations with Newfoundland in the two decades before it joined Canada in 1949. *Documents on Canadian External Relations* has reprinted over 20,000 documents so far, totalling almost 35,000 pages of text and making it one of the largest publishing projects in Canadian history.<sup>10</sup>

These volumes and this collection are based primarily on the records of Canada's foreign ministry, then known as the Department of External Affairs, and its cabinet secretariat, the Privy Council Office. These are supplemented where necessary by the private papers of Cabinet ministers and senior officials, as well as the files of other government departments. In preparing this selection of documents on Canada and the Hungarian Revolution, we were given complete access to the files of the Department of External Affairs and generous access to other collections.

To help readers wishing to do further research, the source is indicated at the upper right-hand corner of each document. The symbols are explained in the Location of Documents. A dagger (+) indicates a Canadian document that has not been printed. Editorial excisions are shown by an ellipse (...). The phrase "group corrupt" indicates decryption problems in the transmission of the original telegram. Words and passages that were struck out by the author, marginal notes and distribution lists are reproduced as footnotes only when important. Unless otherwise indicated, it is assumed that documents have been read by the addressee. Proper and place names are standardized. The editors have silently corrected spelling, punctuation and capitalization, as well as transcription errors whose meaning is clear from their context. All other editorial additions to the documents are indicated by the use of square brackets. Documents are reprinted in either English or French, depending on their language of origin.

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OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
MAY, 2006

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<sup>10</sup> Greg Donaghy, "Documenting the Diplomats: The Origins and Evolution of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*," *The Public Historian* Vol.25, No.1 (Winter 2003), pp.9-28.

## INTRODUCTION

En janvier 1956, il y a plus d'une dizaine d'années que les perspectives de paix et de sécurité n'ont pas été aussi bonnes en Europe. La mort de Staline, en 1953, la Conférence de Genève, en mai 1954, et la rencontre au sommet organisée dans cette même ville en 1955, où dirigeants soviétiques et occidentaux se réunissent pour la première fois depuis 1945, semblent annoncer un apaisement des tensions internationales. Toutefois, le Cabinet du premier ministre Louis Saint-Laurent n'en est pas convaincu, à telle enseigne que, à l'automne 1955, il envoie à Moscou le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures du Canada, Lester B. Pearson, avec pour mission de prendre le pouls de la situation. Le chef de la diplomatie canadienne apprécie sa rencontre animée avec le premier ministre soviétique, Nikita Khrouchtchev, dont il dira plus tard que seul un paysan ukrainien, devenu l'un des hommes les plus puissants du monde, pouvait faire montre à la fois d'une telle brusquerie et d'une telle impétuosité.<sup>11</sup> Pearson, qui envisage les choses dans une perspective libérale et réaliste, retourne à Ottawa en novembre 1955. Il affiche alors un optimisme prudent à l'égard de l'offre soviétique d'instaurer une «coexistence concurrentielle»

En février 1956, lorsque Khrouchtchev dénonce Staline, lors du 20<sup>e</sup> Congrès du Parti Communiste, cela contribue à renforcer la confiance du Canada dans les intentions de Moscou. « Il y a peu de doute que le mythe de Staline est en voie d'être complètement détruit, jubile Pearson. À présent, ajoute-t-il, le corps de Staline, comme le cadavre d'Oliver Cromwell, va probablement être pendu et écartelé. »<sup>12</sup> L'assouplissement de la politique soviétique et le vent de libéralisation qui souffle légèrement sur toute l'Europe de l'Est incitent les fonctionnaires du ministère des Affaires extérieures à revoir leur position à l'égard des pays satellites de la région. Robert Ford, chef de la Direction de Europe et plus grand spécialiste canadien des questions soviétiques, insiste pour que le gouvernement intensifie les échanges économiques, scientifiques et culturels avec ces pays. « Ces régimes ne seront pas renversés, écrit-il en juin 1956, de sorte qu'il vaudrait mieux nous attacher à les rendre plus acceptables à nos yeux. Il faut les encourager à se détacher de Moscou, tout en montrant clairement que nous n'avons aucune intention belliqueuse ni celle de modifier radicalement leurs régimes sociaux et politiques actuels. »<sup>13</sup>

Toutefois, les populations d'Europe de l'Est aspirent au changement, et souhaitent que celui-ci intervienne rapidement. C'est alors que, à l'automne 1956, les fonctionnaires canadiens sont pris de surprise par l'agitation populaire dont ils sont témoins et qui vient à bout des régimes communistes « nationalistes » de Pologne et de Hongrie. Les diplomates canadiens ne sont pas moins surpris, à la fin d'octobre, lorsque des émeutes d'intellectuels et d'étudiants hongrois forcent les troupes soviétiques à se retirer de Budapest. Au début, comme en témoignent les premiers documents du recueil, ils espèrent une action prompte des Nations Unies, susceptible de mettre un terme à la violence et de permettre au gouvernement

<sup>11</sup> Bonn (de Pearson) à Ottawa, télégramme 237. 15 octobre 1955. *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada, Volume 21* : 1955, sous la direction de Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Groupe Communication Canada. 1999). p. 1167.

<sup>12</sup> L.B. Pearson, « Note « l'intention du premier ministre ». 27 mars 1956, *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada, Volume 23* : 1956 - 1957. *Partie 2*, sous la direction de Greg Donaghy (Ottawa: Edition du gouvernement du Canada. 2002). p. 911.

<sup>13</sup> Robert Ford. « Note à l'intention du chef de la Direction de l'Europe ». 12 juin 1956. *ibid.* p. 877.

du premier ministre Imre Nagy de trouver, avec Moscou, un compromis pacifique et d'instaurer un régime libéral.

Cet espoir est déçu lorsque les soldats et les chars d'assaut soviétiques entrent de nouveau dans la capitale hongroise, quelques jours plus tard, puis répriment brutalement des rebelles mal armés et mettent en place un gouvernement fantoche. Ne recevant de Hongrie qu'une information incomplète, Pearson et ses fonctionnaires essaient de comprendre le fil des événements, « L'erreur des rebelles, et celle d'Imre Nagy, qui s'est efforcé d'accéder à leurs demandes, explique alors le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Jules Léger, a été d'aller trop loin, trop vite. » [Document 12] Jules Léger estime, avec la même sévérité, que les pays occidentaux n'ont pas su réagir, les qualifiant de « complètement impassibles ». [Document 11] En fait, cela est encore plus accablant. Certes, il ne va pas jusqu'à affirmer que la reconquête de la Hongrie par les Soviétiques est le résultat de l'offensive franco-britannique pour reprendre le canal de Suez, le 29 octobre. Il croit néanmoins que, à la suite des mésaventures de deux des principaux membres de l'OTAN au Moyen-Orient, l'Occident s'est aliéné le bloc des pays afro-asiatiques aux Nations Unies, et que cela l'a empêché de tirer parti de l'indécision initiale de Moscou, à Budapest, afin de trouver une solution négociée au profit de la Hongrie.

Il est probable que le nombre de documents consacrés à la réaction de l'Inde aux événements intervenus en Hongrie étonne le lecteur. Cela n'est pas dû au hasard. Depuis la fin des années 1940, les décideurs canadiens s'attachent à courtiser ce pays et son premier ministre, le pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, considéré comme le chef des pays non alignés d'Afrique et d'Asie.<sup>14</sup> La révolution hongroise sert de banc d'essai à cette politique et fait ressortir ses insuffisances. L'Inde et ses alliés mettent en effet du temps à se rallier à la cause de la Hongrie à New York, source d'amertume et de trahison chez de nombreux fonctionnaires canadiens. « Je pense que nous devons reconnaître, concluait M. Ford, que la démarche des Nations Unies à l'égard de la Hongrie a été dans une large mesure un échec. (...) Les pays ont refusé obstinément d'entendre la seule leçon utile qu'aurait pu leur apprendre le groupe arabo-asiatique sur la nature du régime soviétique » [Document 55]

Bien qu'imparfaites, les mesures prises par le Canada face à l'afflux des réfugiés hongrois, qui essaient dans toute l'Europe à la suite de la crise, sont plus édifiantes que le détachement affiche aux Nations Unies. Grâce à son économie florissante d'après-guerre, axée sur les matières premières, le Canada est bien placé pour s'attaquer efficacement à ce problème, et Pearson veille à ce que le gouvernement apporte sa contribution. Animé à la fois par des objectifs idéologiques et humanitaires, le ministre des Affaires étrangères insiste pour qu'Ottawa fournisse une aide proportionnelle aux efforts déployés de toute part, à l'échelle nationale et internationale, pour aider les réfugiés. Toutefois, la partie est loin d'être gagnée. Les discussions au Cabinet, reproduites dans le présent recueil, montrent que l'accueil des réfugiés pose l'épineux problème des compétences fédérales et provinciales, qui force les ministres à se montrer prudents. Les responsables politiques mettent également en doute la capacité de la Croix-Rouge de veiller au bon acheminement de raide canadienne et, à ce titre, souhaitent ne pas l'augmenter trop rapidement. En tout état de cause, le gouvernement finit par lever la plupart des restrictions habituelles à l'immigration et subventionne largement

<sup>14</sup> « The Most important Country in the World: » Escott Reid in India, 1952-57. » Greg Donaghy dans *Escott Reid: Diplomat and Scholar*, Greg Donaghy et Stéphane Roussel, McGill-Queen's University Press. 2004). p. 67-84.

la venue de réfugiés hongrois au Canada. C'est ainsi que, dans l'espace d'une année, près de 30000 hongrois émigrent au Canada, où ils occupent une place non négligeable dans le nouveau paysage multiculturel canadien.

La politique généreuse du Canada envers les réfugiés hongrois n'a pas survécu au changement de gouvernement suite aux élections de juin 1957. Inquiet de la croissance du taux de chômage à l'intérieur du pays, le gouvernement conservateur du premier ministre John Diefenbaker a soudain limité l'admission des hongrois à ceux dont les familles proches ou les futurs employeurs au Canada se portaient garants. Malgré la pression de ses alliés européens et du haut commissariat pour les réfugiés de l'ONU, Ottawa est resté hésitant à adopter une posture plus ouverte, et les appels concernant la réinstallation du reste des réfugiés ayant ainsi été rejetés à plusieurs reprises au début de 1958. À titre de compromis, le cabinet a convenu d'accepter un groupe final de 1.100 réfugiés en juillet 1958, mettant ainsi fin à l'opération réfugié sans précédent.

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Les documents publics dans ce court recueil sur le Canada et la révolution hongroise sont extraits du *Volume 23* et *25* de la série *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*, publiée annuellement par Affaires étrangères Canada. Parus pour la première fois en 1967, les *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* se veulent un recueil des documents fondamentaux relatant la conduite de la politique et des relations étrangères du gouvernement du Canada. Ils rendent compte, de manière complète, des décisions de politique étrangère importantes prises par le Canada, et de leurs fondements. À ce jour, 25 volumes ont été publiés, pour la période allant de 1909, année de la création du ministère, à 1959. Deux volumes spéciaux sont également consacrés aux relations avec Terre-Neuve pendant les 40 années qui ont précédé son entrée dans la Confédération, en 1949. Jusqu'ici, plus de 20 000 documents ont été reproduits dans le cadre de cette série, ce qui représente environ 35 000 pages de texte et l'un des projets d'édition les plus importants jamais entrepris au Canada.<sup>15</sup>

Ces volumes, comme l'ensemble de la série, reposent surtout sur les dossiers de l'ancien ministère des Affaires extérieures et du Bureau du Conseil privé. Au besoin, ils ont été étoffés par des documents privés appartenant à des ministres du Cabinet et à des hauts fonctionnaires, ainsi que par les archives d'autres ministères. Pour ce volume, on a pu consulter librement tous les dossiers du ministère des Affaires étrangères et une bonne partie des autres collections d'archives.

Aux fins de recherches ultérieures, mentionnons que la source figure dans le coin supérieur droit de chaque document. Une croix (+) désigne un document canadien inédit. Les modifications rédactionnelles sont indiquées par une ellipse (...). L'expression « group corrupt » signale des problèmes de déchiffrement dans la transmission du télégramme original. Les mots et les passages biffés par l'auteur, les notes marginales et les listes de distribution ne sont reproduits sous forme de renvois en bas de page que lorsqu'ils sont importants. Sauf

<sup>15</sup> «Documenting the Diplomats: The Origins and Evolution of *Documents on Canadian External Relations*. » Greg Donaghy. *Public Historian*. volume 25. n° 1 (hiver 2003). p. 9 à 28

indication contraire, on suppose que les documents ont été lus par leur destinataire. Les noms propres et géographiques ont été normalisés. Les éditeurs ont corrigé, sans l'indiquer, l'orthographe, la ponctuation et la mise en majuscules, ainsi que les erreurs de transcription, lorsque le contexte permettait de saisir facilement le sens du passage. Tous les autres ajouts rédactionnels apportés aux documents sont indiqués par des crochets. Les documents sont reproduits en français ou en anglais selon la langue utilisée dans l'original.

GREG DONAGHY ET MICHAEL STEVENSON  
OTTAWA, ONTARIO  
MAI 2006

**PROVENANCE DES DOCUMENTS  
LOCATION OF DOCUMENTS**

Dossiers du ministère de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration et Archives Canada	DCI	Department of Citizenship and Immigration Files, Library and Archives Canada (RG 26)
Dossiers du ministère des Affaires extérieures. Bibliothèque et Archives Canada	DEA	Department of External Affairs Files, Library and Archives, Canada (RG 25)
Documents de Escott Reid. Bibliothèque et Archives Canada	E.R.	Escott Reid Papers. Library and Archives Canada (RG 25)
Bureau du Conseil privé-conclusions du Cabinet et documents du Cabinet. Bibliothèque et Archives Canada	PCO	Privy Council Office—Cabinet Conclusions and Cabinet Documents. Library and Archives Canada (RG 2)



**LISTE DES ABBRÉVIATIONS**  
**LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

Cab Doc	CABINET DOCUMENT
CBC-IS	CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION—INTERNATIONAL SERVICE
DCI	DEPARTMENT OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION
DEA	DEPARTMENT OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS
FAO	FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION
ICEM	INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMMITTEE FOR EUROPEAN MIGRATION
ICRC	INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
NATO	NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION
PCO	PRIVY COUNCIL OFFICE
PEI	PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND
TB	TUBERCULOSIS
UK	UNITED KINGDOM
UN	UNITED NATIONS
UNESCO	UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION
USA	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
USSR	UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS



## LISTE DES PERSONNALITÉS

BOULGANIN, N.A., PRÉSIDENT CONSEIL DES MINISTRES DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE

CHUVAHIN D.S, AMBASSADEUR DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE

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DOUGLAS, TOMMY C., PREMIER MINISTRE DU SASKATCHEWAN

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FORTIER, COLONEL LAVAL, SOUS-MINISTRE DE LA CITOYENNETÉ ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

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HORTHY, MIKLÓS, RÉGENT DE HONGRIE DE 1920 À 1944

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KÁDÁR, JÁNOS, PREMIER MINISTRE DE HONGRIE (NOV. 1956)

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MENON, V.K. KRISHNA, MINISTRE SANS PORTEFEUILLE DE L'INDE (DÉC. 1956) ET PRÉSIDENT, DÉLÉGATION DE L'INDE À L'ASSEMBLÉE GÉNÉRALE DES NATIONS UNIES, MINISTRE DE LA DÉFENSE

MUNRO, SR. LESLIE, AMBASSADEUR DE NOUVELLE-ZÉLANDE AUX ÉTATS-UNIS ET REPRÉSENTANT PERMANENT AUPRÈS DES NATIONS UNIES

NAGY, IMRE, PREMIER MINISTRE DE HONGRIE (OCT-NOV. 1956)

NEHRU, PANDIT JAWAHARLAL, PREMIER MINISTRE DE L'INDE

PEARSON, LESTER B., SECRÉTAIRE D'ÉTAT AUX AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES

PICKERSGILL, J.W., MINISTRE DE LA CITOYENNETÉ ET DE L'IMMIGRATION

PILLAL, SIR R.N., SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL DU MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES EXTÉRIEURES DE L'INDE

RAJK, LÁSZLÓ, CHEF COMMUNISTE HONGROIS EXÉCUTÉ POUR ESPIONAGE EN 1949 ET REHABILITÉ EN 1956

REID, ESCOTT, HAUT-COMMISSAIRE EN INDE

ROBERTSON, NORMAN, HAUT-COMMISSAIRE AU ROYAUME-UNI

SAINT-LAURENT, LOUIS S., PREMIER MINISTRE

SHEPILOV, DMITRI TROFIMOVICH, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE (FÉV. 1957)

STALIN, JOSEF, SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL, PARTI COMMUNISTE DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE (MORT MARS 1953)

STANBURY, DR. WILLIAM STUART, COMMISSAIRE NATIONAL SOCIÉTÉ CANADIENNE DE LA CROIX-ROUGE

SUMMERS, G.B., CHEF, BUREAU EUROPEËN

VOIR SAINT LAURENT

TITO, MARÉCHAL JOIP BROZ, PRÉSIDENT DE YOUGOSLAVIE

WERSHOF, MAX H, REPRÉSENTANT PERMANENT AUPRÈS DU BUREAU EUROPÉEN DE NATIONS UNIES

ZHARKOV, ALEKSI, VICE-MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES DE L'UNION SOVIÉTIQUE

ZHUKOV, MARÉCHAL GIORGI K., CANDIDAT À PRAESIDIUM DU SOVIET SUPRÊME DE L'UNION  
SOVIÉTIQUE ET MINISTRE DE LA DEFENSE

## LIST OF PERSONS

BULGARIN, N.A., CHAIRMAN, COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF SOVIET UNION

CHUHAVIN, D.S., AMBASSADOR OF SOVIET UNION

DIXON, SIR PIERSON, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UNITED KINGDOM TO UNITED NATIONS

DOUGLAS, TOMMY C. PREMIER OF SASKATCHEWAN

DUTT, SUBIMAL, FOREIGN SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF INDIA

FORD, R.A.D., HEAD, EUROPEAN DIVISION (MAR. 1957), AMBASSADOR IN COLUMBIA

FORTIER, COLONEL LAVAL, DEPUTY MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

GOMULKA, WLADYSLAW, FIRST SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE, UNITED WORKERS PARTY (COMMUNIST) OF POLAND (OCT. 1956)

GUIRINGAUD, LOUIS DE, ASSISTANT HEAD, PERMANENT MISSION OF FRANCE TO UNITED NATIONS

HARRIS, WALTER E., MINISTER OF FINANCE

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HORTHY MIKLÓS, REGENT OF HUNGARY (1920-1944)

HORVÁTH, IMRE, FOREIGN MINISTER OF HUNGARY

JOHNSON, DAVID M., AMBASSADOR IN SOVIET UNION

KÁDÁR JÁNOS, PRIME MINISTER OF HUNGARY (NOV. 1956)

KHRUSHCHEV, N.S., FIRST SECRETARY OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION

LÉGER, JULES, UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS

LINDT, AUGUSTE RUDOLPH, UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

LODGE, HENRY CABOT JR., PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF UNITED STATES TO UNITED NATIONS

MACKAY, R.A., PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS

MENON, V.K. KRISHNA, MINSITER WITHOUT PORTFOLIO OF INDIA (DEC. 1956), AND CHAIRMAN OF INDIAN DELEGATION TO UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY, MINISTER OF DEFENCE

MUNRO, SIR LESLIE, AMBASSADOR OF NEW ZELAND IN UNITED STATES AND PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO UNITED NATIONS

NAGY, IMRE, PRIME MINISTER OF HUNGARY (OCT. – NOV. 1956)

NEHRU, PANDIT JAWAHARLAL, PRIME MINISTER OF INDIA

PEARSON, LESTER B., SECRETARY FO STATE FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRES

PICKERSGILL, J.W., MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION

PILLAI, SIR R.N., SECRETARY-GENERAL, MINISTRY OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS OF INDIA

RAJK, LÁSZLÓ, HUNGARIAN COMMUNIST LEADER, EXECUTED FOR ESPIONAGE IN 1949 AND REHABILITATED IN 1956

REID, ESCOTT, HIGH COMMISSIONER IN INDIA

ROBERTSON, NORMAN, HIGH COMMISSIONER IN UNITED KINGDOM

SEE ST-LAURENT

SHEPILOV, DMITRI TROFIMOVICH, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SOVIET UNION (FEB. 1957)

STALIN, JOSEPH, GENERAL SECRETARY, COMMUNIST PARTY OF SOVIET UNION (DIED MAR. 1953)

STANBURY, DR. WILLIAM STUART, NATIONAL COMMISSIONER, CANADIAN RED CROSS SOCIETY

ST-LAURENT, LOUIS S., PRIME MINISTER

SUMMERS, G.B., HEAD, EUROPEAN DIVISION

TITO, MARSHAL JOSIP BROZ, PRESIDENT OF YUGOSLAVIA

WERSHOF, MAX H, PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO EUROPEAN OFFICE OF UNITED NATIONS

ZHAROV, ALEKSEI, VICE-MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF SOVIET UNION

ZHUKOV, MARSHAL GIORGI K., CANDIDATE MEMBER OF PRAESIDIUM OF SUPREME SOVIET OF SOVIET UNION AND MINISTER OF DEFENCE

LA DIPLOMATIE CANADIENNE PENDANT  
LA RÉVOLUTION HONGROISE

CANADIAN DIPLOMACY AND  
THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION

1.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in United Kingdom*

TELEGRAM SS-220

Ottawa, October 26, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE

Repeat Paris, Washington, New Delhi, Canberra, Belgrade, Pretoria, Wellington.  
(Immediate).

Repeat New York (Information).

HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND THE U.N.

1. As State Department has unfortunately already announced, USA has consulted us and others about feasibility of taking Hungarian situation to United Nations. USA Minister asked us this morning for our reactions to two possible courses of action which might be taken collectively by as many of the signatories of the Hungarian peace treaty as wish to do so:

(a) A letter might be sent to Security Council to invite attention to situation created in Hungary by employment of Soviet forces against Hungarian people to repress demands to enjoy human rights and freedom affirmed in Charter and guaranteed by peace treaty; letter would urge Council members to keep situation under review to determine whether it is liable to endanger peace and security, and if so what constructive steps Council might take;

(b) Alternatively Security Council resolution could be submitted provided for establishment of committee to determine facts and report results of findings to the Council.

2. We are interested in this idea especially if India and Yugoslavia take an active part and would see some advantages in inviting USSR to join in sponsoring this or amended proposal although they would probably reject it. If they did by any chance accept, it might provide only foreseeable context in which Hungarian leaders could talk officially to the West.

3. In any case we would hope U.N. action might facilitate an end to the fighting on terms which would be better than mere repression of anti-Soviet rioters. Rebels are reported this

morning to have appealed to U.K. (and perhaps others) to take Security Council action. In circumstances a letter to Security Council is probably all Western group of peace treaty signatories can do. However, if USSR would participate fact finding committee might have more than propaganda value.

4. Grateful for your comments and (except for Washington) those of your Foreign Office on USA suggestion.

5. (Belgrade only) Your USA colleague has authority to approach Yugoslav government at his discretion but may have decided not repeat not to do so.

L. B. Pearson

2.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in United Kingdom*

TELEGRAM SS-222

Ottawa, October 29, 1956

Confidential. Immediate.

Repeat Paris, Washington, New Delhi, Canberra, Belgrade, Pretoria, Wellington.  
(Immediate).

#### HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND THE U.N.

Following is the text of the letter<sup>16</sup> addressed today by our Permanent Representative in New York to the Secretary General of the UN. Text begins. In accordance with instructions from my government, I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Canada fully approves of the initiative taken by the Governments of France, the UK and the US in requesting on October 27/56 that the Security Council should concern itself urgently with the situation in Hungary arising out of foreign armed intervention. In this connection I should like to draw your attention to a statement made on October 27 by the Honourable L.B. Pearson, Secretary of State for External Affairs, a copy of which is annexed. Text ends.

2. Following is the relevant portion of the Minister's speech on Saturday communicated by Dr. MacKay to the Secretary General. Text begins. The view of the Canadian Government is that the United Nations should immediately be seized of the Hungarian situation in order to prevent further bloodshed and to enable Hungary freely to choose its own course as a new

<sup>16</sup> Cette lettre a été demandée par des «junior officers» de la mission des États-Unis auprès des Nations Unies le 28 octobre. Mackay a discuté de l'approche des États-Unis avec Léger au téléphone. New York à Ottawa, télégramme 1037, 29 octobre 1956, MAE dossier 8619-40.

This letter was solicited by "junior officers of the United States U.N. mission on October 28. MacKay discussed the American approach by telephone with Léger. New York to Ottawa, Tel 1037, October 29, 1956, DEA file 8619-40.

member of the United Nations.

3. It will be the duty and the responsibility of the Soviet Union as well as any other member of the United Nations to work towards such a solution.

4. The forces of world opinion must be mobilized in favour of the forces of national freedom in these countries and against foreign armed intervention and foreign domination. The United Nations is where this should be and can be done. Text ends.

5. Please inform the Government to which you are accredited.

3.

DEA/8619-40

*Le haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in United Kingdom  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1484

London, October 30, 1956

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat Washington, Permision New York, Paris, NATO Paris (Information).

By Bag Warsaw, Belgrade, Prague, Moscow.

#### SITUATION IN HUNGARY

We had a discussion this morning with Brimelow, Head of the Foreign Office Northern Department, about recent developments in Hungary. Brimelow is more than ever impressed with the contrast between Nagy and Gomulka. Reports from the UK Legation in Budapest, which the Foreign Office fully accept, suggest that Nagy's own position has become increasingly, and is now perhaps almost exclusively, dependent on the support of Russian armed forces. Brimelow suggested that if these forces were really withdrawn Nagy and his government might well be lynched. He expects that the Russians will continue to try to shore Nagy up, mainly by armed force, but thinks the Russians probably under-estimate the political difficulties of this.

2. According to UK reports the overwhelming majority of Hungarians have rejected not merely Russian domination but also communism itself. The UK Legation in Budapest seems to have little, if any, confidence in Nagy's honesty, and reports that his government have repeatedly tried to trick the nationalists into surrendering by false reports of surrenders and of the conclusion of truce agreements.

3. The picture of last week's events is now somewhat clarified. Apparently it was the Hungarian security police which started shooting at the beginning and thereby turned the demonstrations into a popular uprising. By now, according to the British Legation, virtually all Hungarians excepting top communists and the security police, but including some of the latter, are bitterly anti-Russian and pro-nationalist.

4. Nagy's efforts to broaden his government have been largely unsuccessful. The UK

Legation are sceptical about the extent to which Bela Kovacs is in fact voluntarily participating in the new government. Apparently Nagy did carry out negotiations with “genuine social democrats for a real coalition government but these broke down because the social democrats stood firm on the conditions of free elections and the withdrawal of Russian troops.

5. The Nagy Government is, however, going to great lengths in its efforts to get some nationalist support. Thus the Prime Minister is reported to have stated in a broadcast that “a great national movement has taken shape of which the government approves”. Moreover, in an article entitled “A Reply to Pravda,” the Hungarian Communist Party Organ *Szabad Nep*, specifically says that “What happened was not anti-democratic, was not an adventure and did not collapse, and states that “The tragic yet uplifting struggle has not been the outcome of some undermining activity but alas had been brought about by our own errors and crimes, primarily by our failing to protect the sacred flame inherited from our ancestors –that is our national independence.” This paper puts the blame explicitly on “the criminal clique of Gero.”

6. The British Legation reported that Mikoyan arrived in Budapest on Saturday.

7. Both the USA and the UK representatives in Hungary took the early initiative of urging that their governments take action in the UN. The British representative, though he apparently started with a rather more cautious view than his American colleague, has during the past few days come to attach very great importance to action or statements which would encourage the Hungarian nationalists, who seem to have surprised everyone by showing some prospect of winning out in the end.

8. When we saw Brimelow this morning no decision had been taken about the instructions to be sent to Sir Pierson Dixon at the UN, where the Hungarian situation is expected to be discussed tomorrow, Wednesday October 31. As you will appreciate there was some confusion and uncertainty in view of the overnight developments in the Middle East. In New York Lodge had apparently suggested introducing a draft substantive resolution on Hungary asking that Russian troops be withdrawn, but it was recognised that this would almost certainly invoke a Soviet veto, and might also conceivably create an awkward precedent for other areas. Its legal basis might also be complicated in view of the Warsaw Treaty. The Foreign Office officials were inclined to approve an alternative suggestion of Pierson Dixon’s that a good first stage in the Security Council might be to introduce a procedural resolution taking note of Nagy’s public promise to ask the Russians to withdraw their troops from all of Hungary, and deciding to leave the question on the agenda to see how these negotiations come out. This, it is thought, might give an opportunity for non-Communist representatives to make helpful statements on the record while avoiding a Soviet veto and yet taking some formal action to pin Nagy down and to encourage the liberalization processes in Hungary. In any case, however, in view of the importance of speed and of agreement of the USA and France the widest discretion will almost certainly be left to the missions in New York.

N.A. Robertson

4.

PCO

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet**Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], October 31, 1956

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
 The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin),  
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),  
 The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson),  
 The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),  
 The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters),  
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),  
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),  
 The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General (Senator Macdonald),  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill),  
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),  
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler),  
 The Secretary of State (Mr. Pinard),  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin).

HUNGARY; SERVICE OF CANADIANS IN HUNGARIAN FORCES; FOREIGN  
 ENLISTMENT ACT

1. *The Secretary of State for External Affairs* said there had been a number of requests from persons of Hungarian extraction for information on the possibility of going to Hungary to fight against the Russians. Under the Foreign Enlistment Act, passed in 1937, it was an offence for a Canadian to enlist in the forces of a foreign state at war with a friendly nation. It was not an offence to take part in a civil conflict in another country unless an order in council were passed under that statute, specifically prohibiting it. The minister had said no such order had been passed in regard to this Hungarian war nor was one contemplated. Legally, therefore, Canadians could go to Hungary to join the Hungarian liberation forces. Of course, persons with Hungarian citizenship might have difficulty returning to Canada, and even people of Hungarian origin with Canadian citizenship might also find it difficult to travel without a passport.

The number of requests would probably slacken off as the Russians withdrew from Hungary. Meanwhile, it was proposed to explain the legal situation and to mention that it was not proposed to pass the type of order referred to above.

2. *The Cabinet* noted the report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs on the legal position with regard to persons in Canada joining the liberation forces in Hungary.

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in United Kingdom*

TELEGRAM SS-227

Ottawa, October 31, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Our telegram No.SS-220 October 26 and your telegram 1484 October 30.

Repeat Washington, Paris, Permis New York (Immediate).

Repeat NATO Paris (Information).

#### HUNGARIAN SITUATION AND THE U.N.

Our two aims in supporting the discussion of this question in the U.N. were to put an end to the bloodshed and to try to reach a satisfactory solution. From reports reaching us the first seems to have been accomplished, at least temporarily, and it may be that the Hungarians themselves can work out a satisfactory arrangement for the future government of their country. Latest reports of the changing Soviet attitude towards the satellites indeed are so encouraging, it seems to me that it may be advisable, in the circumstances, to postpone further discussion of this question in the Security Council until the situation becomes a little more clear, and certainly until the new Hungarian Delegation reaches New York.<sup>17</sup> It may well be in any case that Middle East developments will prevent early discussion in any event. I hope when discussion is resumed that the Western Powers can avoid the temptation to score a propaganda victory over the Russians. Depending on the course of events a good first stage could well be that suggested to you by the Foreign Office.

2. To London only: Could you please outline these views to the Foreign Office.

To Washington and Paris only: Please discuss with the State Department (Quai d'Orsay) along these lines.

To New York only: It would be useful to discuss this with your UK, French, US and Australian colleagues.

J. Léger

<sup>17</sup> Dans une importante déclaration publiée le 30 octobre 1956, l'Union soviétique a annoncé qu'elle avait l'intention de réviser ses relations avec les États socialistes de l'Europe de l'Est «so as to remove any possibility of violation of the principle of national sovereignty, mutual benefit and equality in economic relations.» Pour la déclaration, voir *Documents on International Relations*, 1956, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs - Oxford University Press, 1959, pp.465-468.

In an important declaration issued on 30 October 1956, the Soviet Union announced its willingness to conduct a searching re-examination of its relations with the socialist states of Eastern Europe "so as to remove any possibility of violation of the principle of national sovereignty, mutual benefit and equality in economic relations." For the declaration, see *Documents on International Relations*, 1956, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs - Oxford University Press, 1959, pp.465-468.

6.

E.R./Volume. 8

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut-commissaire en Inde*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in India*

TELEGRAM M-604

Ottawa, October 31, 1956

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat London, Paris, Washington, Permis New York (Information).

A press despatch just received carries the story of Indian condemnation of the Israeli attack on Egypt. I have no quarrel with the Indian Government's decision in this matter but the contrast between its quick and strong denunciation of Israeli action with its complete silence over events in Hungary, and Russian intervention in these events, will have a very bad effect in this country.

L.B. Pearson

7.

DEA/8619-40

*Le haut-commissaire en Inde  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in India  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 642

New Delhi, November 1, 1956

SECRET. IMPORTANT

Reference: Your telegram [M604] October 31.

#### INDIA'S SILENCE OVER HUNGARY

I saw Pillai at noon November 1. I began by saying that when I had requested this interview a few days ago it was to give him a memorandum on the Hungarian situation and the UN. I then gave him this memorandum which embodied the text of the documents given in your telegram SS-222 October 29. I went on to say that when we had seen Dutt on October 30 on the question of the Indo-Canadian immigration agreement he had asked me to stay on for a few minutes alone. He had then expressed India's concern over the newspaper reports of the

Israeli invasion of Egypt.

2. At that time I had said to Dutt speaking personally that he had no doubt seen that there was already criticism in North America over the silence of Nehru over Hungary. It was impossible to conceive of any situation affecting a Western power which would parallel that which had arisen in Hungary. Suppose however there had been a popular revolution in Spain against Franco and USA troops had at Franco's request participated in quelling the revolution. I was sure that if that had occurred there would have been an outcry in the Indian press.

3. I said to Pillai that not repeat not only had there been silence by Nehru over Soviet armed intervention in Hungary but there had been a statement by Krishna Menon on October 28 that developments in Hungary were internal matters for the Hungarian people.

4. My fear that Indian silence on the Hungarian situation would cause criticism in North America had been confirmed by the message that I had received this morning from you. I then read your message making clear that I had not repeat not been instructed to transmit it to him but that I felt that he ought to have it. I said that I would draw to your attention the fact that there had been no repeat no separate Indian condemnation on the Israeli attack on Egypt and that you must be referring to the statement of the official Indian spokesman on October 31 condemning the Israeli attack on Egypt and the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt.

5. Pillai at first took strong exception to my remarks. There was no repeat no parallel between what was happening in Egypt and what had happened in Hungary. Because of the Warsaw Pact and the request by the Hungarian government for Soviet assistance in quelling the revolution a cloak of legality had been cast over the Soviet action. I replied that that cloak had been cast aside when Nagy had denied that the Hungarian government had requested Soviet intervention. Pillai said that if Canada criticized India for not repeat not having come out strongly on Soviet action in Hungary he might similarly criticize Canada for not repeat not having yet issued a strong public denunciation of the aggression of Israel, France and the UK against Egypt.

6. I said I would not repeat not have spoken to him about your message to me if the question was one of recrimination. The discussion of the question of Hungary was however still pending before the Security Council. Would it not repeat not be possible for Nehru in the course of the next few days to make his position clear. The people of Hungary had put on one of the most gallant demonstrations of courage which the world had seen in many years. They had been fighting for national freedom against foreign domination. I could if I wanted to quote statements made by Nehru during the course of the Indian struggle for freedom which could be applied unchanged to the Hungarian struggle.

7. Pillai said that I was the only diplomatic representative here who had expressed to him criticism of Indian inaction in relation to Soviet aggression in Hungary. The Prime Minister's time was so occupied that it would be impossible for Pillai to speak to him about what I had said. We felt that if he were to report in a memorandum it would have an unfortunate effect. He suggested that the next time a convenient opportunity arose when I was talking to Nehru I might raise the matter with him delicately perhaps not repeat not in reference to Hungary but in reference to what might happen in another country e.g. Romania.

8. I had hoped that by raising this issue I might evoke from Pillai the reply that though India had remained silent in public it had brought pressure to bear on the USSR through diplomatic channels. Unfortunately no repeat no such approach was made to the USSR. The only action which the Prime Minister did take to show his sympathy for the revolutionaries in Hungary was to give orders that the telegrams which he had received from Hungarian emigrés

imploing his assistance should be published since he wanted the people of India to know that he was in touch with these emigrés.

9. From my experience in the past in dealing with Pillai I think that what I have said to him of your views may encourage him to urge Nehru if not repeat not to say something about Hungary soon at least to speak quickly if another situation on the Hungarian pattern arises.

10. I should be glad to know if you wish me to pursue the matter with Nehru the next time I see him.

E. Reid

8.

DEA/8619-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1084

New York, November 2, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

Repeat London, Washington, NATO Paris, Paris (Information).

#### HUNGARIAN SITUATION

Under present plans there will be a Security Council meeting on the Hungarian situation at five pm today called at the request of UK, USA and France. A resolution will be presented and the USSR is expected to veto it. The USA will then move that the question be considered by the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly under the Uniting for Peace Resolution.

2. According to the UK delegation it is most unlikely that the General Assembly would meet on this item today. It is expected however that it will meet to take this up tomorrow assuming that the procedure in the Council goes as expected.

3. The USA, UK and French delegations have not yet agreed on the draft resolution to be introduced in the Council. They are meeting at three pm and we shall forward this resolution to be introduced later in the Assembly.

4. Apparently no new Hungarian representative has presented his credentials although there are confused stories to the effect that a new Hungarian representative may be available by the time the meeting is called.

9.

DEA/8619-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1089

New York, November 3, 1956

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris (Information).

#### SITUATION IN HUNGARY

Our telegrams yesterday may have given the impression that the USA, the UK and France were in agreement on the tactics and purposes of the treatment of the Hungarian item. Our info now, confirmed by the statements and attitudes taken at yesterday's Security Council meeting, is that only the UK and France were actively seeking a Soviet veto in order to have a General Assembly meeting on the Hungarian question. The USA was apparently determined to proceed more cautiously, to await clarification of the situation in Hungary, and was not prepared to rush a resolution into the Security Council designed chiefly to reap a Soviet veto. Statements made by both Dixon and Guiringaud in the Council yesterday were much more sharply anti-Soviet than Lodge's statement. The keynote of Lodge's statement was his assertion that "We must now get all the facts so that whatever we do will be done in a sure-footed way and will be really helpful. Guiringaud on the other hand said his government had instructed him "To ask for an urgent meeting of the Security Council so that the Council may adopt an appropriate resolution. If that resolution were to prove impossible of achievement because of a veto we would have to envisage the immediate convening of a meeting of the Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly."

2. In the course of the meeting the Hungarian Permanent Mission in New York, whose First Secretary had been allowed to sit but not speak at the meeting, circulated a note to the Secretary-General transmitting a further letter dated November 2 from Nagy to the effect that large Soviet military units had crossed the border of the country marching toward Budapest. The text of the letters from Nagy of November 1 and November 2 to the Secretary General are given in a following telegram.<sup>18</sup>

3. The Council adjourned until 3.00 p.m. today. We have learned from the USA delegation that a resolution has been approved in Washington which is not as strong as the UK and France would want it. The USA is now prepared to put this resolution forward by itself if it cannot get UK and French agreement. The USA hope that the resolution would not come

<sup>18</sup> Pour les notes de Nagy, voir Nations Unies, Assemblée générale, Documents officiels, deuxième session extraordinaire d'urgence, Annexe, document A/3251, p.1 et Nations Unies, Conseil de sécurité, Documents officiels, onzième année, Supplément d'octobre, novembre et décembre 1956, document S/3726, pp.119 à 120.

For the Nagy notes, see United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records, Second Emergency Special Session, Annex, Document A/3251, p.1 and United Nations, Security Council, Official Records, Eleventh Year, Supplement for October, November and December 1956, Document S/3726, pp.119-120.

to a vote today so that the situation created by a probable Soviet veto can be delayed. In some circumstances they would be prepared to transfer this question to the Assembly but "the present circumstances are not the right ones". Their concern is no doubt partly the desire to have all the facts and not to take hasty action on Hungary but also, we believe, a desire to keep the emergency session of the General Assembly free of other issues until it has dealt fully with the Middle East crisis.

4. The UK and French delegations on the other hand are still pressing for the early moving of a resolution calculated to get a veto followed by immediate action to take the question up in the Assembly.

10.

DEA/8619-40

*Projet de note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Draft Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External  
Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, November 3, 1956

#### SITUATION IN HUNGARY

The information from Hungary is contradictory and confusing. We are dependent almost entirely on newspaper reports, and I understand that even the missions in Budapest itself can only get a partial idea of the situation. Nevertheless, the following preliminary comments on what is happening there might be of use over the weekend.

2. There seems to be little doubt that the Soviet troops, under pressure from the almost universal revolt against Soviet domination, did withdraw from Budapest. The entire Hungarian army and air force went over to the rebels and only remnants of the secret police sided with the Russians. The present government is a coalition, still headed by Nagy. The old Communist Party of Hungary has been dissolved and reformed as the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party of which Janos Kadar, the closest equivalent to a Hungarian Tito, is First Secretary. Four other parties are now represented in the government. The most important are the Smallholders Party and the Social Democratic Party. Public pressure is continuing for the resignation of three former Stalinists from the key portfolios of the Interior, Iron and Steel, and Coal and Electricity.

3. It is still uncertain how much prestige or authority this government has, since revolutionary committees, both civilian and military, appear to have been set up in other cities of Hungary, and their aims and ideas concerning tactics vary enormously. The main thing they all seem to have in common is their violent anti-Russian and anti-Communist feeling.

4. With regard to the military situation, it is reported that Soviet armoured columns have entered from the U.S.S.R. and Romania. Our military intelligence estimates Soviet strength in Hungary has increased to at least three divisions. Armoured columns have closed off the

Austro-Hungarian border and telephone communications between Vienna and Budapest appear to have been cut. The main airports, railways and highways are said to be controlled by Soviet forces.

5. Radio Budapest has announced that the Hungarian government has communicated three notes to the Soviet Ambassador in Hungary concerning a protest about the entry of new Soviet troops into the country; the immediate withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary; and the commencement of immediate negotiations to determine the relations between the U.S.S.R. and Hungary on the basis of equality and independence.

6. Nagy has also sent a message to the United Nations Security Council announcing Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and Hungary's permanent neutrality, calling on the United Nations for support. Our information is that the Warsaw Pact has no provision for withdrawal of any State before the expiration of the twenty year period under which it is valid. We have not yet secured the text of the resolution which the United States delegation intends to submit to the Security Council.

7. The vacillation of the Soviet authorities over the Hungarian situation are due, in my opinion, to the following factors:

- (a) The speed with which the Titoist movement in Hungary spread into a violent anti-Russian and anti-Communist revolt;
- (b) Probable divisions of opinion in Moscow as to the course of action to be followed by the U.S.S.R.;
- (c) The diversion caused by the Suez crisis, giving time and excuse for the Soviet leaders to return to a policy of force in Hungary;
- (d) The strongly anti-Soviet attitude adopted by the Hungarian government, probably under strong popular pressure;
- (e) Fear of western intervention in Hungary, accentuated by the willingness of the British and French to risk war by actually attacking an important member of the United Nations.

8. Our latest reports are that the Russians have commenced negotiations with the Hungarians in Budapest. We have no more information than that, but I would suspect that the Russians will now demand as a minimum the stationing of Soviet troops in Hungary and the formation of a government which maintains at least the pretence of being partially Communist. The Anglo-French defiance of the United Nations presumably will make them feel in a stronger position to resist United Nations demands and to insist with the Hungarians on a measure of Soviet control. In my view, one of the most disastrous consequences of the Middle East adventure is the excuse now given to the Russians to regain at least partial control of their satellites. The whole aim of NATO and the Western Alliance was to maintain the strength of the West in the hope that some day the Russians could be persuaded to agree to a more permanent type of peace for Europe. It was in our hands to see the Russian threat to Europe brought back right to the borders of the U.S.S.R. It is now quite possible that we have thrown this away.

9. The Russians are nevertheless still faced with a dreadful dilemma in Hungary. They can, if they wish, destroy the present government and the Hungarian Nationalists. The remnants of the Hungarian Communists are completely discredited, but they have escaped to Moscow. They could be restored in Budapest, but there can be little doubt in the Soviet mind that they would have to be maintained by force. In view of the complete lack of success of the Hungarian Communists in maintaining control of the country and a reasonable economic

standard, and in view of the complete opposition throughout the country in every sector of national life to both Communism and the U.S.S.R., it seems doubtful that the Soviet leaders who have shown a willingness to accept the realities in Poland, would be foolish enough to think that such a situation would be permanently possible or profitable.

10. The Soviet leaders must equally, however, have been appalled at the speed with which the Hungarian Nationalists were prepared to withdraw their country from the Soviet orbit and the violence of the anti-Russian sentiments displayed. I do not think that they can tolerate the division of their Satellite empire into a northern and southern tier by the loss of Hungary, or permit the possibility of this country being built up as an anti-Soviet base, something they must undoubtedly fear. They probably suspect, therefore, that the Hungarian government's request for neutrality is simply the first step in bringing Hungary completely over into the Western camp.

11. It is not in the interests of the Western powers to attempt to push things too fast in Eastern Europe, though in all truth we have been completely passive in the events played out in Budapest. The Hungarians have set the pace from the beginning. The Russians themselves have announced their willingness to renegotiate the basis of their relations with the Eastern European countries, and indeed they are now talking of a Commonwealth of Socialist States. Before the Suez crisis really broke on us, they had also announced their willingness to negotiate the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. If it had been possible for the West to take a diplomatic initiative at this time, this would have been the best possible moment to announce our willingness to negotiate the withdrawal of Western forces from Germany in return for the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Eastern Germany and all of Eastern Europe. The collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe would have followed almost immediately with the withdrawal of Soviet forces. The effect on the military strength of NATO could hardly have been greater than the effect on the military strength of the U.S.S.R. On the other hand, the West would have gained a tremendous political victory, but as it is the unity and military effectiveness of NATO is sadly shaken without any commensurate political gain.

12. One last thought is that unless the West gives some expression of its solidarity with and sympathy for the Hungarians, we will have lost the last remnants of our prestige in all of Eastern Europe. We can hardly expect that the Romanians and Czechs will attempt to shake off the dominance of Moscow if the Hungarian battle is lost. I am not suggesting material aid, which is clearly impossible. But some kind of political initiative and support would clearly have been of great moral and political aid to the Hungarians.

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 1099

New York, November 4, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris (Information) By Bag Karachi and Ankara from London, Delhi from Ottawa.<sup>19</sup>

## SITUATION IN HUNGARY

In view of the increasing seriousness of the reports from Hungary of Soviet military intervention, the Security Council met again on the Hungarian question at 3 am today and voted on a US resolution calling upon the USSR to desist from any form of intervention and deploring the use of Soviet military forces. This resolution was defeated by the Soviet veto. The representative of Yugoslavia said that he could not take part in the vote since he had no instructions. A second US resolution referring the question to the General Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure was then adopted by ten (including Yugoslavia) in favour and one against (USSR).<sup>20</sup>

2. The second Emergency Special Session of the Assembly was then convened at 4 pm today. The agenda item on Hungary was adopted by 53 votes in favour, 7 against (Soviet Bloc) and 7 abstentions. There was no Hungarian representative at the meeting since the Hungarian Mission here had notified the Secretary General that they had no credentials valid for this second Emergency Special Session. On the vote to adopt the agenda all members of the Afro-Asian group except Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Cambodia, Ethiopia, Liberia and Thailand either abstained or were absent. Yugoslavia abstained.

3. Early in the debate the USA delegation put forward a draft resolution (text follows in separate telegram)<sup>21</sup> which condemns the use of Soviet military forces to suppress the

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<sup>19</sup> Note marginale:/Marginal note:

Repeat by tel for info to New Delhi. Done. L.F. Nov 5/56.

<sup>20</sup> Pour de plus amples renseignements sur ces deux résolutions, voir United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, Volume XXV, Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1990, pp.388-389. For additional information on these two resolutions, see United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, Volume XXV, Washington D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1990, pp.388-389.

<sup>21</sup> La version finale de cet avant-projet a été réimprimée au United States, Department of State, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume XXV, pp.392-393. The final version of this draft is reprinted in United States, Department of State, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume XXV, pp.392-393.

efforts of the Hungarian people to reassert their rights and requests the Secretary General to investigate the situation caused by foreign intervention in Hungary and to report as soon as possible to the General Assembly. My statement supporting this resolution has already gone forward.<sup>22</sup> After about ten speakers had been heard it was proposed, although there were still many names on the speakers' list, that a vote be taken immediately and that the remaining speakers be heard later. With the exceptions noted above, no member of the Afro-Asian group was inscribed on the speakers' list.

4. In the vote 8 members of the Soviet Bloc (including Poland) voted against the USA draft resolution (Hungary was not represented). The following 15 countries (Arab-Asian members plus Yugoslavia and Finland) abstained: Libya, India, Ceylon, Indonesia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Jordan, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen and Yugoslavia and Finland. The remaining delegations (including Pakistan, Iran, Liberia, Turkey, Thailand, Cambodia and Ethiopia) voted in favour. Laos and Lebanon were absent.

5. The Assembly will meet again on this item, probably tomorrow, to hear the remaining speakers and explanations of vote. The latter, from the Afro-Asian group, should be interesting, if indeed any explanations are made. Lall told me at the beginning of the meeting that he could not take any part in the proceedings because he had no instructions. Since this no doubt seemed pretty lame, he added that in any case it was not proper to consider an item entitled "the Hungarian question the absence of properly accredited representatives of Hungary."

6. There is no need to underline the significance for the UN and for the relations between Western and Asian countries of this vote.

L.B. Pearson

12.

DEA/8619-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 7, 1956

#### SITUATION IN HUNGARY

To clear our minds before attempting any interpretation of the events of the last month in Hungary, it is necessary to set forth as clearly as possible, from a welter of sometimes contradictory reports, a chronology of events.

2. In 1953, after Stalin's death, Imre Nagy became premier and sought to shift emphasis somewhat away from heavy industry and in favour of consumer goods production. Early in

<sup>22</sup> Voir Canada, ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Affaires Extérieures*, vol.8, N° 11, Novembre 1956, pp.347 à 348. See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *External Affairs*, Vol.8, No.11, November 1956, pp.334-336.

1955, after Khrushchev and Bulganin came to power, Nagy went out and Rakosi re-assumed the dominant position as Party First Secretary. He sought to re-assert the primacy of heavy industry and to re-establish the political controls which had been loosened slightly under Nagy's régime. In July 1955, under mounting pressure from intellectuals and the people at large, and as a result of the logical development of Titoism, he resigned. He was replaced as Party First Secretary by Geroe, a Stalinist associate; and Hegedüs, another "tough lineman, became premier.

3. Early in October, as if in response to the ferment in Poland, there was further unrest among students and intellectuals. Budapest was the scene of a mass march of 200,000 for the re-burial of Rajk who had just been "re-habilitated after his execution for Titoism in 1949. Rakosi fled the country, but Geroe remained at the helm and attended the Black Sea talks with Khrushchev and Tito.

4. On October 23, student demonstrations in Budapest erupted into violence involving both the Hungarian security police and Soviet troops. Geroe is credited with asking for or condoning the use of Soviet forces in an attempt to suppress the initial uprising. On October 24, Nagy, known as a national deviationist and regarded as the most popular of the Hungarian Tитоists, replaced Geroe. The Communist Party of Hungary was dissolved and re-formed as the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party with Kadar still First Secretary. The government was re-formed as a coalition, including members from other parties of which the most important were the Smallholders Party and the Social Democratic Party.

5. The governmental shuffles were not enough to avert a week of violence and confusion. It is impossible to sort out the aims of the various rebel groups which sprang up, for they ranged from national communist across the political spectrum to democratic socialist, peasant and possibly even farther right. They seemed to have no concrete or integrated plan or policy. Initially they demanded a representative government, the resignation of Rakosi associates, economic reforms, freedom of speech and assembly, democratic elections and withdrawal of all Soviet forces. As the shaky government yielded on these initial demands, violently anti-Russian and anti-communist elements among the rebel groups eclipsed the Tитоists. Nagy was pushed further and further in his attempts to accommodate the ever-increasing demands of the rebel groups. He announced the end of collectivization of agriculture. He demanded and temporarily obtained the evacuation of Soviet forces from Budapest. He sought the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Hungary and, after new Soviet units began to move into Hungary, he announced, on November 1 and 2, Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and called on the United Nations to support Hungary's "permanent neutrality".

6. The deployment of Soviet troops is of some significance. Our best information - although it cannot be regarded as entirely firm - is that when the revolt began on October 23, Soviet forces in Hungary consisted of two divisions totalling 32,600 men. As the rebels gained strength, the Russians began a military build-up on October 25. Between October 25-27, one division of 15,000 men was moved in from the USSR and, on the latter date, 10,000 men were transferred to Hungary from Romania. By this time there were four Soviet divisions of 60,000 men in the country. On October 29, the Soviet forces began to withdraw from Budapest at the insistence of the insurgents and Nagy and in accordance with the promises of Zhukov and Shepilov.

7. On October 30 came the statement from Moscow defining Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe. We do not know whether the terms of this declaration encouraged Nagy and the rebel leaders with whom he was beginning to identify himself to go still further to satisfy

the anti-communist and anti-Russian elements in the uprising, or whether Nagy's realization that the USSR had reinforced their military position in Hungary caused him to denounce the Warsaw Pact on November 1 and demand publicly the withdrawal of Soviet forces. His appeal to the United Nations on November 2 to support Hungarian neutrality suggests that fear was stronger than an attempt to placate the anti-communists. By denouncing the Pact he may also have wished to destroy the legal basis for the presence of Soviet troops. Whatever Nagy's motives the immediate Soviet reaction was to send three more divisions into Hungary from the USSR between November 1 and 3 (thus increasing their total strength in Hungary to seven divisions totalling about 200,000 men) and attack Budapest with three divisions on November 4. They clearly were not prepared to permit Nagy to take Hungary out of the Warsaw Pact and align it with Austria outside the Soviet security system. As the United States representative pointed out to the NATO Council, the Soviet's declaration of October 30 could be interpreted as not applying to a non-communist Government.

8. The first Soviet statements about their readiness to negotiate for the withdrawal of Soviet troops were made before Nagy's declaration of Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact. Even after this declaration, as additional troops were being moved into Hungary, the Russians agreed to a meeting between the Soviet and Hungarian military commands on November 3 to discuss withdrawal. The seizure of Nagy, allegedly for condoning the counter-revolution, at the time negotiations were actually in progress, must be seen as an act of duplicity comparable only to the imprisonment of the sixteen Polish leaders who were asked to come to Moscow in 1945 to discuss the future government of Poland.

9. A new puppet government of "workers and peasants has been set up, headed by Kadar, who has accommodated himself to the new situation. It includes Apro, a supporter of the Nagy programme; Munnich, a former Rakosi associate (Defence and Internal Security); three former socialists and left-wing syndicalists, compromised by long collaboration with Nagy; and Horvath, dropped by Nagy as Foreign Minister and now restored to the post. The stated aims of the puppet régime set up by then Soviet high command, as announced by Radio Moscow on November 4, are given in an annex to this memorandum. They appear designed to persuade the Hungarians that democratization will continue, but the phrases about national independence will seem very hollow to a people subjected to ruthless military repression for going too far and too fast. At the time of writing the rebellion was almost over though pockets of resistance were still holding out.

10. With this chronology of events before us, we must try to analyse the significance of the drastic measures to which the Soviet Union resorted in order to impose its will on a rebellious Hungary.

11. The first important thing to be kept in mind is that the Soviet Union is experiencing grave difficulties in its control in Eastern Europe. These difficulties stem from the Soviet rapprochement with Tito, the doctrine on "differing paths to socialism" adopted by the Twentieth Party Congress, the strong nationalism of the countries of Eastern Europe, the failure of ten years of Soviet control to improve the standard of living of the satellite peoples, and in most of these countries the disastrous failure of the economic programmes. For a wide variety of reasons, the Soviet Union would probably still like to work out a new relationship, based on the declaration of October 30, which would maintain the close relationship between the USSR and its satellites but would leave the satellites with a greater measure of independence at least as to internal policy. But this will depend in large measure on their estimate of the military situation.

12. The Soviet interest in the satellites is political, economic and strategic. It must be recognized that the Soviet Union considers it essential:

(a) that the satellite régimes be at minimum well-disposed to a close or at least friendly relationship with the USSR;

(b) that the Eastern European economies continue to be closely linked with that of the Soviet Union; and

(c) that, either through the presence of Soviet forces or the maintenance of effective satellite military forces willing to align themselves with the Soviet Union in the event of war, the satellites continue to provide defence in depth to the USSR. It was only when these three essentials seemed to be threatened, i.e. that Hungary might break completely with the Soviet bloc, that the Soviet Union resorted to full-scale force to impose its will.

13. The mistake of the rebels, and of Nagy for trying to keep pace with their demands, was in trying to go too far and too fast. The pattern of the whole operation suggests that, while prepared to use force, the Russians would have preferred to have avoided military action as they did in Poland. The ambivalent approach to Nagy and the Hungarian revolt in the course of the critical week may well be a further reflection of differences of opinion within the Soviet leadership as to how best to handle their problems of imperial control. Mr. Johnson has reported some evidence in Moscow that the army leaders seemed depressed by the Soviet policies in Poland and Hungary, and elated when the attack on the Hungarian rebels was decided on. If strategic arguments were paramount in reaching this decision, then it seems logical to expect an increase in the influence of the military. As of this date, Johnson reports no real sign of a decrease in the influence or importance of Khrushchev. The Soviet Union probably decided reluctantly upon its drastic action, only when the potential defection of Hungary threatened to divide the Soviet Empire into a northern and southern tier. The Soviet leaders must have anticipated the extremely adverse reaction of world public opinion, but this was less important than the possible loss of Hungary and the fear that, if they did not take a firm stand in Hungary, the revolt might spread to other satellites.

14. The chronology of events and the assessment of the probable Soviet reasons for full-scale armed intervention cast some light on the relationship between the Soviet action in Hungary and the Anglo-French action in Egypt. The Anglo-French action and the United Nations discussion of it undoubtedly created a sensational diversion of international public attention and probably helped relieve the anxieties the Russians must have had about reaction abroad. But the fact that troop movements began three or four days before the Israeli attack on Egypt and the fact that three additional divisions were ready to move in immediately Nagy denounced the Warsaw Pact suggests that the Anglo-French action was not the dominant factor in determining the ultimate course of Soviet action, which was determined primarily by military necessity. The scale and timing of their action and the logistic preparations obviously required for mounting such an operation suggest that the decision to deal with Nagy by force if necessary was not directly related to Anglo-French action in Egypt.

15. It is conceivable, however, that the Russians might have been deterred from taking this drastic action if the attention of the world had been fully concentrated on Hungary, and if the Western powers had been firmly united, but the facts tend to disprove this. Nevertheless, had the West not been pre-occupied with the Middle East, we might then have been able to take diplomatic initiative to guarantee Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe, or possibly to take advantage of the declared Soviet willingness to discuss the withdrawal of troops from

Hungary, Romania and Poland.

16. In addition the readiness of the British and French to use force in Egypt might have reinforced the military argument that the USSR could not at that moment afford to risk that Hungary would not only be separated from the Soviet bloc, but might also be used as a spring-board for western incursions against the USSR.

17. But the Soviet dilemma has by no means been solved by their intervention by force to suppress a revolution which they themselves must recognize represented the vast majority of the Hungarian population. In the first place they have to all intents and purposes lost one of the satellite armies. The Kadar government, in spite of its announced programme, will be loathed by most Hungarians and will be able to stay in power only with the support of Soviet troops. Hungary will certainly for some time to come be a political and economic liability.

18. Armed intervention in Hungary and its brutality have dealt the international prestige of the USSR a severe blow, though its impact on Asian-Arab opinions has been largely lost because of the diversion of opinion in the East and the Middle East crisis. Its effect on Soviet policies in general will be very great, but it is too early to tell in exactly what direction the Russians will now move.

19. In subsequent papers I shall submit some suggestions as to the policies we might consider in the light of the developments in Hungary. I am also preparing papers on Soviet policy in the satellites in the light of the Hungarian revolt,<sup>23</sup> and the situation in Poland.

J. Léger

13.

PCO

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet*

*Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 7, 1956

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
 The Minister of National Health and Welfare and Acting Secretary of State for  
 External Affairs (Mr. Martin),  
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg), (for afternoon meeting only)  
 The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters),  
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),  
 The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris),  
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),  
 The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General (Senator  
 Macdonald),  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill),

The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),  
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler).  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin),  
 The Economic Adviser, Privy Council Office (Mr. Lamontagne).

...

#### RELIEF FOR HUNGARY

22. *Mr. Martin, as Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*, considered that a substantial effort would be required to relieve, even in a small degree, the distress of the Hungarian population and to make them feel they had not been deserted by their friends in the west. Whether relief supplies would continue to be allowed into the country was uncertain, but large amounts would be needed in any event to sustain the 15,000 or more refugees who had already escaped. A considerable amount of assistance was already reaching Vienna but much more would be needed.

The Canadian Red Cross had so far devoted some \$28,000 for Hungarian relief and it could draw on the \$600,000 remaining in the old European Flood Relief Fund. However, it was not anxious to exhaust this fund since other emergencies would likely arise for which it would be needed. To supplement existing resources, a campaign was being organized by Hungarian groups in Canada to secure voluntary contributions which would be paid to, and administered by, the Red Cross. These activities would not likely meet the situation and a material gesture by the Canadian government appeared desirable, not only to meet the needs of the Hungarians, but also to encourage Canadians to contribute to the campaign being organized. Such action would also be in accord with recent U.N. resolutions urging member governments to assist.

The Minister recommended that Canada offer assistance through the Red Cross either by donating 2,000 tons of butter or, preferably, by contributing \$1 million for relief purposes in Hungary or among Hungarians who had left their country since the uprising began. If the latter proposal were acceptable, a portion of the funds might be turned over at once to the High Commissioner for Refugees. The money involved in both cases might be met from the vote for unforeseen expenditures or by Governor General's warrant, or a combination of both methods.

An explanatory memorandum was circulated.

(Acting Minister's memorandum, Nov. 5, 1956; Cab. Doc. 219-56) +

23. *The Minister of Finance* said he preferred the second form of assistance. However, the vote for unforeseen expenditures was not adequate and he would not like to use a Governor General's warrant. Perhaps, an immediate contribution of \$100,000 as an earnest of the government's intentions would suffice for the moment and the Red Cross could arrange to finance the remainder on a temporary basis. The full amount might be voted at the special session to be called as a result of the contribution to the U.N. police force.

24. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) Should any of the proposed contribution not be used for purposes described, it should be returned to the Receiver General and not be retained by the Red Cross for other purposes.

(b) Although one could not be sure that Canadian supplies would not reach people in Hungary, it would be undesirable for any contribution to be made at this time for relief purposes in Hungary itself. Austria was faced with a serious problem in dealing with the

refugees, especially as there had been a poor crop and a food shortage was possible.

(c) A request had been made to permit exemptions for income tax on contributions to a fund being organized in Montreal. The law would appear to allow exemptions in these circumstances, but the Department of National Revenue had ruled in the past that to claim them, the organization concerned had to conduct the whole operation for which it was established and not just collect funds to pass on to others. It would be preferable if those wishing to help Hungarian refugees were to make their contributions to the Red Cross and exemptions could then be granted in the usual way.

(d) Before reaching a decision on the proposal, the Department of External Affairs should make it clear to the Red Cross that the money should be used for refugees outside of Hungary and ascertain also if part of any grant should be paid direct to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.

25. *Mr. Martin* reported later that the Red Cross would use any grant for assistance to refugees not in Hungary, and also that the High Commissioner for Refugees needed funds urgently. He suggested that one grant of \$100,000 to the Red Cross and another of the same size to the High Commissioner be approved in principle now for use in assisting refugees, to be paid when funds were available.

26. *The Cabinet* noted the report of the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs on relief for Hungary and agreed,

(a) that \$100,000 be contributed to the Canadian Red Cross for the relief of refugees who had left Hungary since the recent uprising in that country began, on the understanding that as much materials and supplies be procured in Canada as possible, and that any portion of the grant not used for the purposes specified be returned to the Receiver General;

(b) that \$100,000 be contributed to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the same relief purposes; and,

(c) that detailed financing arrangements be settled subsequently by the Treasury Board, but that, as an earnest of the government's intentions, \$50,000 be made available immediately from the unforeseen expenses vote of the Department of Finance.

...

14.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council*

TELEGRAM SS-245

Ottawa, November 8, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat Permis New York, Washington, London, Paris, Bonn, Rome, Brussels, Delhi

(Most Immediate).

By Bag Moscow, Prague, Belgrade, Oslo, Hague, Athens, Ankara, Cairo, Tel Aviv, Beirut, Pretoria, Wellington, Canberra, Karachi, Colombo, Djakarta, Geneva from London.

By Bag Warsaw, Vienna, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Lisbon, Madrid, Tokyo, Berne from Ottawa.

#### HUNGARIAN SITUATION

1. The following are the summary conclusions of a longer departmental paper on events in Hungary. It has not yet had ministerial approval and must necessarily still be considered somewhat speculative.

(1) The Soviet Union probably decided to quell the Hungarian rebellion by force (a possible necessity which it had prepared for at the first signs of serious trouble) only when it became clear that Nagy had lost control of the situation and was merely riding the crest of the rebels' ever increasing demands. His concessions and demands meant the end of Communist control and the withdrawal of Hungary from the Soviet Bloc. For political,

economical and, most important, strategical reasons, the Soviet Union could not permit this. It would have preferred the maintenance of essential control by less violent means but felt forced to intervene to prevent Hungary's total defection.

(2) The duplicity of the Russians in this action should be noted. During the week when Soviet troops were being moved into Hungary, Bulganin and Zhukov were consistently denying these movements to Western diplomats in Moscow. Moreover, the Russians were actually mounting their full-scale assault on Hungary at the same time as they were offering to negotiate and holding discussions with the Hungarians for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops.

(3) By its action in Hungary, the Soviet Union has seriously impaired its line of peaceful co-existence and the possibilities for better relations, in all fields, with the West. Unfortunately, the impact on Asia-Arab opinion has been largely dissipated because of diversion of attention to the Middle East.

(4) The timing and pattern of troop movements into Hungary, and the necessary logistical preparation for those movements, show that the Soviet Union was prepared to take drastic action to cope with the Hungarian situation, if it got out of hand, *before* the Israeli attack on Egypt and *before* the Anglo-French action in Egypt. While the latter offered a sensational diversion of international public opinion for action which the Russians decided was necessary for them to take, and thus minimized for the West a great political and propaganda advantage, it cannot be considered as the primary motivating factor for the Russians. 2. As you know, both the Prime Minister and the Minister have condemned the Soviet action in Hungary in forthright terms, and Canada voted for the USA resolution on Hungary at the Special Session of the General Assembly. 3. (For NATO Paris only) You may use this analysis in discussions in the NATO Council. 4. (For other missions) You may use this analysis at your discretion with the Foreign Ministry and with diplomatic colleagues.

15.

DEA/5475-EA-4-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, November 9, 1956

My dear Colleague:

I am most grateful to you for the very prompt action which you took to give priority in selection to Hungarian refugees and to extend the assisted passage loan scheme to them. I know this offer by Canada, as well as the grants of \$100,000 each to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees and the Canadian Red Cross, is greatly appreciated by all who are concerned with the plight of these unfortunate people. I see in this morning's paper that wide publicity is being given in Austria to our offer.<sup>24</sup>

I should like to raise with you the possibility that, in the case of Hungarian refugees, we might adopt a more liberal policy than would be applicable to a regular immigration operation. I am afraid that, if we stick rigidly to the usual health and job training requirements, Canada's offer to give priority will seem a rather meagre one compared with what I understand are unconditional quota offers by a number of other countries. If the word gets around, as it is bound to, that we are willing to take only the hale and the hearty and that we are leaving those whose need for help is greater to other countries, then it is bound to reflect adversely on Canadian willingness to help.

You are no doubt aware that a number of outstanding applications from Hungarians have already been approved by your Department. They concern persons with close relatives in Canada who had been denied exit permits by the Hungarian authorities. It is conceivable that some of these applicants may have fled Hungary along with other refugees. If any in

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<sup>24</sup> Le 6 novembre 1956, J.W. Pickersgill a publié le communiqué suivant: "With the approval of the Prime Minister and in accordance with the general policy of the Government respecting refugees, the Canadian Immigration Office in Vienna has been instructed to give priority to applications from refugees from Hungary. Assisted Passage Loans will be available to such immigrants on the same terms as to other immigrants from Europe. Des instructions semblables ont été communiquées aux agents d'immigration en poste à Londres, à Paris, à LaHaye, à Cologne, à Copenhague, à Rome, à Bruxelles, à Stockholm, à Oslo et à Berne. En outre, Pickersgill a annoncé que les réfugiés hongrois n'avaient pas besoin de parrains canadiens ou de répondre aux exigences professionnelles habituelles. Voir Canada, ministère des Affaires extérieures, Affaires Extérieures, vol.8, N°11, p.337.

On November 6, 1956, J.W. Pickersgill issued the following statement:

"With the approval of the Prime Minister and in accordance with the general policy of the Government respecting refugees, the Canadian Immigration Office in Vienna has been instructed to give priority to applications from refugees from Hungary. Assisted Passage Loans will be available to such immigrants on the same terms as to other immigrants from Europe. Similar instructions were issued to immigration officers in London, Paris, The Hague, Cologne, Copenhagen, Rome, Brussels, Stockholm, Oslo and Berne. In addition, Pickersgill announced that Hungarian refugees did not need to have Canadian sponsors or meet the normal occupational requirements. See Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, Vol.8, No.11, p.325.

this category should present themselves to Canadian immigration officials along with other refugees I think it would be desirable that they be given special consideration in view of the fact that their applications have already been approved.

I need not emphasize the domestic and international political desirability of making it clear that Canada is taking an unselfish interest in the plight of the Hungarian refugees. I hope, therefore, that it may be possible to waive for the present purposes some of the conditions which, while admirably suited to normal immigration, do not fully meet the requirements of the present urgent situation.

Yours sincerely,  
L.B. Pearson

16.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut-commissaire en Inde*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in India*

TELEGRAM SS-251

Ottawa, November 9, 1956

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

## HUNGARY

I am grateful for your prompt and effective efforts to bring to Mr. Nehru's attention the apparent discrepancy between his attitude to the situation in the Middle East and that in Hungary. His UNESCO statement was perhaps all that we could have hoped for and Menon's statement at the UN on the same issue has been welcome.

2. In view of Menon's cooperative and not unreasonable attitude so far in New York, we should not, I think, press further at the risk of turning the Indians sour. You must protect your excellent position in Delhi and not endanger it too much on the Hungarian question. It would be preferable, I think, if your note to Nehru remained unofficial and personal, since it has in any case achieved its purpose.

L.B. Pearson

17.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au haut-commissaire en Inde*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to High Commissioner in India*

TELEGRAM SS-252

Ottawa, November 9, 1956

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your telegram 684 of November 6 and my telegram SS-245 of November 8.

## SITUATION IN HUNGARY

If you wish to show my SS-245 to any members of the Indian government you may wish to expand verbally on the conclusions of its paragraph 4.

2. The Soviet military build-up from two divisions began at least as early as October 25 and reached a total in Hungary of four divisions by October 27 and of possibly nine divisions by November 3. The Russians attacked Budapest on November 4 with three divisions and set up a puppet communist government under Kadar which promises only a limited number of the rebel demands.

3. The timing and pattern of Soviet troop movements into Hungary, which required extensive logistical planning, show that the USSR was ready to take drastic action before the Israeli and Anglo-French action in Egypt. The latter action has diverted foreign and Soviet public opinion from a resort to brutality, the only course of which the Soviet leadership is capable when its vital interests are threatened by a genuinely nationalist movement, and cannot be considered as the primary motivating factor for the Russians.

18.

DEA/8619-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le premier ministre*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
for Prime Minister*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], November 12, 1956

## SOVIET INTERVENTION IN HUNGARY

Soviet armed intervention in Hungary cannot help but have a profound effect throughout the world and upon relations between Canada and the Soviet Union. Here, and in New York, we have been engaged in efforts to determine what we can best do to stop the bloodshed in Hungary and to take advantage of the difficulties which the Soviet Union is facing in its

European empire.

2. For the moment, I think the best thing we can do, apart from extending material assistance to the Hungarian people and the Hungarian refugees, is to give whole-hearted moral support to the condemnatory resolutions which the General Assembly has passed. We voted on November 4 for the first resolution, and on November 10 for the supplementary Italian, U.S. and Austrian resolutions.<sup>25</sup> To my mind, the most important thing is to bring it in upon the Russians that, by their own actions, they have shattered whatever confidence in their intentions the world had begun to entertain, and that they stand alone and isolated before world public opinion. At the same time I think we must not go so far that we nullify whatever chances may remain of moderating to some extent the severity of Soviet repression by a genuine humanitarian appeal.

3. With this in mind, I have drafted for your consideration the attached message to Premier Bulganin. If you agree, I propose transmitting it through our Ambassador in Moscow. It might later be published.

4. I would also like to suggest that you call in the Soviet Ambassador, Mr. Chuvahin, to impress upon him the extremely unfavourable reaction which Soviet actions in Hungary have caused in this country. You might tell him that, if the Soviet Union persists in this course of action, it is idle to speak of improving relations in any field between Canada and the Soviet Union. You might also read out to him the message which you have sent to Premier Bulganin to impress upon him the seriousness with which the Canadian Government and people view the events of the last few days.

5. The attached message was shown to Mr. Pearson before he left again for New York. He was in two minds about sending it and suggested that another way of coping with the matter would be for you to call the Soviet Ambassador in and give him orally the substance of the message. Mr. Pearson said he would like to leave it to you to decide which you thought was the better course of action.

J. Léger

19.

DEA/2462-40

*Le premier ministre  
au président du Conseil des ministres de l'Union soviétique*

*Prime Minister  
to Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Soviet Union*

Ottawa, November 13, 1956

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<sup>25</sup> Pour de plus amples renseignements sur ces trois résolutions, voir United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, Volume XXV, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1990, pp.428-429.

For additional information on these three resolutions, see United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1955-1957, Volume XXV, Washington, United States Government Printing Office, 1990, pp.428-429.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I consider it my urgent duty to let you know that the people and the Government of Canada have been profoundly shocked by the reports we have received of the actions your Government has taken in Hungary during the last few weeks. We have made our attitude clear in the position taken by Canada in voting for the United Nations resolutions on this subject. I wish to add my plea not only for rapid compliance on the part of the Soviet Government with these resolutions, but for a display even at this late date of moderation towards the unfortunate victims of these tragic events.

I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that I speak for the whole people of Canada in expressing our horror at the suffering of the Hungarian people as a result of their efforts to obtain the freedom to choose their own type of Government. It is not, however, my present purpose to attempt to pass judgment on the actions that have been taken but to ask you, in the name of humanity, to use your influence to alleviate the sufferings of the Hungarian people and to permit competent international agencies and organizations to help in the urgent work of distributing food and caring for the sick. In this humanitarian work the Canadian Government and people are already giving material support wherever it is within their power to do so.

The Government and people of Canada have no desire to influence the form of Government chosen by the peoples of Eastern Europe. Our only aim is that they should be free to do so, and that the Governments so chosen should steer their own independent courses, respecting the equal rights of all their neighbours and bearing in mind only the needs and wishes of their own people in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter.

Yours sincerely,  
Louis S. St. Laurent

20.

DEA/8619-40

*Le haut-commissaire en Inde  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*High Commissioner in India  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 764

New Delhi, November 13, 1956

TOP SECRET (CANADIAN EYES ONLY). IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your KK-150 November 12. +

#### NEHRU AND HUNGARY

This morning November 13 I had a 25 minute conversation with Nehru in his office just before the opening of the Colombo Prime Minister's meeting at 9:30.

2. I began by thanking him for granting me an interview at a time when I knew he was even more pressed than usual. I had reported to you that it was expected he would be making

a considered statement on Indian foreign policy in Parliament November 14. You knew that he was receiving information about events in Hungary from India's own missions abroad and from friendly governments. Canada had some information which you wished me to give him. Normally I would have given the information to Pillai for transmission to him but I was under instructions that the information contained in one of the documents was not repeat not to be committed to writing but was to be given orally (meaning your SS-252 November 9).

3. I then handed him a memorandum embodying your SS-245 November 8. Before I had a chance to go on with the oral expansion of paragraph 4 of the memorandum Nehru said that the essential charge in the Departmental paper was of "duplicity against the Russians, that their statement of October 30 was "eyewash". However both Russia and China keep striking forces always ready. It is therefore possible that the decision to move into Hungary had been taken after October 30.

4. I said that another telegram which I had received from you demonstrated that the Soviet build-up had begun as early as October 25 and had reached a total in Hungary of four divisions by October 27 and of possibly nine divisions by November 3. Thus by October 30 when the Soviet statement was issued the number of Soviet troops in Hungary was already somewhere between four divisions and nine divisions. I then read to him slowly the operative paragraphs of SS-252.

5. Nehru said we had to go back beyond the actual Anglo-French invasion of Egypt. UK and France had been moving troops in the Mediterranean from August on. The implications of this would make it necessary for the USSR to begin to make its own troop dispositions.

6. I said that I had nothing to go on except the information [in] your 252, but I failed to follow Nehru in his reference to a connection between the Anglo-French military build-up in the Mediterranean and the Soviet mobilization against Hungary beginning on October 25.

7. Nehru said that what we were both doing was trying to make logical deductions from the information in the telegram I had read to him. It was clear and here he mentioned the Yugoslav interpretation of events in Russia that for some months there had been 2 groups within the Russian government pulling in different directions. One group was prepared to allow the trends towards liberalization in Poland and other Eastern European countries to continue; the other considered it dangerous to let these get out of hand. We must remember the mentality of the Russians in respect of Eastern Europe. They consider that the USA by various means is "constantly inciting the people of Eastern Europe to revolt".

8. The mere fact that the Soviet military build up against Hungary had begun at least as early as October 25 did not repeat not necessarily mean that the tougher group in the Soviet government had won out by that time. When on a critical issue opinion within a government is divided it is often necessary for a government to authorize preparations for the action which would have to be taken in the event the Government finally comes down in favour of one side or the other. Thus the fact that by October 25 the Soviet government had authorized a military build up against Hungary did not repeat not necessarily mean the Soviet government had then decided on a tough policy against Hungary. It could mean merely that the Soviet government had authorized the build up in case the government finally accepted the views of the tougher faction.

9. I agreed that undoubtedly what he had said of the way any government would act was correct. I drew his attention however to an article in the *Hindustan Times* this morning on the genesis of the Hungarian revolution which referred to the initial spark being the huge student demonstrations on October 23. I said it was surely significant that the other faction in the

Soviet government was strong enough only 2 days after the first student demonstration to get authority for what amounted to partial mobilization against Hungary.

10. Nehru said that just as there had been indications for some days ahead of the launching of the attack that Israel was going to attack Egypt -indications so strong that Eisenhower had made representations to the Israel government -so also there could have been indications to Russia even before the student demonstration of October 23 in Budapest that the Soviet position in Hungary was going to be threatened. I said that so far as I could recall the only public advance notice had been a statement about 2 days before October 23 that the students of Budapest were going to put on a peaceful demonstration.

11. Nehru said that what he was thinking of was the process of liberalization which had started in Poland a good deal earlier and which the Russians must have known would affect Hungary.

12. Group corrupt to Nehru's remarks about conflicts between 2 groups in Moscow. I said that I had a copy of a telegram of November 5 from our Ambassador in Moscow which gave his interpretation of what had been happening there. I then handed Nehru a memorandum embodying Moscow's telegram 367 November 5+ Since it was now about 9:20 I went on immediately to say that the only other document I had to give him was one containing extracts from a statement you had made at a press conference on November 9 on the rejection by the USSR of the UN resolution to send supplies to Hungary.<sup>26</sup> I gave him a memorandum embodying the information in your telegram YY-606 November 10.

13. Without giving him a chance to comment I went on to say that there (was?) one pleasant matter I would like to bring up. I spoke about the International Police Force along the lines of my telegram 763 November 13+ and we then had a few minutes talk about Nehru's hope that he would be able to visit Canada.<sup>27</sup> On this I am also reporting separately.

14. At the end of our talk Nehru said that while the agenda for Parliament for November 14 did state that he was going to give a speech on international affairs it would not repeat not be possible for him to do so because of being tied up with the meetings of the Colombo Prime Ministers. Consequently the speech had had to be postponed to November 16. I said I was looking forward to hearing him that day.

15. My conversation with Nehru was most depressing example of his willingness to find the least blameworthy explanation of every step the USSR has taken in respect of Hungary.

E. Reid

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<sup>26</sup> Voir/See The Globe and Mail, November 10, 1956, p.2.

<sup>27</sup> Voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires étrangères et du commerce international, Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada, 1956-1957, Volume 22, TomeII, Ottawa, Ministère des Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux, le document 692.

See Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Documents on Canadian External Relations, 1956-1957, Volume22, PartII, Ottawa, Department of Public Works and Government Services, Document 692.

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet**Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 14, 1956

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
 The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe),  
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),  
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),  
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),  
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),  
 The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General and Acting Minister of Justice (Senator Macdonald),  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill)  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin),  
 The Registrar of the Cabinet (Mr. Halliday)

## IMMIGRATION; HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

21. The *Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* reported that he had had an opportunity, when recently in Toronto, of explaining at a private meeting of the heads of organizations representing new Canadians from European countries behind the "Iron Curtain", what the plans of the Canadian government were to help Hungarian refugees wishing to emigrate to Canada. This had been a timely opportunity as there had been considerable misrepresentation in Toronto as to these plans and views had been advanced that the proposed priorities for such refugees were mere talk and would be nullified by immigration red tape.

He had explained that orders had been given to immigration offices that all Hungarian cases were to be given first priority that no application by a Hungarian was to be turned down on account of any technicality, and that the ordinary rules of sponsorship would not apply so that a request from anybody reasonably able to look after a refugee would be considered and dealt with promptly.

22. *Mr. Pickersgill* added that, so far, there had been very few cases coming forward. The reason was, no doubt, that the refugees in Austria were mainly women, children and old men who were in too dazed a condition to think about emigration and were only concerned with keeping alive. This situation might well alter in the future, however. He felt the immigration officials in Toronto were doing a good job and were making Hungarian Canadians and others concerned realize that the Federal government was interested and sympathetic at this time of difficulty. The United States proposals to admit an additional 5,000 Hungarians had received

considerable publicity but it was not realized that it was merely a proposal to place a bill to this effect before Congress. At the moment it meant nothing. Also, in his opinion, it would be inadvisable to contemplate establishment of any refugee camp in Canada. Only those refugees should be taken who could take employment or who could be looked after by others. The equivalent expenditure would provide direct relief for far more persons in Europe than in Canada.

23. *The Cabinet* noted with approval the report of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on the explanation he had given in Toronto about the immigration proposals to assist Hungarian refugees.

...

22.

DEA/5475-EA-4-40

*Note du chef de la Direction européenne  
pour le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Head, European Division,  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], November 14, 1956

#### CANADIAN AID FOR HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

In my memorandum of November 9, 1956,+ I pointed out that our contribution to this problem was not as generous as it first appeared and that we ought to try to liberalize our regulations with regard to the admittance of Hungarian refugees unless we were to be exposed to considerable criticism. This has already commenced as can be seen from the attached editorials in the *Toronto Telegram*<sup>28</sup> and the *Globe and Mail*,<sup>29</sup> among others, which refer to the attitude of the Immigration Department as double-talk with little practical significance. The *Montreal Gazette* of this morning also suggests that Mr. Pickersgill will face criticism in Parliament for the policy he announced respecting the entry to Canada of Hungarian refugees.<sup>30</sup> Annexed are a few excerpts from the press, and some typical editorials.

2. I attach a telegram of November 13 + from the Canadian Delegation in New York which indicates that other countries have agreed to admit Hungarian refugees as follows:

Argentine	- 3,000 children
Australia	- 3,000
Belgium	- 4,000
France	- as many as wish to go

<sup>28</sup> Voir/See Toronto Telegram, November 12, 1956, "Let Hungarian Refugees In,p.8.

<sup>29</sup> Voir/See The Globe and Mail, November 12, 1956, "The Gains,p.6.

<sup>30</sup> Voir/See Arthur Blakely, Montreal Gazette, November 14, 1956, "Ottawa Day by Day,p.8.

Netherlands	- 1,000
New Zealand	- 500
Sweden	- 1,000
Switzerland	- 2,000
United Kingdom	- 2,500
United States	- 5,000
Germany	- 3,000
Italy	- 2,000
Israel	- all Jewish refugees

In addition, it would appear that the United States administration is making a special effort to cut through the red tape in order to admit the refugees immediately.

3. Dr. Stanbury, of the Red Cross, phoned me this morning to give me a report on the interview which the Head of the Hungarian-Canadian Federation had had on Monday with Mr. Pickersgill in which an attempt had been made by the Hungarians to secure details of what our immigration policy really is. The delegation, according to Dr. Stanbury, is extremely dissatisfied as they were not able to get any clarification on what the immigration policy means in regard to the following points:

(a) sponsorship -financial aid is apparently still required; and

(b) health -Mr. Pickersgill said that they were prepared to accept some substandard health risks but that it was up to the sponsors to secure the approval of the provinces. If this were not forthcoming all the refugees would be required to meet medical standards and other normal immigration requirements.

4. Dr. Stanbury told me that the Red Cross has had in the past, in a few humanitarian cases, been required to deposit bonds with the provinces accepting immigrants with a risk of T.B. He added that the tragedy of it seemed to be that there were many empty T.B. beds all across Canada but he saw little hope of cutting through red tape. He did add, however, that he was worried about the reaction of the Hungarian-Canadians when it became entirely clear to them that in fact Canada was not proposing to give any assistance to the refugees in the way of admitting them to this country except in cases which would be obviously profitable to Canada.

5. As this question has internal political, as well as international, implications, you may wish to let the Minister know. So far as I am aware Mr. Pickersgill has not yet replied to Mr. Pearson's letter on the subject.<sup>31</sup>

R.A.D. Ford]

<sup>31</sup> Note marginale:/Marginal note:

Please have telegram prepared to minister. It could take the form of a draft telegram he could send from N.Y. to Mr. Pickersgill. J.L.Éger

*Note du secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le Cabinet*

*Memorandum from Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Cabinet*

CABINET DOCUMENT NO.222-56

Ottawa, November 15, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL

RELIEF FOR HUNGARY

It will be recalled that on November 7 the decision was taken to make available the amount of \$200,000 for the relief of Hungarian refugees. One half of this amount is to be assigned to the United Nations Refugees Fund, the other half to the Canadian Red Cross Society for emergency relief of refugees from Hungary.

The decision concerning those relief arrangements for refugees from Hungary (who are mainly in Austria, where their number has been estimated at some 15,000 (now reported as increased to 21,000)) was taken at a time when it appeared that the Red Cross might be prevented from bringing effective assistance to the tens of thousands of people suffering acute distress in Hungary. Although reports are far from complete, it is clear that shortages of food, medical supplies and shelter are critical in Budapest and other parts of Hungary. Red Cross authorities in Vienna have informed the Canadian Red Cross Society that shipments of butter, wheat, flour and dried milk would be particularly welcome.

On November 9 the General Assembly resolved by 67 votes in favour (including Canada), none against and 8 abstentions "to undertake on a large scale immediate aid for the affected territories by furnishing medical supplies, foodstuffs and clothes", and called upon all Member States "to participate to the greatest extent possible in this relief action".

Despite opposition from Soviet sources the Red Cross has now been able to begin effective relief operations within Hungary, and it is believed by Red Cross authorities that they will be able to maintain and expand the relief services which have begun with the arrival of the first two convoys. In view of the large number of people in acute distress, and the extent of the physical damage to the city of Budapest, it seems clear that the relief required will be on a massive scale.

As the original contribution approved last week was to be limited to the relief of refugees, and as effective relief activities on what will undoubtedly prove a substantially larger scale are now being undertaken by the Red Cross within Hungary, the Government will no doubt wish to consider whether a contribution should be made to the support of this latter relief programme.

The political arguments in favour of such a contribution are obviously powerful. The entire world has been stirred with admiration for the heroism and determination of the Hungarian people in their bitter opposition to their Soviet oppressors. Their struggle has been a lonely one, since the risks of causing a greater catastrophe in the form of a general war have, amongst

other reasons, prevented the western countries from providing any military assistance. We must nevertheless welcome the persistence of Hungarian opposition, even though it may be passive rather than military from now on, for it will make more difficult that Soviet control of Eastern Europe which it is our objective to diminish. The Hungarian revolt has been the first major proof that Soviet indoctrination and methods of control have not been successful, despite ten years of Soviet effort, and we must assume that opposition will continue in one form or other. As the Hungarian opposition is striving for the goals we consider desirable, we should give it whatever help we can. This opposition will be less effective if the people of Hungary come to consider themselves deserted or neglected in their hour of need. It is to be hoped that they will understand why western countries could not intervene militarily, but they would find it very difficult to understand a failure to assist them in the ways that are open. Emergency relief assistance is their most immediate need, and one which Canada and other western countries can meet.

Information on action being taken or contemplated by other governments is far from complete, but the latest reports will be made available for the discussion of this memorandum by the Cabinet. It is perhaps appropriate to mention here, however, that the Government of the United States has already offered to provide relief assistance to a total of twenty million dollars, and President Eisenhower stated on November 14: "We should -try -to get into Hungary as much as we can to help out these unfortunate people". The Soviet Government has announced that it will provide relief supplies of various types to Hungary, in at least some cases free of charge. This no doubt will have some effect in relieving distress, even though distribution of these supplies is unlikely to be impartial and present indications are that the scale of Soviet relief, though substantial, will not be adequate to meet the requirements. Poland, having itself recently asserted a measure of independence from Soviet control, has announced that voluntary contributions from the Polish people for Hungarian relief have been provided to the extent of \$2 million. This is of course desirable. Nevertheless it is important on humanitarian as well as political grounds that the western countries should extend substantial aid to be distributed impartially to those in distress in Hungary.

In view of the urgent need, the political considerations mentioned, the desirability of balancing aid to those Hungarians who have stayed in their country with that already provided for those who have fled, and the probable efforts of other governments including the United States, it is suggested that the Government might make an additional contribution of eight hundred thousand dollars to provide for emergency relief in Hungary. This might best be done by making this sum available to the Canadian Red Cross Society, to be drawn on as needed to finance the provision of supplies for utilization in Hungary by the International Red Cross. In informing the Canadian Red Cross Society of this contribution it would be appropriate to suggest that to the extent practical and economical the money be used to provide supplies of Canadian origin.

In this latter connection there are several possibilities that come to mind. It appears that a most acute need is for foodstuffs; hence some of the money, up to perhaps some \$300,000 could be used to provide butter from Government stocks. There is also the fact that the proposed trade agreement with Hungary would have provided for the supply of Canadian wheat to Hungary. The conclusion of that agreement has been suspended, but there is some indication that Hungarian authorities may, in any case, approach us concerning a possible wheat sale. The provision of Canadian wheat as emergency relief might usefully precede the sale of wheat if that should subsequently prove possible and desirable. Indeed a particularly

favourable impression would probably be created, both in Hungary and elsewhere, if milled flour could be made available promptly to alleviate the acute food shortage. This might be done by arranging for the release of flour from commercial stocks in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, to be replaced in due course from Canadian sources.

Another possibility, which would have to be carefully studied in terms of the supply situation in Europe, would be the provision of powdered milk. There is no Government stock of this commodity, but it is believed that there are supplies available in commercial hands which might perhaps be suitably packaged for emergency distribution. Consideration might also be given to the provision of powdered eggs, which it is understood may become surplus in Canada within the next few weeks.

I therefore recommend that the Government make an additional offer of eight hundred thousand dollars, to be made available as required to the Canadian Red Cross Society, for relief in Hungary, subject to the condition that the Red Cross must be able effectively to supervise the distribution of relief and ensure that it is provided impartially to those in need. I recommend further that the use to be made of the money should be discussed with the Canadian Red Cross Society, in order to encourage the provision, to the extent practical and economical, of appropriate supplies of Canadian origin. Finally, I recommend that an immediate announcement be made of this offer and of the Government's intention to request the necessary funds from the forthcoming Special Session of Parliament.

[L.B. Pearson]

24.

DEA/5475-EA-4-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au chef de la délégation à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Chairman, Delegation to United Nations General Assembly*

TELEGRAM SS-275

Ottawa, November 19, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

#### HUNGARIAN REFUGEES

Following for the Minister: I am sending you in my immediately following telegram + text of aide-mémoire left on Friday by Austrian Chargé d'Affaires, in which Austrian government, in pressing appeal, asks us to share heavy burden of taking care of high number Hungarian refugees still entering Austria.

Mr. Pickersgill (who returns Ottawa from Vancouver tonight and leaves for Europe probably next Saturday) has not yet replied to your letter on subject of November 9. You then recommended to him that we might adopt, in the case of the Hungarian refugees, a more liberal policy than would be applicable to a regular immigration operation, in view of the internal political, as well as international, implications. It has since appeared that our contribution on

this question was not as generous as we first thought. Criticism is already being voiced in the press and among Canadians of Hungarian origin that our regulations regarding admittance of Hungarian refugees are not sufficiently liberal. For these reasons, it is suggested that you might raise again this matter with Mr. Pickersgill on an urgent basis. Following is text of telegram you might wish to send him directly from New York, if you agree.

“My department is sending you text of aide-mémoire in which Austrian government, in pressing appeal, asks that we continue with other friendly governments to share in taking care of high number of Hungarian refugees still entering Austria.

Austrian request adds further weight and urgency to proposal I made in my letter to you on this subject of November 9, that we might adopt in the case of the Hungarian refugees a more liberal policy than would be applicable to a regular immigration operation. Considering the unconditional offers made by numerous other countries, it appears that our contribution on this question has not been as generous as might be hoped. I also understand that criticism on this score is already being voiced in the Canadian press and among Canadians of Hungarian origin.

Again I need not emphasize the domestic and international political desirability of making it clear that Canada is taking an unselfish interest in the plight of the Hungarian refugees. I hope that you will be able to give this important matter your urgent consideration and that it will be possible to waive most of the non-political immigration requirements in this urgent and exceptional situation.<sup>32</sup>

[J.] Léger

25.

DEA/50128-B-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council*

TELEGRAM SS-282

Ottawa, November 21, 1956

SECRET. IMPORTANT.

Reference: My telegram SS-260 November 13.+

Repeat London, Washington, Paris, Bonn (Information).

By Bag Moscow, Stockholm, Belgrade, Prague, Warsaw, Vienna.

#### THE SITUATION IN EASTERN EUROPE

The NATO countries were caught completely napping by the events in Hungary, and, of course, the Middle East diversions prevented us from concentrating our diplomatic resources

<sup>32</sup> On ne sait pas très bien si ce message a déjà été envoyé à Pickersgill.

It is not clear whether this message was ever sent to Pickersgill.

on this problem. It would be disastrous if this were to be repeated and I am therefore advancing a few ideas which might be put forward when this question is next discussed in the NATO Council.

2. The dilemma for the Russians, of course, is that they have seriously endangered their policy of co-existence and the position of the Communist parties in Western Europe, in order to keep Hungary in the Soviet bloc, and to protect their strategic position. They might now very well wish to establish a national communist régime in Hungary which would, however, remain an integral part of the Soviet bloc, but it seems doubtful that they will be able to govern except by a military régime.

3. This is bound to have its effects on the other satellites, and in Poland and Yugoslavia. The brutal repression of Hungary is likely to discourage other revolts. In Poland it may have the effect of slowing down the too rapid evolution towards national communism, but will also add fuel to the anti-Russian, anti-communist fires.

4. It is difficult, therefore, to see how the Russians can simultaneously suppress Hungary and the satellites, and yet continue the Khrushchev policy towards Yugoslavia, and tolerate the evolution of Poland.

5. It is this dilemma which might precipitate another crisis, with all the implications for the West since either Soviet policy carries with it the seeds of further unrest. If there should be an outburst in Poland, it would certainly arouse the strongest of feelings in the West, possibly with considerable pressure "to do something". If it should happen in Czechoslovakia, with an open frontier on the West, then the pressure to help the Czechs might be overwhelming. Admittedly there seems little likelihood of an outbreak in the latter country, but it cannot be dismissed entirely.

6. We must be prepared then for two eventualities, either that violence should spread; or that the evolution towards national communism in Poland, Hungary, and possibly the other satellites continues. This requires an early clarification of the kind of positive, and above all joint, action the Western Powers can take to meet either possibility, since the only thing we can be sure about is that the situation will not remain static.

7. In the event of another outbreak of violence, as suggested in paragraph 5, we would presumably want to rule out military action, since this would mean world war, but there may be ways to bring non-military action to bear in addition to the UN.

8. In the event that violence does not spread, the best hope probably lies in encouraging "gradualism" in the evolution of Eastern Europe. As a start, now that jamming of foreign broadcasts has ceased in Poland, we might counsel the Polish people to exercise patience in order to avoid another Hungarian catastrophe. We are already taking steps here to make sure that the tone of our CBC-IS Polish broadcasts is not inflammatory.

9. This, of course, has another aim of not confirming Soviet fears and suspicions of ultimate Western aims in Eastern Europe. This is intimately connected with a new Western policy (and propaganda) which would try to re-assure the Russians on their security problem. In this connection, there are many variations on the theme of guaranteeing legitimate Soviet security interests in Eastern Europe, which could be discussed.

10. Ultimately our aim should be to help the Russians to see that the examples of Yugoslavia, Poland and Hungary prove that they can only combine the two aims of protecting their security and maintaining communist régimes by the use of brute force; and that the most they can hope for in the long run is neutrality for Eastern Europe along the lines of Yugoslavia. This, of course, should not be our proclaimed policy, but discreet encouragement

of the Gomulka régime and the national communists would be a first step in the right direction. This must be done very carefully, however, and not at the risk of frightening the Russians into thinking we were trying to detach Poland from the Soviet bloc.

11. If it becomes clear that the Russians were prepared to permit evolution towards national communism to develop, then some of the specific steps we could eventually take to encourage this might be: to strengthen economic ties, emphasizing the switch to consumer goods and those aspects of the satellite economies which would add least to war potential; a gradual move towards multi-lateralism (a United Kingdom suggestion), emphasizing first of all links between Poland and Yugoslavia, etc, closer diplomatic contacts, more cultural contacts, and so on. It should be underlined that this is a long-term suggestion and is very much dependent on the course of Soviet policy.

12. These are very preliminary ideas, of course, and your own suggestions and comments would be most useful. The main thing, in our mind, is to regain the initiative in an area of immense importance to the West, and at least start serious consideration of a new Western policy. The Minister agrees with the general line of thinking advanced in this telegram.

13. For London, Washington, Paris, Bonn: I should appreciate your views. If the occasion arises you might use some of these ideas with local officials in order to ascertain the thinking of the government to which you are accredited.

[J.] Léger

26.

PCO

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet*

*Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 22, 1956

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
 The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe),  
 The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann),  
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),  
 The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),  
 The Minister of Public Works and Acting Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Winters),  
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),  
 The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris),  
 The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham),  
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),  
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill),  
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),  
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler)  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),

The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin),  
The Economic Adviser, Privy Council Office (Mr. Lamontagne)

...

RELIEF FOR HUNGARY  
(PREVIOUS REFERENCE NOV. 7)

9. *The Prime Minister, on behalf of the Secretary of State for External Affairs*, submitted a further report on relief for Hungary. The number of refugees had increased considerably. Also, it was now believed that effective relief operations could be carried on inside the country itself. In view of the powerful political arguments for increasing the scale of assistance and the urgent need, the Minister recommended that a further contribution of \$800,000 be made to the Canadian Red Cross for emergency relief inside Hungary. To the extent that it was practical and economical, the money might be used for supplies of Canadian origin such as wheat, powdered milk, or powdered eggs, all of which would be useful.

An explanatory memorandum had been circulated.

(Memorandum, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Nov. 15, 1956 -Cab. Doc. 222-56)

10. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) The contribution of \$200,000 authorized so far was too small. Already pressure was developing to increase it. However, in making this increase for purposes inside Hungary, as well as outside, it was essential that the relief be handled by the Red Cross and not controlled by the present Hungarian government.

(b) In principle, it was a mistake to provide this relief. Either the revolt in Hungary would be so ruthlessly suppressed that it would be a long time before the people ever rose again, or else there would be continuous unrest and trouble. By contributing supplies was not Canada dampening down the Hungarian desire for freedom?

(c) Some pressure was likely to develop to establish refugee camps in Canada. Any such action would give rise to appalling problems. More value could be obtained, and the immediate needs of sufferers best met, by providing relief in Europe rather than by using the same money to bring refugees here. For this reason, a reasonably adequate contribution, announced quite soon, was desirable.

(d) Apart from the \$200,000 already committed to the Red Cross and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the increased funds should not be specifically earmarked. The vote should be broad enough, for instance, to cover any assessment the U.N. might make on its members for Hungarian refugee problems.

11. *The Cabinet* approved the recommendation of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and agreed that a further \$800,000 be made available for the relief of Hungarian refugees, and that Parliament be asked to approve the appropriation of \$1 million for Hungarian relief in general terms.

...

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet**Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 23, 1956

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
 The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe),  
 The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),  
 The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann),  
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),  
 The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),  
 The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters),  
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),  
 The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris),  
 The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham),  
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill),  
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler)  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin)

...

IMMIGRATION; HUNGARIAN REFUGEES  
 (PREVIOUS REFERENCE NOV. 14)

1. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* said that, until a few days ago, his officials in Vienna had been able to keep up with the applications of Hungarians to come to Canada. Now, however, these requests were being made at such a rate that they could not be dealt with as promptly as the situation demanded. As of yesterday, 657 people had applied but only 128 visas had been granted and 21 refused. If further steps were not taken to speed up processing, the feeling would grow here that red tape was nullifying the plans announced to help these refugees. He proposed, therefore, that he be authorized to waive the usual form of medical examination and to use funds, which were available in his appropriations, to charter aircraft to bring Hungarian refugees to Canada.

On the first point, all European countries had cut out their normal medical requirements. If his suggestion were approved, only a minimum medical examination would be given in Europe and X-ray and certain other examinations would be done on arrival in Canada, possibly in cooperation with the Department of Veterans Affairs. If a few cases of illness were discovered they would have to be admitted to hospital. There would probably be controversies with local

authorities as to who would look after these unfortunate people, but these would just have to be faced and settled.

As regards chartering aircraft, the Canadian Pacific Air Lines had indicated it would be willing to arrange flights at quite reasonable rates between Vienna and Vancouver over the North Pole. Landing the immigrants in Vancouver was desirable because there was a Hungarian group there who would be willing to help their former countrymen, and Vancouver had always complained that it never seemed to get enough new arrivals. He hoped, too, that chartering arrangements at similarly reasonable rates could be made with Trans-Canada Air Lines.

2. *Mr. Pickersgill* added that he had already relaxed the regulations to the fullest extent possible under the law. To do more to hasten the arrival of the refugees necessitated these further arrangements and they, in turn, involved the assistance of other departments.

3. *The Cabinet* noted with approval the report of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on proposals for speeding up the flow of Hungarian refugees to Canada and agreed,

(a) that the normal medical examination requirements abroad, including X-ray, be waived, and undertaken on the arrival of these immigrants in Canada; and,

(b) that aircraft be chartered to bring successful applicants to this country; the detailed arrangements to be made by the Minister in consultation with the Ministers of Trade and Commerce and of Transport.

...

28.

DEA/2462-40

*L'ambassadeur en Union soviétique  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Ambassador in Soviet Union  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 396

Moscow, November 24, 1956

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

#### HUNGARY

1. This afternoon Zakharov, Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, handed to me Bulganin's reply dated today to Mr. St.Laurent's letter of November 13. <sup>33</sup> Neither Zakharov nor I made any comment on reply. Zakharov said that it was not repeat not intended to publish reply.

<sup>33</sup> Notes marginales:/Marginal Notes:

Mr. Seaborn: Have we distributed to missions B's answer? R.A.D. Ford

Mr. Ford: Yes. To all those who received our telegram giving text of PM's letter. J.B.Seaborn

However if Mr. St. Laurent publishes his letter, the Soviet government will publish theirs.

2. Following is an official translation of text. "Dear Mr. Prime Minister

I have received your letter of November 13. The contents of your letter and also of your recent statements and of speeches of Canadian officials about situation in Hungary show that the Canadian government seem to have one sided tendentious and unobjective information about developments in Hungary and about position of Soviet Union on this question.

3. I would like to note that revolutionary workers peasants government of Hungary have shown in their statements that reactionary forces inside Hungary with active support of certain circles outside tried to overturn peoples' democratic régime in the country and establish a Horthy fascist régime. The inner patriotic forces of Hungary came out in defence of peoples' democratic régime asking for help of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary under the Warsaw Treaty.

4. As concerning position of the Soviet government on question of relations of Soviet Union with Hungary this has been fully set forth in "Declaration of Soviet Government on Foundation for Development and Further Strengthening of Friendship and Cooperation between Soviet Union and other Socialist States published on October 31/56.

5. In your letter Mr. Prime Minister you raise the question of Soviet government giving assistance to international organizations to make it possible for them to render assistance and help to Hungarian people in food and medicine. This question is fully within competence of Hungarian government. As far as we know government of the Hungarian Peoples' Republic has already positively solved this question and Hungarian government has formally informed Secretary General of UN about this.

Yours sincerely,  
N.A. Bulganin"  
[D.M.] Johnson

29.

PCO

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet*

*Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], November 28, 1956

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe),  
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),  
The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann),  
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),  
The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson),  
The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),  
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters),

The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),  
 The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris),  
 The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham),  
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),  
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill),  
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage)  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin),  
 The Registrar of the Cabinet (Mr. Halliday)

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#### HUNGARIAN REFUGEES; FREE PASSAGE TO CANADA (PREVIOUS REFERENCE NOV. 23)

54. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* pointed out that Canada was the only country which had not offered free passage to Hungarian refugees who wished to emigrate from Europe. If the Federal government did not do this the Ontario government undoubtedly would. For this reason, and more particularly because these people were in most instances penniless, he recommended that assisted passage be made free, both for future cases and for those who had already arrived or were en route. Admittedly this would increase the number of problem cases which would have to be looked after in the future, but he hoped that the provinces would agree to accept this responsibility as their part in this humanitarian effort. Sufficient funds were available in his appropriations, but a supplementary estimate might be required by the end of the fiscal year.

Over 90,000 refugees had reached Austria and the rate of arrivals had not decreased. So far 1200 applications had been made to come to Canada. He had no idea of how many might eventually be settled here but it did appear that those interested were excellent types, most of whom could start work immediately.

55. *Mr. Pickersgill* added that acceptance of his proposal would give rise to another problem. The Jewish Immigrant Aid Society had asked if the government would consider rendering aid to the Jews threatened with persecution in Egypt. No trouble had occurred there yet but it was a possibility to be kept in mind.<sup>34</sup>

56. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) The fact that passage was now being provided at varying rates was beginning to create difficulties. These might be overcome by treating as a debt for everyone only what amounted to tourist passage by sea, for which there was a precedent. There was no precedent, however, for completely free passage. On the other hand, this appeared to be the only just and humane thing to do and could be defended easily because of the unusual situation. In two or three months the offer of free passage could be withdrawn.

(b) Another reason for granting this further assistance was that facilities in Austria were being taxed to the limit and that country would be faced with a severe problem unless other countries did all they could to assist.

(c) It might be possible to induce the U.N. to request countries not receiving refugees to pay part of their transportation and settlement costs. It was doubtful if anything would come of

<sup>34</sup> Pour le texte d'une discussion sur ce problème, voir volume 22, document 205.  
 For a discussion of this problem, see Volume 22, Document 205.

this, however, as most nations with reasonably sized budgets were already helping directly.

57. *The Cabinet* noted with approval the report of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, and agreed that free passage be offered to Hungarian refugees wishing to come to Canada and to those who had already arrived or were en route; an announcement to be made forthwith including a statement that the Minister was proceeding to Austria to ensure that everything was being done to move the refugees to Canada as quickly as possible.<sup>35</sup>

...

30.

DEA/5475-EA-4-40

*Le ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Minister of Citizenship and Immigration  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, November 29, 1956

My dear Colleague:

I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 9 which refers to the admission to Canada of Hungarian refugees.

I can assure you that during this emergency our officers are not applying too rigidly the health regulations now in effect. Instructions have already been issued to our officers in Vienna to waive the normal X-ray procedures, should they slow up the processing of applicants. As a matter of fact, in actual practice, refusals on medical grounds are now being limited to those with contagious diseases and to those who in their own interest should obviously not be moved.

It is inevitable under this drastic reduction of our medical examination standards, that some immigrants will require hospitalization on their arrival. It is hoped that other provinces will follow Ontario's example by making provision for treatment in such cases.

There are in fact no training requirements. Our officers are instructed to accept all immigrants who are willing and able to work, but we do try to advise prospective immigrants where in Canada their particular skills are most required and what conditions they are likely to encounter.

I agree that sponsored Hungarian refugees who have already received approval from this department but who lack exit visas, should be given special consideration if they appear along with other refugees before our immigration officials. Of course the main objective at present is to keep the flow maintained. Therefore our officials cannot be spared from their already very heavy duties to seek out those who may be in this position.

In order to facilitate the movement of Hungarians to Canada, we are providing free

<sup>35</sup> Voir Canada, ministère des Affaires extérieures, *Affaires Extérieures*, vol.8, N°12, p.428.

See Canada, Department of External Affairs, *External Affairs*, Vol.8, No.12, p.412.

passage by air and sea on regular airline and ship service, and are arranging special chartered flights both to eastern and western Canada. Ocean shipping is being used to the fullest extent possible. Two hundred and fifty refugees are due in Quebec on December 8, and another four hundred on December 11th, and negotiations are under way for more space with other shipping companies.

Yours sincerely,  
J.W. P[ickersgill

31.

DEA/8508-40

*Extrait du procès-verbal de la réunion hebdomadaire des directions*

*Extract from Weekly Divisional Notes*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 3, 1956

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I. THE UNITED NATIONS

*1. Further U.N. Resolutions on Hungary*

EUROPEAN DIVISION: On November 21 the United Nations General Assembly adopted by an overwhelming majority three more resolutions on Hungary. A Cuban resolution, imputing genocide to the U.S.S.R. because of the deportations from Hungary and urging compliance with previous resolutions, was passed with 55 countries in favour (including Canada), 10 against (Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia) and 14 abstentions. An Indian resolution calling on Hungary to admit United Nations observers was adopted by 57 votes in favour, 8 against (Soviet bloc, except Poland) and 14 abstentions. Krishna Menon's statement on Hungary was the most constructive and helpful the Indian delegation has made, and the Soviet delegation was said to be surprised and angry about the Indian initiative. The Soviet bloc was isolated and split once more in the voting on a United States resolution concerning aid to Hungarian refugees, which was carried by 69 votes in favour (including Canada), only 3 against (Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Romania) and 7 abstentions (Albania, Bulgaria, Byelorussia, Poland, Sweden, Sudan, Ukraine and Soviet Union).

Following the Secretary-General's report on November 30 that Hungary had still not complied with the Assembly's request for the admission of United Nations observers, the United States, British and French delegations co-operated (for the first time since the Suez action) in drafting a resolution recommending that the Secretary-General immediately dispatch his observers to the borders of Hungary. The resolution was introduced on December 3 under the sponsorship of 13 countries, and was carried on December 4 by a vote of 54 to 10 with 14 abstentions. Mr. Roch Pinard, heading the Canadian delegation in the absence of Mr. Pearson, spoke in support of the resolution and suggested that if the Hungarian government refused to co-operate, the United Nations should take stronger measures.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Extraits du discours de M. Pinard sont reproduits dans Canada, ministère des Affaires

The Hungarian government announced on December 3, after the latest U.N. initiative was under way, that it would be willing to have the Secretary-General visit Budapest "at a later date appropriate for both parties". Mr. Hammarskjöld then conferred with Imre Horvath, the Hungarian delegate to the United Nations, and has proposed December 16-18 as the dates for his visit to Hungary.

(CONFIDENTIAL)

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32.

PCO

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet*

*Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], December 5, 1956

*Present*

The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production and Acting Prime Minister (Mr. Howe), in the Chair,  
 The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann),  
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),  
 The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson),  
 The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),  
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),  
 The Minister of Finance and Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Harris),  
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),  
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),  
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),  
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler)  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin)  
 The Registrar of the Cabinet (Mr. Halliday)

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extérieures, Affaires Extérieures, vol.9, N°1, pp.8 à 9.

Extracts from Pinard's statement are reprinted in Canada, Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, Vol.9, No.1, pp.8-9.

## HUNGARIAN REFUGEES; ARRANGEMENTS WITH PROVINCES; REPORT ON ARRIVALS

60. Mr. *Harris, as Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*, said the Saskatchewan government had presented a plan for receiving and caring for Hungarian refugees in the province which might involve substantial federal expenditure, but which might be desirable to accept and use as a basis for negotiation with other provinces.

Saskatchewan proposed to establish and administer reception centres. The Federal government would be expected to pay \$3 a day for each refugee for such time as they were in these centres. If there were any expenditures for social aid, the Federal government would reimburse the province accordingly. It was also proposed that the Federal government pay the transportation costs to these centres and from them to places of employment. As regards medical examinations and hospitalization, the province would take X-rays and give vaccinations at its expense; for the first six months the Federal treasury would pay hospital costs, for the next six they would be shared equally, and after that the province would bear the full cost. Premier Douglas had asked that this latter feature be changed so that the Federal government pay full costs for a year, after which the responsibility would be assumed by the province.

The only really serious item in this proposal might be hospitalization costs, as it appeared that it would be relatively easy to establish refugees in Saskatchewan where there was already a substantial Hungarian community and a shortage of farm labour.

61. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) It might be helpful to re-open the federal reception centres used for immigrants shortly after the war. Some of these were being occupied now as the refugees arrived and it was desirable to get the provinces to cooperate as soon as possible, particularly as the question of hospitalization would probably arise immediately.

(b) The great merit of the Saskatchewan proposal was that, at the province's initiative, it established a provincial responsibility. After a year the welfare of these refugees would be quite clearly the concern of the province. However, it had to be recognized that unless similar agreements were made with other provinces, this principle might not be generally recognized.

62. *Mr. Sinclair* reported on the arrival of the first group in British Columbia, and the arrangements made to look after them. The whole of the Hungarian state school of forestry, including faculty and students, would soon be coming to the province. The University of British Columbia had agreed to help as much as it could with this group, and accommodation had been arranged by the Powell River Pulp and Paper Company. Jobs could probably be found for most of them in the summer although the older professors might present a problem. Most members of the Hungarian State Opera Company had also indicated they wished to come to Canada, preferably as a unit. The settlement and integration of its members would obviously be more difficult.

63. *The Cabinet* noted the report of the Acting Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and of Mr. Sinclair on the arrival of Hungarian refugees and agreed, in principle, that Mr. Harris might work out arrangements with the provinces for sharing the costs of their care and welfare along the lines suggested by the government of Saskatchewan.

R.B. Bryce  
Secretary to the Cabinet

*Extrait du procès-verbal de la réunion hebdomadaire des directions**Extract from Weekly Divisional Notes*

SECRET

Ottawa, December 17, 1956

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## I. THE UNITED NATIONS

*1. Further U.N. Resolutions on Hungary*

EUROPEAN DIVISION. The announcement on December 6 that the Hungarian Government was not prepared to receive Secretary-General Hammarskjöld on December 16, as agreed on December 4, aroused a strong U.S.A. protest in the General Assembly. On December 10, the United States introduced a new draft resolution, co-sponsored by 15 other countries, calling attention to the failure of the Soviet and Hungarian Governments to comply with the previous decisions of the General Assembly concerning the withdrawal of troops and related political matters.

India, together with Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia, introduced an alternative draft resolution, and later tabled a number of amendments to the 16-power resolution designed to delete the idea of condemnation and bring it closer to the Indian draft resolution whose terms were couched in a milder and more conciliatory tone on the grounds that co-operation from the U.S.S.R. would otherwise be impossible.

The debate on these resolutions and on an Austrian resolution introduced on December 11 continued until December 12. During this period the United States resolution acquired four new sponsors, and a fifth paragraph was added to the operative part of this 20-power draft to take into account the Austrian proposal that "the Secretary-General take any initiative that he deems helpful in relation to the Hungarian problem in conformity with the principle of the charter and the resolution of the General Assembly. Austria announced that it would not press its resolution if the 20-power resolution was adopted.

In the vote on December 12, the Asian amendments were rejected, the Austrian amendment accepted, and the 20-power resolution as a whole was adopted by a vote of 55, in favour (including Canada), 8 against (Soviet Bloc with Hungary absent) and 13 abstentions (the Arab States, Cambodia, India, Indonesia, Yugoslavia and Finland). In view of this vote, India announced that the 4-power draft would be withdrawn.

On December 13, Hungary submitted a letter to the Secretary-General announcing formally that December 16 was not an appropriate date for his visit to Budapest, but that steps might be taken towards reaching an agreement "at a later date".

(UNCLASSIFIED)

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34.

PCO

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet**Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], December 19, 1956

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
 The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe),  
 The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),  
 The Minister of National Revenue and Acting Minister of National Health and Welfare (Dr. McCann),  
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),  
 The Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson),  
 The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),  
 The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters),  
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),  
 The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris),  
 The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham),  
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),  
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),  
 The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General (Senator Macdonald),  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill),  
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),  
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler)  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin),  
 The Economic Adviser, Privy Council Office (Mr. Lamontagne)

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HUNGARIAN REFUGEES; REPORT BY MINISTER OF CITIZENSHIP AND  
 IMMIGRATION

27. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* reported on his visit to Austria and other countries in Europe and on the steps taken to move Hungarian refugees to Canada. His latest information was that 135,000 refugees had entered Austria and 64,000 had departed, leaving about 70,000 to be cared for, or the same residual situation that existed two weeks earlier. Except for the United States, few countries were doing anything at the moment to relieve this problem in Austria. Most other European countries had quotas which they had already filled.

Canada was committed to take up to 10,000 refugees directly, who would enter before

the end of January. In addition, the Netherlands had agreed to provide a staging arrangement for 2,000 who would start arriving after March 1st. The Netherlands authorities had agreed to meet the basic needs of these people in the meantime, while his department would provide such amenities as were necessary. He had also arranged with the French to permit 3,000 of those in France to come to Canada, provided France agreed to admit 3,000 more from Austria. The situation in the camps in France was most unsatisfactory, largely because the refugees had been led to regard France as a communist country. His officers in going about the camps in France were doing their best to quieten fears and improve morale. In the United Kingdom he had suggested that Canada might grant visas after April 1st next to 5,000 more refugees presently in camps there if the U.K. would make arrangements similar to those made by Holland and France.

The situation in Austria was almost desperate. Before the Hungarian outburst there had been 130,000 people in refugee camps for eleven years. In two months this figure had doubled and more would continue to come as long as chaos reigned. Whether the Russians were deliberately letting people out to create trouble was uncertain but he did know that Hungarian officials were helping their countrymen across the border. Most of those who had come were healthy men, under the age of thirty-five, many of them single, and nearly all skilled in one trade or another. Once they learned English or French they would be eminently employable.

As far as reception arrangements in Canada were concerned, the situation in Ontario had not turned out to be as satisfactory as earlier indications might suggest. Except for maintaining a centre in Toronto, the Ontario government had done virtually nothing. He proposed in a few days to find out exactly what the province intended to do in the future and to make the best arrangements he could. In other provinces arrangements appeared to be as good as could be expected. The most desirable situation would be to have agreements, like the one made with Saskatchewan, with all provinces where the bulk of the refugees were likely to go.

Specifically, he now requested authority to admit in February 2,000 more refugees now in Austria, to admit a further 1,000 in January and February in aircraft chartered from the Maritime Central Airways, and to arrange for the entry beginning April 1st of 5,000 refugees at present in the United Kingdom as well as the 2,000 from Holland and 3,000 from France.

28. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) There would be very little difficulty in placing arrivals leaving Europe after April 1st. As at present they would be sent to the areas where they were wanted and where employment opportunities were best. Up to date it had been thought better not to use the services of the Unemployment Insurance Commission to place the refugees in work because of the danger of interfering with normal employment of Canadians, but that avenue of approach was open if it were needed. Practically all coming were urban dwellers so there would not be much hope of directing many to farms to relieve the labour shortage. However, instructions had been given to send forward immediately any who did have farm experience.

(b) On the whole, the university people would be integrated and taken care of very well. In addition to the school of forestry from Sopron going to British Columbia, other faculty members and students would be brought in and offers of co-operation had been received from four Canadian universities. The rumours about the opera company coming to Canada were a myth.

(c) Immigration from western Europe would increase considerably next year, particularly from the United Kingdom. The number of enquiries in the past few weeks at offices in the U.K. had increased greatly and while many persons might eventually decide

not to emigrate, most of those who did would be able and willing to pay for their own transportation. The main reason for this renewed interest was the course events had taken in the last few months.

(d) Some municipalities, particularly in Ontario, were worried over the possibility of having to care for any refugees who might become ill or unemployed. The Minister should reassure them by announcing that the Federal government would assume basic maintenance costs, if any, for the first year of residence in Canada.

(e) Refugees who wished to pay their own costs of transportation were free to do so and those who wished preferred treatment must pay too. All those who had borrowed before the recent change in policy would have their loans cancelled.

29. *The Cabinet* noted the report of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on the Hungarian refugee situation and agreed,

(a) that a further 2,000 refugees now in Austria be admitted during February;

(b) that aircraft chartering arrangements be suspended except for the contract with Maritime Central Airways, which would continue in January and February and provide transport for the admission of an additional 1,000 refugees from Austria; and,

(c) that 5,000 refugees now in the United Kingdom and 3,000 in France be admitted starting from April 1st, 1957, as well as 2,000 in Holland from March 1st, 1957.

...

35.

DEA/8619-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 21

New York, January 3, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL. IMPORTANT.

Reference: My immediately preceding telegram.+

Repeat Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris (Information)

#### HUNGARY

We understand from the USA delegation that they are attempting to dissuade the Cuban delegation from proposing the expulsion of the Hungarian delegate from the First Committee by interesting them instead in a resolution to be introduced in plenary the effect of which would be to appoint an investigating committee of governments. This move would come when the Secretary-General made his report, probably early next week, announcing the break-up of the three man observation committee. The USA proposal would be intended in part to keep the Hungarian question before the Assembly, in part to forestall wilder moves (such as a mooted resolution to impose sanctions on the USSR), and in part to relieve the Secretary-General of some of the more embarrassing aspects of the task imposed on him by the Assembly. The USA seems to have decided, at least for the present, not to pursue the plan to hear Anne Kethly

in the First Committee. As an alternative they think this new committee might hear her and probably other Hungarians.

2. We have now heard from the UK delegation that they have received new instructions which would permit them to introduce a resolution starting from the USA base but going on to name an investigating, or watch-dog committee, from among five smaller countries with missions in Budapest. The individuals would actually be members of the diplomatic missions of those countries in Hungary.

3. My reaction, which I have not yet given to the UK, is that this is not a very wise move. The Soviet bloc is bound to vote against such a resolution, and the Hungarians would probably claim it was an infringement of their sovereignty, in which case the members of the committee in Budapest would be placed in a very invidious position.

4. I would be grateful for your comments. My inclination is to try to dissuade the UK, but to support the USA move.

[R.A.] MacKay

36.

DEA/8619-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 55

New York, January 7, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL. IMPORTANT.

Reference: Our telegram 21, January 3.

Repeat London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris (Information).

By Bag Bonn, Moscow, Vienna, Prague, Warsaw, Belgrade from London.

#### HUNGARY

In view of the obvious determination of the Western Powers not to use force either to aid the Hungarian rebels, or to enforce UN decisions, there are, it seems to me, only three possible courses of action open to us:

(a) We can go on passing resolutions in the UN (with ever-decreasing majorities), which we know will not be accepted by the Russians and Hungarians, the aim of which will be presumably to continue to focus public opinion on Soviet misdeeds in Hungary;

(b) We can leave the Russians to try to work out some kind of modus vivendi with the Hungarians; or

(c) We can try to facilitate the second course or, better still, try to find a formula by which the Russians will actually leave Hungary.

2. The latter course would require an overall settlement in Central and Eastern Europe

and presumably would only be acceptable to the Russians if they became convinced that there was no long-term political and economic solution to the problem of Soviet subjugation of Eastern Europe, and if at the same time they were offered something substantial in return for their withdrawal, such as for example the withdrawal of USA and Canadian forces from Western Germany. This, however, seems hardly likely to appeal to either the Russians or the Americans at this stage, and in any case is hardly feasible if Washington is determined to approach questions such as that of the Middle East primarily on the basis of an overt struggle against Soviet aggression, and if Moscow faced with its very difficult problems in the satellites is determined not to compromise where it still holds the upper hand.

3. The difficulty with the first course is that public opinion is not likely to be aroused much longer by repeated UN resolutions which are obviously not enforceable. The West can probably better bring home to the Russians their reaction to the events in Hungary by such action as a scaling down of cultural exchanges, and so on. I think it is important that the Russians continue to be aware that they cannot embark on repressive actions in any part of the world and still gain the benefits of their policy of peaceful coexistence. But we have just about exhausted the possibilities of the UN in this connection.

4. Condemnatory, but futile resolutions, may, however, goad the Russians into taking harsher action in Hungary. The logical conclusion the Russians may eventually reach, if they are unable to establish any kind of native communist, or even semi-communist, régime in Hungary, is that they must set up an outright military government and possibly extend this to some other satellites as well. This would then be the logical time for a strong move in the Assembly, which would be that much stronger if it were not preceded by a number of inconsequential resolutions at regular intervals which had diluted its moral effect.

5. I think we must come reluctantly to the conclusion that it would be best for the Hungarians, and for the West, if the Hungarians were to come to whatever compromise they can arrange with the Russians. If Kadar is unable to make his strictly "stalinist-type régime work nor to secure support from non-stalinist or non-communist elements, then the Russians may have to take over with a blatantly Soviet military government which would surely be much worse for the Hungarians. The reaction this would produce in the other satellites might also necessitate an increase in the Soviet military establishment elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the net result being the bringing of Soviet troops in large numbers and in an ugly mood to the borders of the West. The increasing tension, the greater danger of incidents, and the increased difficulty in reaching a solution with the Russians of the problems of Central and Eastern Europe need hardly be underlined.

6. Although it may sound rather cynical I think we must conclude that the struggle for Hungary may well be over, at least temporarily, in which case our main political pre-occupation ought to be to preserve the gains made by the Poles. This would certainly not be easy if the Russians, who can hardly be in a very confident mood right now in view of the political and economic problems they face, were to decide that relations with the Western world had degenerated to such an extent that they could take no chances inside their bloc.

7. All this may, of course, happen no matter what the Assembly does, but I am now inclined to think that unless we can hit on something effective, we would do well to avoid further action intended to score propaganda victories, although naturally some measures in the UN are going to be required. Of those suggested, the move to establish an investigative committee seems the most acceptable and most effective.

8. I recognize the political unpalatability of these conclusions but I think, nevertheless, in

spite of the positions we have to take publicly, that we should clearly analyze developments in Hungary and Eastern Europe, and try to balance the necessity of giving all possible moral support to the Hungarians against the political realities and the desirability of avoiding an outright Soviet military role in the satellites. This might in the long run lead to the final downfall of the Soviet system, but in the short run it would mean added misery for the peoples of Eastern Europe, and incalculably greater risks of war.

9. Holmes and I entirely agree with this telegram which has been prepared by Ford. I should be grateful for your comments.

[R.A.] MacKay

37.

DEA/232-BG-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], January 7, 1957

Enclosed is the latest Immigration Operational Directive+ dated December 21 which you may find interesting. It revises directives which hitherto have been in use in dealing with Hungarian refugees.

2. It is evident from this that there has been a radical change in our immigration procedures for Hungarian refugees. For example, more complete medical examinations are now obligatory. In Austria only, where hitherto the medical examination has been somewhat superficial, x-rays may be waived where facilities do not exist, but elsewhere complete medical examination including X-rays and vaccination where necessary are required. Furthermore until now there has been no security screening in Austria; an oral interview is now to be given. In all other countries where previously an oral interview took place, the normal complete security check will go into effect. This is not very clearly expressed in paragraph 7 of the directive and it is understood that the question of security screening is still under review.

3. Further tightening may be seen in the instruction that the Visa Office in Vienna is to deal with sponsored cases only, within the liberalized meaning of the term "sponsor", which means any relative or friend. Processing teams in the refugee camps in Austria however will deal with all applicants within the limits set by transportation but will give priority to farm workers, students and other particularly desirable applicants. In other Western European countries excluding The Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom where special arrangements have been made, the processing of Hungarian refugees is to be limited to sponsored cases. In all other countries, e.g. Yugoslavia, normal immigration procedures are to be followed and it will therefore be impossible for Hungarian refugees now in Yugoslavia to qualify for immigration to Canada unless they have close relatives here.

4. The net effect of this is to retard the flow of refugees into Canada during the winter months. Immigration officers abroad are being asked not to publicize this slowing down of

the movement. We understand that the firm commitments made for the months of January and February, together with the 4,500 refugees who had arrived by December 31, will bring the total number of arrivals to 15,000 by March 1. No estimate has yet been made of arrivals in March but by the end of that month the movement of 10,000 refugees from The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and France for which special arrangements have already been completed will begin. On the completion of that movement therefore the total number of refugees who will have arrived in Canada should be in excess of 23,000.

Jules Léger

This makes depressing reading in the light of the 70,000 odd refugees left in Austria. I am wondering if a further effort shouldn't be made to bring more to Canada.<sup>37</sup>

J. Léger

38.

DEA/8619-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 58

New York, January 8, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL. IMPORTANT.

Reference: Ottawa telegram S-11 January 7. +

Repeat London, Washington, Paris, NATO Paris (Information).

#### HUNGARY

There has been no suggestion here that Canada would be a member of the proposed Assembly Committee. Although final agreement had not been reached the names being mentioned yesterday were Australia, Denmark, Burma, a Latin American country (Brazil, Cuba or Peru) and Tunisia. The Australian delegation has told us that Spender has instructions to seek a place on the committee and there is not likely to be any move to have both Australia and Canada on a Committee of Five.

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<sup>37</sup> M. Léger a ajouté ce paragraphe à la main.

Léger added this paragraph by hand.

39.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures au chef de la délégation à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chairman, Delegation to United Nations General Assembly*

TELEGRAM S-13

Ottawa, January 8, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your telegrams 48,+54,+ 55+ of January 7.

Repeat Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris (Information)

## HUNGARY

The Minister has agreed that you may co-sponsor the USA draft resolution.<sup>38</sup> Like you, we regard the resolution as providing a useful opportunity for tidying up a number of loose ends, as suggested in the Secretary-General's report of January 5. For one thing, it will presumably take the place of the Assembly observers who have not yet been sent to Austria to take evidence from refugees. For reasons given in your telegram 55, with which we are in general agreement, we would also hope that the present resolution would be the Assembly's last of the series unless the situation in Hungary changes drastically. A number of wavering delegations might be persuaded to vote for the resolution on this basis, but whether you can do any missionary work in this sense will, of course, depend on the attitude of the other co-sponsors.

40.

DEA/5475-EA-1-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], January 11, 1957

DISCUSSIONS WITH THE NEW UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, MR. AUGUSTE LINDT

We had a meeting with the UNHCR last week and during the discussion Mr. Lindt mentioned the following matters which are weighing on his mind:

<sup>38</sup> Pour de plus amples renseignements sur cette résolution, voir United States, Department of State, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume XXV, p.552.

For additional information on this resolution, see United States, Department of State, FRUS 1955-1957, Volume XXV, p.552.

### *I. Hungarian Refugees*

Mr. Lindt gave the figure of approximately 150,000 who have fled to Austria. (The latest figures as of January 3 which we have are 158,183 to Austria and about 2,300 to Yugoslavia.) The High Commissioner said the reason for the great surge over the Austro-Hungarian border was that the mines had been cleared from that border but not from other Hungarian borders. He also said that at the beginning of the exodus his Office roughly estimated that the majority of the first 30 to 40,000 refugees would return when conditions in Hungary became less disturbed. Then the picture changed and those coming out after the first week or so were coming out permanently. He explained this change of heart among the Hungarian refugees by saying that for years prior to the Second World War Hungary was a country of emigration; but for 16 years the normal flow of emigrants had been bottled up; the refugees wanted to start a new life in another continent. They were not interested in going to South America which had offered refuge to a small number of them because apparently they thought that South America had few opportunities for their work skills or professions. Also most of the Hungarian refugees wanted to get out of Europe.

With regard to the number of refugees, Mr. Lindt noted that anything could happen in the near future -Hungarians might continue to come out at the present rate of about 1,000 a day or, if conditions in Hungary became brutal again, there could be a quick surge of many thousands in a few days and these refugees, he said, would be mainly the "freedom fighters".

The Austrians have done a splendid job in this emergency; it has cost them at least \$6,000,000 and they cannot afford such a drain on their economy. He therefore stressed the urgent need for additional financial assistance.

The High Commissioner mentioned some of his fears -

(a) The siphoning off of Hungarian refugees from Austria is slowing down considerably; there are over 70,000 of them still in Austria and they are becoming slightly restive; should there be another great flight out of Hungary, the living conditions in Austrian camps would become serious;

(b) The psychological hazard, even given no further great flight from Hungary, of this slowing down of movement out of Austria is troubling him. The United States is still processing refugees in the expectation that their allowed total will be increased; however, they can give no definite guarantee to any more since the 21,500 (their present limit) have already been chosen. Mr. Lindt was pleased that Canada has worked out the staging process which relieves to some extent the congestion in Austria. As you know, Canada has agreed to take 5,000 refugees who have been moved temporarily to the U.K., 3,000 from France and 2,000 from the Netherlands. But all Mr. Lindt's conversation was directed towards getting us to take more Hungarian refugees out of Europe now and not wait until the spring. He was interested in learning of Mr. Michael Barkway's articles in *The Financial Post*<sup>39</sup> which urged Canada to bring in the refugees now, give them language training, and try to Canadianize them during the winter and have them part way ready to strike out for themselves in the spring. Mr. Lindt mentioned that Citizenship and Immigration admitted in his discussions with them that reception centres, mostly unused army barracks, were available in Canada to receive refugees

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<sup>39</sup> Voir/See Michael Barkway, *Financial Post*, December 22, 1956, "We Expected More from You, p.3 and Michael Barkway, December 29, 1956, "Canadian is Living on Hypocrisy,p.23.

this winter. It was pointed out to him that for a number of years the Government has tried to space its immigration so as to minimize the number of people arriving in the winter. It was obvious however that Mr. Lindt felt there might be a greater modification of this policy in the Hungarian emergency.

### *II. Hungarian Refugees in Yugoslavia*

Of the 2,300, a small number, about 126, want to come to Canada. The High Commissioner urged that we take this small group as quickly as possible. He said if we could take them there would be great political advantage to us because none of this group, up to now, was getting any offers. He mentioned that the Yugoslavs would be happy to let them come since investigations have shown that the refugees in this group may be a political embarrassment to Yugoslavia since they are anti-communists and could not easily be assimilated in Yugoslavia. Our mission in Belgrade has told us that these "forgotten Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia fear they will be forced back to Hungary. In a memorandum which went to you on January 7 you were advised of the recent Immigration directive, dated December 21 which tightens up the whole movement of Hungarian refugees to Canada, and in fact makes it impossible for any more to be accepted unless they have sponsors in Canada. However even before December 21 there seemed to be almost insuperable difficulties in the way of taking this small group of Hungarian refugees now in Yugoslavia.

### *III. Long-term Refugees*

This problem is worrying Mr. Lindt very much. He said it was heartless the way these long-term refugees were being overlooked. There are approximately 225,000 of them in Europe and of this number 70,000 are "hard core" cases still in refugee camps. These long-term refugees now saw what was being done for the Hungarians after two or three months and resented very much the double standard being followed -the strict immigration requirements being applied to them, and the relaxed immigration regulations being applied to the Hungarians. Mr. Lindt said his Office estimated that if the relaxed regulations were applied to the long-term group 50% of them could meet the standard. On humanitarian grounds alone this should be done. He then went on to argue that the calibre of Hungarian refugees was so high that surely the receiving countries when taking the Hungarians could receive in addition about 10% of the long-term ones, that is 100 "hard co-refugees" to 1,000 Hungarians. This, Mr. Lindt thought, would produce a fair cross section of population, but as things were working out now, the receiving countries were getting all first-class immigrants since the Hungarians were either university-trained or skilled workmen. Mr Lindt was obviously very troubled by the problem of the long-term refugees and sympathized with the bitterness which is creeping over this tragic group.

I understand that you intend discussing this question of refugees with your colleague, the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration. Would you like us to follow up your conversation with a letter to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration?<sup>40</sup> It seems to us that there are at least three points which require some clarification and perhaps a little pressure:

(a) The problem of the 126 or so Hungarians in Yugoslavia. They were there before the more stringent Citizenship and Immigration directive of December 21. The political reasons

<sup>40</sup> Note marginal:/Marginal note:

Yes. L.B. Pearson

for taking this small group are quite strong.

(b) The problem of our winter slow down in receiving Hungarians. Fewer shipping facilities will be available in the spring because normal travelling is greater then. Do you think that the Hungarian emergency requires further modification of Canadian policy to hold back immigration in the winter months?

(c) Could we not take a percentage of the "hard co-refugees? You may know that a year or so ago the Department of Citizenship and Immigration revised the way in which it keeps immigration statistics and so it is impossible to find out how many of these people we admit, but we think that in the last few years we have not been of much help to the High Commissioner in solving this heavy and tragic problem.

J. Léger

41.

DEA/12476-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au ministre des Finances*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Minister of Finance*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], January 11, 1957

My dear Colleague,

As you are aware, I have made a submissions+ to the Treasury Board concerning an item which I believe should be included in the proposed special supplementary estimate to provide funds for urgent expenditures arising from the Hungarian tragedy. My submission was for an item of \$1,250,000 "for assistance for the victims of the recent tragic events in Hungary". Of this total \$250,000 was proposed to meet certain expenses for relief of refugees awaiting immigration to Canada in transit camps in the Netherlands; the main figure of \$1,000,000 was to assist the various international agencies engaged in the provision of relief either within Hungary or for refugees who have not been accepted anywhere for settlement.

The figure of \$250,000 was tentative, as the arrangements for the staging camps were still being worked out. I now understand that the Citizenship Branch proposes to meet a part of the costs involved, and that the figure of \$250,000 in my submission can be correspondingly reduced. A letter covering this matter is going forward to the Secretary of the Treasury Board.

I am writing to you to urge the approval of the main figure of \$1,000,000 for assistance through international channels. My submission to the Board explains how the scale of the tragedy and of the need for emergency relief has increased since the Government recommended the earlier vote of \$1,000,000 for this purpose. I do not believe that there can be any question of the need of these various agencies for further substantial assistance, and the only real question is where it should come from.

Popular feeling about the Hungarian tragedy runs very strong in Western Europe, and relief assistance from private sources in many of the countries concerned has been on a large scale. We have had a fairly recent report from Sweden, for example, that their voluntary subscription

fund had reached \$4,000,000 -a large amount for such a small country. The fund established by the Lord Mayor of London, which it is true received some contributions from outside the city itself, passed £500,000 a month ago. There has been a series of reports indicating a similar high level of voluntary contributions from other western European countries. It is true that governmental assistance, at least in money, has been on a lesser scale in Europe, but the fact remains that per capita contributions from all sources has for those countries been high.

In North America, in contrast, contributions from the public have been disappointing. On January 7 private subscriptions in Canada to the Red Cross Fund (which receives the contributions to the great majority of the various individual fund-raising organizations) had totalled \$367,000); in addition there had been received \$250,000 from the Federal Government and from the provincial governments of Alberta, Ontario and Saskatchewan the amounts of \$7,000, \$25,000 and \$2,000 respectively. Although I have no precise figures, I understand that private contributions in the United States have been even more disappointing. This is particularly distressing in the light of North America's reputation for humanitarian generosity and for leadership in the opposition to the Communist dictatorship responsible for the Hungarian disaster. No doubt with these considerations in mind the United States Government has announced an emergency assistance programme of \$20 million; of this \$5 million has already been contributed in the form of cash grants to the various international agencies concerned. It has not yet been determined what form the remainder of the \$20 million programme will take, but we understand it will be primarily for assistance to refugees and that officials are now, as a separate operation, considering what type of aid programme will be required for the provision of relief within Hungary.

In these circumstances I do feel that the Government should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure an adequate level of assistance from this country. Perhaps this should be done by giving a stronger lead to the public than has so far been provided, so that private contributions might be increased; I would welcome such a course. But the results of such action would not be fully effective for weeks or months; the need is urgent, and is known to the governments and peoples concerned to be so. I therefore feel strongly that for political reasons we should take action which will be effective rapidly, and it seems to me that this can be done only by announcing an adequate further contribution of money.

There is, of course, no special magic in the figure of \$1,000,000. I have no particular plan for how best to divide such a sum. But in the circumstances, given our contribution of \$1,000,000 earlier and the fact that the problem has not merely doubled but has increased three or fourfold since then, I do not expect that anything less would be regarded, either in Canada or abroad, as adequate.

You may consider that this matter should be discussed in Cabinet before a decision is taken by the Treasury Board. If so, I regret that I will not be present next week and would hope that my submission would be sympathetically examined in the light of the considerations I have outlined.

Yours sincerely,  
L.B. Pearson

42.

DEA/12476-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Permanent Representative to United Nations*

TELEGRAM E-55

Ottawa, January 11, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Repeat Permis Geneva, Washington, London, Canac Paris, Paris and Vienna (Immediate) (Information).

## HUNGARIAN RELIEF

1. The Treasury Board today considered a recommendation from this department that a further sum of \$1,000,000 for Hungarian relief through international channels be provided in a special supplementary estimate which may shortly be submitted.

2. The Board was unable to reach a decision, considering that the recommendation was not adequately supported by figures of the assistance provided by other western countries. Accordingly the matter will be decided by Cabinet on Tuesday morning by which time we have undertaken to provide all available information on assistance from other western countries.

3. Please send in time for the meeting whatever information you can concerning assistance from western countries. We have in mind assistance both from governments and from voluntary or non-governmental contributions, since the level of non-governmental assistance from European countries has been far higher relatively than in North America, and this difference may be relevant. We recognize that time may not permit a complete report, but please send what you can.

43.

DEA/12476-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], January 16, 1957

## HUNGARIAN RELIEF

As you may recall, the Special Session of Parliament voted \$1 million as a Canadian contribution for Hungarian relief. Sometime ago one half of this sum was divided evenly between the Canadian Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees on the understanding that the money would be used for relief either in Hungary or for Hungarians

who had fled their country, on condition that it should be provided impartially on the basis of need and used under effective international supervision to ensure that this condition is fulfilled. (This vote was not intended to be used for the expense of transporting Hungarian refugees to Canada.) Last week the Treasury Board approved release of the remaining \$500,000 to the Canadian Red Cross (\$100,000) and to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (\$400,000).

In making available this final \$500,000, we proposed that the Canadian contribution might be used most effectively if it were given to the United Nations Secretary-General who is in a better position than we, despite our careful sifting, to determine which of the deserving appeals from the Austrian Government, the Red Cross, the United Nations High Commissioner, and the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration, for example, is most urgent at present. However, some Ministers indicated a preference for disbursing this money through the High Commissioner for Refugees since this ensured that none of the funds would be spent within Hungary itself, and this course was accepted.

It has been generally understood for some time that the sum voted as a Canadian contribution would undoubtedly have to be augmented when the complex relief problem could be more clearly appreciated, if Canada is to provide more than token support for the international co-operative effort to assist the 160,000 Hungarian refugees in their attempts to seek freedom. Thus, an item is included in the Supplementary Estimates which are to go before Parliament in the next few days to provide a further \$1 million for this purpose.

This second million dollars, however, will probably be expended in a somewhat different manner. The Cabinet has agreed that the costs incurred in the Netherlands staging camp where Hungarians destined for Canada are to await their movement across the Atlantic should be met from this sum. These costs will probably amount to \$250 - 300 thousand and will be administered by the Department of Immigration.

The remainder, I suggest once more, might be made available to the Secretary-General in order that maximum flexibility and control can be ensured in the utilization of Canadian relief resources. While the point may not be of enough significance to stress strongly, I do think that it would be most feasible for us to contribute through the Secretary-General and, if it is considered desirable, to make our assistance conditional as we see fit. Thus, if it is not considered appropriate to permit further assistance to be given to the citizens of Hungary who are still within their own country, this stipulation can be made although I do not think that such an arrangement need be made unless the Ministers suggest it should.

I would recommend therefore that we should seek the agreement of the other Departments concerned to the release of the \$1 million to be requested of Parliament in the next few days as follows:

- (a) to provide for the expenditures of the Department of Immigration for the staging camps in the Netherlands (on the understanding that this will require about \$250 - 300 thousand)
- (b) to place the remainder at the disposition of the Secretary-General of the United Nations so that the most efficient use may be made of the funds in meeting such urgent requirements as he is aware of (with the understanding, if it is so desired, that a stipulation be made preventing any expenditure of these funds in Hungary, and requesting some assistance be given to the Austrian Government if any explicit recommendation to this effect is felt necessary).

I enclose letters to the Minister of Finance and the Minister of Immigration, which you might sign if you agree. In these letters, I have provided additional details they have requested regarding the extent of assistance provided by other Western countries. I have concluded by

indicating the nature of the problem faced by the Austrian authorities, and by recommending as in this memorandum, that Canadian aid can most usefully be distributed through the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

J. Léger

*[PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]*

*Le secrétaire d'État par intérim aux Affaires extérieures  
au ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration  
et au ministre des Finances*

*Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Minister of Citizenship and Immigration  
and Minister of Finance*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, January 16, 1957

My dear Colleague:

As you will recall it was agreed with the Secretary of State for External Affairs before he left for New York that an item for \$1 million be placed in the forthcoming supplementary estimates for 1956-57 to be presented to Parliament within the next few days. It was agreed further that before any expenditure from this sum would be permitted that agreement would be sought among the three Departments concerned on the most feasible method of allocating this money to the various international agencies and governments who are concerned with the problem of Hungarian relief.

You will recall also that in discussing earlier the disposition of the remaining \$500,000 from the vote made during the Special Session of Parliament the Department of External Affairs agreed to conduct a further assessment of the manner in which other Western nations are continuing to assist in the very great task which must be faced and solved by international co-operation if the more than 160,000 Hungarians who have left their country are to be cared for satisfactorily. To this end I am reporting on a few of the more recent comments we have had on the extent to which other friendly nations have committed themselves.

You may be especially interested to learn of the latest aid provided by the United States. The initial government authorization of \$20 million has been allocated among the various organizations which are operating in this international task. This sum has been supplemented of course by money provided previously for such schemes as the United States Escapes Programme, which assists refugees fleeing satellite nations, and the International Committee for European Migration which has received a special grant within recent weeks. The Department of Defence is expected to spend a total of \$12 million before its "Operation Safehaven" is completed, which is destined to move 15,000 refugees to the United States. To this public assistance must be added private contributions which now have reached about \$10 million; thus the total assistance provided by the United States will probably exceed \$42 million (by far) in addition to funds previously destined for relief work. The final cost to the United States has not yet been suggested and authorities predict that expenditures on relief will continue for some time.

From Western Europe, several comments have been received in the past few days

which show this assistance for Hungarian refugees in this part of the world continues to be forthcoming. In France about \$6 million has thus far been set aside for Hungarian relief. Most of this money is intended for use outside the country and much of it has been collected privately. In Norway some \$3.5 million has been collected, most of it in private donations. The Danish Red Cross reported \$1 million for relief by the beginning of December and at the same time Finland had provided about \$.75 million. In Sweden voluntary contributions reached about \$2.5 million by mid-December. In most of these areas government contributions have not compared with private collections largely because the governments concerned have devoted substantial and often incalculable amounts for the financing of internal reception arrangements for refugees.

The situation in Austria is at the other extreme, of course, since the amounts expended internally far exceed requirements abroad. By the end of December, we have been informed by the Austrian authorities, relief expenditures had reached \$8 million and these had been offset by external grants only to the extent of \$1 million. Since then the United States has provided an additional \$2 million. Moreover, the serious situation which exists can hardly be expected to improve in the coming months if large numbers of the refugees remain in Austria. The latest available figures place the number of Hungarians in Austria at 70,000. This number is increasing by about 600 - 800 a day. Almost no refugees are leaving Austria now, although 90,000 have thus far been relocated in other countries. During the current year if 80,000 refugees are to be cared for in Austria the Austrian government has estimated that some \$130 million would be required. Of this amount \$96 million would be used in the construction of lodging facilities. It is apparent, therefore, that the Austrian government, if it is to provide even a minimum amount of assistance, will continue to require large expenditures for those refugees remaining within Austrian borders for even a short time.

In addition to the initial problem of providing assistance for Hungarian relief, the Austrian authorities and the Secretary-General of the United Nations have both indicated that the aid provided must be as flexible as possible. Previous contributions specifically made for care of orphans or for immigration assistance to particular nations and commodity gifts have been useful but not necessarily of maximum value. It would seem that in addition to an increased volume of assistance, there is a need for greater co-ordination of relief so that a comprehensive programme can be carried out.

Therefore, I would recommend that we might arrange for the \$1 million to be requested of Parliament to be disbursed as follows:

(a) to meet the expenses of the Department of Immigration for clothing, medical expenses and language training of refugees in the staging camps in the Netherlands, which it is estimated will reach about \$250 - 300 thousand.

(b) the remainder to be placed at the disposal of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, within whatever specific terms we may wish to prescribe, in order to make the most effective Canadian contribution possible.

Yours sincerely,  
Paul Martin

44.

PCO

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet**Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], January 17, 1957

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
 The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe),  
 The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),  
 The Minister of National Health and Welfare  
 and Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),  
 The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann),  
 The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),  
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr Lapointe),  
 The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris),  
 The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham),  
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),  
 The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General (Senator Macdonald)  
 (for morning meeting only),  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr Pickersgill),  
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),  
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler),  
 The Secretary of State (Mr. Pinard)  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Registrar of the Cabinet (Mr. Halliday),  
 The Economic Adviser, Privy Council Office (Mr. Lamontagne)

...

MAIN ESTIMATES, 1957-58; FURTHER SUPPLEMENTARY ESTIMATES (2)  
 1956-57; HUNGARIAN RELIEF  
 (PREVIOUS REFERENCE JAN. 14)

30. *The Minister of Finance* submitted the main estimates for 1957-58 and further supplementary estimates (2) for 1956-57. The main estimates totalled \$4,827,600,056, an increase of approximately \$171 million over 1956-57.

The supplementaries contained items for freight assistance on western feed grains (\$2million), transportation and other assistance for Hungarian refugees coming to Canada (\$9million), further Hungarian relief (\$1million), grants to municipalities (\$2,024,000), grants to universities (\$7,986,000), immigration medical services (\$225,000), construction of a P.E.I. ferry (\$600,000), veterans hospital at Deer Lodge (\$435,000), and a loan to finance the clearing of the Suez Canal (\$1 million), a total of \$24,270,000.

In the matter of further Hungarian relief, the Minister recalled that, at the previous meeting, it had been decided to include the item subject to revision when further information was available. What information had now been received was not too satisfactory. It appeared that the Austrian government estimated that it would cost about \$130 million to look after the refugees in that country for one year, of which some \$96 million would be capital outlay for new buildings and rehabilitation of existing barracks and camps and about \$35 million for maintenance of refugees. The situation seemed complex and unorganized as yet. He felt \$96 million on buildings was a large amount to spend when this refugee movement would likely be over in a year. It also seemed that disposal of the original \$1million, less some \$200,000 needed for refugees in Holland, would be left with the Secretary General of the United Nations. It had been originally considered that the relief amounts were to be handled by the High Commissioner for Refugees in Austria. This way there would be some kind of sensible relationship of Canadian contributions to other ones. It did not seem desirable to embark on a programme which could perpetuate the relief situation in Austria and Canada's contribution should be in bringing refugees to Canada. Total contemplated Canadian expenditures in assisting Hungarians, amounting to some \$15million, seemed far out of proportion to what, for instance, the United States was doing.

31. *Mr. Martin, as Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs*, reported that it had now been ascertained that U.S. expenditures on aid to Hungarians were about \$42 million. Other approximate figures were -France \$6 million, Norway \$3.5 million, Denmark \$1million, Finland \$0.75million, and Sweden \$2.5million. Some of these were private contributions. Up to the end of December, expenditures for relief in Austria had been \$8million. A large number of refugees, some 70,000 were still in that country and were being added to at the rate of 600-700 a day. If 80,000 were to be looked after, the suggested total of \$130million might well be required. Large expenditures would undoubtedly be needed but there was still little precise information.

32. *During the discussion* it was suggested that it would be better to wait for a time to see how matters would turn out. If necessary, provision could be made for more assistance in the further supplementary estimates in March; meanwhile, costs of assisting refugees coming to Canada could come out of the special Immigration Branch votes, including the amount that had been planned for assistance to those in Holland and included in the relief figure.

33. *The Cabinet* approved the main estimates for 1957-58, as submitted by the Minister of Finance and the further supplementary estimates (2) for 1956-57, after deletion of an item of \$1 million (vote 540) for Hungarian relief, and agreed that the Governor General be asked to recommend them to the House of Commons, in accordance with the provisions of the British North America Act.

IMMIGRATION; HUNGARIAN REFUGEES  
(PREVIOUS REFERENCE DEC. 19, 1956)

34. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* recalled that no commitment had been made to bring to Canada Hungarian refugees from Austria during March. It was now considered that it would be relatively easy to handle a further 2,000 during that month and these could be taken in just as soon as their papers were processed and transportation found. It seemed desirable to keep the "refugee pipeline" full. After April, those in Canada would soon be absorbed in the country. It was desirable not to keep the refugees together any longer than necessary.

35. *The Cabinet* noted the report of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and

agreed that a further 2,000 Hungarian refugees from Austria be admitted to Canada during March.

...

45.

DEA/887-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council*

TELEGRAM S-35

Ottawa, January 18, 1957

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Your telegram 78. January 16, +

Repeat London, Washington, Candel New York, Paris (Information).

By Bag Rome, Bonn, Moscow, Prague, Warsaw, Vienna, Belgrade.

#### WESTERN ECONOMIC AID TO HUNGARY

We were interested to learn that the French and Italian governments have been approached about the possibility of providing economic aid to Hungary. This confirms press and radio reports that the Kadar régime is faced with a desperate economic situation and is willing to accept economic assistance from the West.

2. While for humanitarian reasons it is necessary that food and clothing be provided through the International Red Cross or United Nations agencies to alleviate hunger and cold among the Hungarian people, it would seem reasonable to insist that representatives of such relief organizations should have freedom to exercise some control over the distribution of supplies. Anything beyond belief, it seems to us, must be considered in the light of East-West strategy and our own commercial interests.

3. According to a report in the Swiss economic daily *Neue Züricher Zeitung* the Hungarian national rising reduced the Budapest government's planned production for 1956 by one-quarter, or 10 billion of forints in terms of national income. Physical destruction and displacement of people is leading during the current year to an acute shortage of labour in the mines and agriculture and to serious unemployment in the cities. Other reports indicate that the five-year plans in all the satellites and in the Soviet Union have been seriously affected by the developments in Hungary and Poland and that the cost of destalinization to date for the USSR may be close to 2 billion dollars apart from considerations of prestige and defence. We can see little political advantage now in making concessions to ease this situation at its most acute point, in Hungary, particularly if by extending loans or credit we bolster a Moscow-imposed régime that the Hungarian people and workers' councils have so far refused to accept.

4. Against these political considerations must be weighed the commercial interests of western countries. When the uprising began, Canada, for example, was on the point of

concluding a trade agreement with Hungary providing for the sale of 300,000 tons of wheat over a period of three years and was willing to extend one year's credit for at least the first year's purchase. The agreement was never signed in view of public opinion here and abroad. Moreover, the credit position of the Hungarian government is shaky and the Hungarian Minister of Agriculture admitted on November 27 that the Hungarian government was not in a position to honour trade agreements concluded with foreign countries.

5. On balance therefore we are inclined to share the USA view that there should be no truck or trade with the Kadar régime except for relief measures through the International Red Cross or the United Nations. Should economic or other pressures force some degree of liberalization in Hungary, we would have to reassess this attitude. The French rationalization about aiding the satellites to achieve greater economic independence of the Soviet Union would, in our opinion, apply in the case of Poland but is hardly applicable to the puppet régime in Budapest at present, though we must recognize that if the Kadar régime breaks down completely the Red Army might have to run the country directly.

6. You will by now have received Candel's telegram 228 of January 17 + giving a confidential report of de Seynes impressions of the Kadar government and of the economic crisis which Hungary is facing. Although you will not be able to use this private account in the Council, de Seynes noted that the Kadar régime was regarded with contempt, that power and coal supplies are barely brought to keep one or two basic industries going, and that food stocks would be exhausted by May, leading to an extremely serious situation. You will also have been Candel's telegram 251 of January 18 + summarizing the official public report of de Seynes and of the experts who accompanied him.<sup>41</sup> While the findings of the UN team may perhaps provide a more acceptable framework either for aid or trade, the basic political difficulty remains that of having to deal with the Kadar régime. So far as may be possible, we would prefer arrangements or any western aid to be made with Kadar's administration through Red Cross and UN channels, but if big program is developed this might prove impossible. In any case further consideration will need to be given both at the UN and by individual governments to the general policy of aid to Hungary and to the methods of distribution, should more relief be extended. In the meantime, we think it well worthwhile to have a further exchange of views in the Council.

46.

DEA/12476-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au chef de la délégation à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Chairman, Delegation to United Nations General Assembly*

TELEGRAM E-87

Ottawa, January 21, 1957

<sup>41</sup> Pour le rapport public de Seynes, voir Nations Unies, Assemblée générale, Documents officiels de l'Assemblée générale, onzième session, Annexes, 12 novembre 1956 - 8 mars 1957, 1956-1957, pp. 46 à 53.

For de Seynes' public report, see United Nations, General Assembly, Official Records of the General Assembly, Eleventh Session, Annexes, 12 November 1956 - 8 March 1957, 1956-1957, pp.45-51.

CONFIDENTIAL. IMPORTANT.

Reference: Your telegram 261, January 19.+

For the Minister, Begins: Canadian Contribution for Hungarian Relief

Cabinet deleted from the supplementary estimates the further item for Hungarian relief. This decision was apparently based upon a feeling that an unduly high proportion of the proposed expenditure by Austria was of a capital rather than a current nature.

2. Expenditures in connection with the staging camp in the Netherlands to be used for prospective immigrants will now be financed from the supplementary vote which Citizenship and Immigration is seeking for transporting these immigrants to Canada.

3. In view of this rejection I would think we should attempt to achieve the maximum effect from the funds already made available by arranging formally or informally that one half or more of the four hundred thousand dollars which Treasury Board agreed last week would be given the High Commissioner for Refugees should be passed on to the Austrian government for its relief work. For this reason we ascertained from the delegation this morning that such a rider would be proper and acceptable when our grant to the High Commissioner is made.

4. As for the question of a further vote, in the event that you may consider it advisable on your return to recommend additional relief assistance, we are continuing to collate available information on the need and the extent to which it is being met in Hungary, in Austria and beyond. To this end we are asking the delegation today to request from the [Secretary-General] an appraisal insofar as is possible of what will be required in the coming months.

47.

DEA/12476-40

*Le sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au sous-ministre de la Citoyenneté et de l'Immigration*

*Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, January 25, 1957

Dear Colonel Fortier:

#### HUNGARIAN REFUGEES IN YUGOSLAVIA

Just before Mr. Pearson returned to New York last week for meetings of the eleventh session of the United Nations General Assembly, he asked me to take up with your Department three questions concerning refugees in Europe. Perhaps the most important matter requiring attention at the moment is that of Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia; the other two questions - the winter slow-down of movement of Hungarian refugees out of Austria to Canada, and the

problem of long-term refugees in Europe -will be dealt with in a subsequent letter.<sup>42</sup>

The latest word we have received concerning Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia indicates that, with more and more refugees crossing the Hungarian-Yugoslav border, the total in Yugoslavia has now reached 8,000 and is rapidly growing. Of this number, it seems likely that a few hundred may wish to come to Canada, for the last definite figure we had was 126, when the total influx was less than 3,000.

I am sure that your Department will already have under review the desirability of arranging for the admission of a sizable proportion of these refugees from Yugoslavia and will appreciate the advantages of avoiding the criticism that Canada is discriminating against refugees who fled from Hungary to Yugoslavia rather than to Austria, by requiring them to have close relatives in Canada as sponsors before they will be considered for admission. However, there is, in addition, a strong case on grounds of international policy for taking action to admit Hungarian refugees now in Yugoslavia.

You will, no doubt, have seen telegrams 133+ and 134+ of January 22 on this subject from the High Commissioner in London. These two telegrams have already been referred to you, but I attach copies for convenient reference. In these telegrams Mr. Robertson submits further information derived from the United Kingdom Ambassador in Belgrade and suggests that our present policy towards Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia might be reconsidered in the light of the marked change in attitude shown by the Yugoslav Government.

At the present time, in contrast with what is happening on the Austrian frontier, there appears to be little interference with the movement of Hungarian refugees across the Yugoslav border and the knowledge that this escape route is open to them may have an important bearing on the continued resistance to the Kadar Government of many Hungarians now actively dissident. If, however, Canada and other Western countries withhold their cooperation in facilitating the movement of refugees from Yugoslavia, it may become necessary for Tito to close the frontier against any further influx. This, in turn, may have an important impact not only upon events within Hungary but also upon relations between Yugoslavia and Hungary and may have the effect of upsetting the delicate balance which Tito, under increasing pressure, is attempting to maintain, and of drawing him closer to the Kadar régime, who will, no doubt, continue to press Tito for the return of Hungarian refugees.

In view of these important considerations, I should be grateful if our present policy with respect to Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia could be re-examined and if the possibility could be reviewed of applying to the Hungarians in Yugoslavia the same criteria, and also the same opportunities for free passage, as are now being extended to Hungarian refugees in Austria. If a meeting would be helpful to discuss these matters as well as any other problems concerning the movement of refugees from Europe, I know that officials of this Department would be very pleased to attend such a meeting.

Yours sincerely,  
J. Léger

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<sup>42</sup> Non retrouvée./Not located.

48.

DEA/12476-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Permanent Representative to United Nations*

TELEGRAM E-131

Ottawa, January 28, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL. IMPORTANT.

Repeat Geneva (Important).

Repeat Washington, Paris, NATO Paris, London (Information)

By Bag Berlin, Brussels, Belgrade, Bonn, Hague, Rome from London.

## HUNGARIAN RELIEF

Allocation of the second half of the one million dollars voted by Parliament in December for Hungarian relief has now been decided upon. One hundred thousand dollars will be given the Canadian Red Cross for its international relief activities and the remaining four hundred thousand dollars is to be made available to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, the chief co-ordinator for international assistance as designated by the UN Secretary-General. In making this sum available to the High Commissioner we are also requesting that two hundred and fifty thousand dollars of it be earmarked for the Austrian government for the relief of the many thousands of refugees who are not provided for by the International Red Cross under the terms of its agreement with the UN whereby the Red Cross acts as the operating agency of the UN. In this way it is intended that Canadian assistance will be open to all; and by disbursing the one hundred thousand through the Canadian Red Cross provision is also being made for relief activities outside the scope of those which the UN has undertaken -especially aid to prospective Canadian immigrants, for example, and others who do not qualify for UN sponsored aid. (This of course is not to be taken as a reflection upon the work which the High Commissioner's office is engaged in; on the contrary, our confidence in the capacity of his office for co-ordinating the various national contributions towards Hungarian relief is demonstrated in our allocation of the entire Canadian contribution of one million dollars apart from the three hundred and fifty thousand dollars given to our own Red Cross. Our purpose is simply to ensure that our assistance is spread as widely as possible.)

2. Consideration is now being given to a further stipulation that fifty thousand dollars of remaining one hundred and fifty thousand dollars for High Commissioner be given to ICEM and for the moment it is planned that the High Commissioner shall have for use at his own discretion only one hundred thousand dollars. A decision will be taken on the remaining fifty thousand dollars within the next few days.

3. Please notify without delay on an informal basis the High Commissioner or his office of our decision so that there will be no danger of his learning of our actions from the press. You should emphasize that in allotting the sum mentioned for the use of the Austrian government and in considering a further stipulation with respect to the ICEM our intention is not to interfere unduly with his freedom of action but rather is to ensure that some help is directed towards

the wide spread needs which are not now covered by the UN-IRC agreement and which have been brought to our attention by the Austrian authorities, other international agencies and by the High Commissioner himself.

4. Apart from notifying the appropriate UN people we would not wish mention of our contribution to be made publicly prior to a press release which will be issued here on Thursday at eleven am.<sup>43</sup> This course is subject to the minister's concurrence although the time will remain approximately the same in any event. Any change will be sent to you by immediate telegram.

5. The cheque for the High Commissioner for four hundred thousand dollars will be forwarded Tuesday January 29 according to present plans.

49.

PCO

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet*

*Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], January 31, 1957

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
 The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe),  
 The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),  
 The Minister of National Health and Welfare  
 and Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Martin),  
 The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann),  
 The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),  
 The Minister of Justice (Mr. Garson),  
 The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters),  
 The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),  
 The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris),  
 The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham),  
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),  
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),  
 The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General (Senator Macdonald)  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill),  
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),  
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler),

<sup>43</sup> Pour le texte du communiqué, voir Canada, Ministère des Affaires extérieures, Affaires Extérieures, vol.9, N°2, février 1957, p.81.

For the text of the press release, see Canada Department of External Affairs, External Affairs, Vol.9, No.2, February 1957, p.81.

The Secretary of State (Mr. Pinard)  
 The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin),  
 The Registrar of the Cabinet (Mr. Halliday),

...

IMMIGRATION; HUNGARIAN REFUGEES; ARRANGEMENTS WITH  
 PROVINCES;  
 JEWISH REFUGEES FROM EGYPT  
 (PREVIOUS REFERENCE DEC. 5, 1956)

54. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* said that the Minister of Planning and Development for Ontario [Nickle] would be in Ottawa to-morrow to discuss an agreement with the province on care of Hungarian refugees.

Ontario had been offered much the same terms as the agreement made with Saskatchewan but had come back with unacceptable proposals. In addition to asking the Federal government to pay \$3 a day for each refugee during the time in reception centres,

Ontario expected payment for the capital cost of these centres. This was quite out of the question. The Federal government would also, as with Saskatchewan, pay Ontario the cost of providing immediate clothing needs. The Saskatchewan agreement also required that the Federal government pay full costs of medical treatment of indigent Hungarian immigrants during the first year in Canada, provided that the province would assume such costs after that year.

The Minister suggested that the best way to break the "jam" was to say that Ontario could either have an agreement such as that with Saskatchewan or rely on the existing agreement for landed immigrants; that was a fifty-fifty share of costs in respect of immigrants, but with the Federal government bearing the full cost of treatment for those not legally landed.

As regards the other provinces, Nova Scotia would probably accept on the same basis as Saskatchewan but Manitoba had raised the question of paying for persons who had not been landed. Quebec did not wish to deal with the Federal government but proposed to go ahead on its own. The Minister had supplied a provincial committee with the terms of the Saskatchewan agreement and, in effect, refugees in Quebec would get everything they got elsewhere. A good job was being done and some \$100,000 had been made available. An excellent agreement had been negotiated with Newfoundland, but it was unlikely that many refugees would go there.

55. *Mr. Pickersgill* raised the question of Jews leaving Egypt. The Canadian policy in respect of such persons had been quite severe and no applications were processed in Egypt. Emigrants had to get first into other countries, excluding Italy, and were required to go through all the formalities, such as medical examinations and security checks. He thought a more liberal policy might be taken in making arrangements for dealing directly in Egypt with those Jews who had relatives in Canada who had been landed two years or more, and were well established. To do this, it would be necessary to send to Egypt, temporarily, a small team of an immigration officer and a doctor. Any such immigrant approved would, of course, be expected to pay his own way to Canada. Probably some 400 persons might be involved.

56. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) There would only be a few Hungarian immigrants who were not landed. They would be persons not thoroughly examined or even unable to satisfy requirements, who had been accepted under the same system adopted in the emergency by the United Kingdom and

France.

(b) Without a special agreement, Canada would have to take care of those not landed who required treatment. It was argued that section 48 of the Immigration Act dealing with medical treatment applied to the Federal government just as to any transportation company.

57. *The Cabinet* noted the report of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and approved,

(a) the proposed line to be taken with representatives of the Ontario government on an agreement with that province on the care of Hungarian refugees; and,

(b) the temporary stationing in Egypt of an examining team to deal with relatives of persons of Jewish origin resident in Canada for two years or more, who wished to emigrate to Canada at their own expense.

...

50.

DEA/8619-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au chef de la délégation à l'Assemblée générale des Nations Unies*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Chairman, Delegation to United Nations General Assembly*

TELEGRAM S-56

Ottawa, February 1, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL. IMPORTANT.

Reference: Your telegrams 55 of January 7 and 364 of January 26. +  
Repeat Washington, London, Paris, NATO Paris (Information)

#### HUNGARY

In our view, the special committee on Hungary should place primary emphasis on ascertaining what happened in Hungary and how it happened, holding up the documented record beside the principles of the Charter and the terms of the resolutions passed by the Assembly.

2. To serve this purpose, the committee ought to ensure that its report provides effective answers to the following obvious questions: (a) Has the present régime a legal mandate or has it been imposed by Soviet force? (b) What was the nature of the Soviet intervention and under what conditions did it take place? (c) Have arrests, deportations and executions been carried out without due process of law and in disregard of human rights?

3. We agree that the substance of a report along these lines is bound to be damaging to the USSR, but consider that this should not be permitted to divert the committee from the discharge of its responsibilities.

4. In the light of this, there seem to be two problems. First, should the aims of the committee be related only to the simple condemnation of the USSR, or should its work be exploited as part of a grander design? Second, how far should it go by publicity, etc., to heighten the condemnation which the facts alone will convey?

5. Although it may still be too soon to attempt to draw up a detailed policy regarding

Hungary and the satellites as a whole, there seems to be general agreement that the West should encourage a gradual drift away from Soviet dominance. This drift must spring from national Hungarian initiatives. The committee may help to serve this end.

6. The low standard of living, as well as the lack of fundamental freedom have, we think, been basic causes of the trouble in Eastern Europe, including Hungary. A refugee movement of such dimensions cannot however be explained solely by the desire for freedom in the abstract. It may be that one of the avenues of approach by which to encourage the drift will prove to be through economic channels. It would follow that the committee should ensure that its findings are not confined to the course and circumstances of Soviet intervention, but should ensure that its reports paint a concise but telling picture of the economic lot of the individual on the eve of the trouble. For this purpose, it has abundant human source material available. Thus the facts themselves will not only condemn the USSR, but will document the legitimacy of the Hungarian rising. Moreover, they put the case for the other satellites, at a time when at least some of them show signs of wanting more trade with the West rather than with the USSR and the Middle East, will help to explode the myth of the communist economic solution for a classically underdeveloped area (“Green Europe”), will say explicitly what the flight of over 200,000 refugees implies, and will be of no little interest to the Afro-Asian countries who tend to overlook the violations of human rights behind the curtain and may be tempted to take similar short cuts to industrialization.

7. As to the second question, the USSR has made it clear that it does not wish a resumption of the cold war, despite Suez and the Sino-Soviet reply to the Eisenhower doctrine.<sup>44</sup> It cannot simply put the clock back on the October 30 declaration, for the Soviet Union faces a persistent and similar problem at home. Already, Soviet military posture in Hungary suggests that Moscow expects to be able to ride out the storm in a long-term occupation and not to have to impose direct military rule. Should it do so, the Assembly can always take strong action, as you have suggested.

8. We therefore think that the hearings should be conducted in public, if only to prevent the USSR from discrediting evidence taken in camera. It would be unfortunate if the committee were to allow a desire to obtain the widest possible measure of agreement to lead to emasculation of its report and to direct its hearing accordingly. Although we believe that by confining itself to facts the committee should be able to present a succinct report we would hope that these facts could be fully documented in annexes and that in any event if the committee found itself too strongly divided to produce an acceptable common statement, it should be prepared to present either majority and minority reports or an agreed report followed by supplementary submissions.

9. The use to which the report should be put will depend on its conclusions and the circumstances at the time of its release. We agree that further condemnatory resolutions in the meantime are likely to be futile and inadvisable, unless there is a sudden change in the picture.

10. All reports indicate that the struggle is not yet over in Hungary. The régime is held in contempt even by its employees and passive resistance continues. It would seem that both the Kadar régime and the USSR are counting on the winter and the depletion of food stocks to bring the population to heel. It would follow that we should expect no compromise before

<sup>44</sup> Pour une note sur la Doctrine d’Eisenhower, voir volume 22, document 208, note 173.

For a note on the Eisenhower Doctrine, see Volume 22, Document 208, footnote 173.

the spring. Only such a compromise will make it easy for many members of the UN to move beyond relief. It might be useful if the committee took this possibility into account as regards the timing and substance of its reports.

11. These suggestions imply, within the broader terms of reference of the committee which are inherent in the circumstances of its creation, the adoption of a few precise but connected objectives: documentary justification for the condemnation of the USSR, the exposure of the myth of the Soviet socialist solution for Eastern Europe, the holding of Hungary, which has rebelled against that solution, in the limelight, a show of moral support for the valour of the Hungarians, and the encouragement of continued resistance by a demonstration that in the eyes of the UN a compromise is not only possible but inevitable, with a hint to all concerned that a compromise will make it easier for the West to move beyond relief to consider re-habilitation for Hungary. We realize, however, that we can only attempt to influence the committee's programme through our close friends on the committee.

51.

DEA/12476-40

*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

CONFIDENTIAL

[Ottawa], February 4, 1957

## CANADIAN RELIEF FOR HUNGARY

In telegram 152+ of January 30 our Delegation to NATO reports on a further Council Session at which the problem of Western aid to Hungary was considered. You may recall in earlier telegrams (CANAC telegram 123+ and Paris telegram 86+ of January 25) it was reported that the French were pressing proposals which would provide for some measure of rehabilitation as well as relief for Hungary. Copies of these telegrams are attached for your reference. Since it appears probable that this question will be under continued consideration in the next few weeks I thought you might wish to consider a few of the points at issue, in the light of our own position, and perhaps to advise us of your views.

We have been giving some consideration in our own Department to the problem of Hungarian relief and to our trade relations with Hungary. We have not yet had time to work out a detailed policy on Hungary and the satellites. It may be that we must shortly recognize in current trends in eastern Europe an important opportunity for the west, and that to exploit these concretely western countries may later on have to consider an increase in trade with this region, including Hungary (although in Canada's case, we would not expect much trade to develop with Hungary whatever the circumstances). Meanwhile, and thus far, we have adopted the attitude that there is no political advantage to be gained from dealing with a régime which is not acceptable to the people of Hungary. The limited credit-worthiness of the present Hungarian government has reinforced this attitude.

The French proposals would provide for:

- (a) Free deliveries of coal, wheat, barley, etc.,

(b) Re-establishment of normal commercial relations with Hungary by NATO Members in so far as the individual interests of each is served by such relations.

If it is likely to become necessary or desirable to modify our stand, it may be wise to explore now the probable alternatives which are before us. We have examined the de Seynes report (together with the request the FAO made of us for feedstuffs in conjunction with this report) in an effort to determine what the effect of a Canadian contribution of relief supplies to Hungary would be, because at this stage we do not think that the conclusion of an agreement to sell wheat on credit would be understood either in Canada or abroad. However, the de Seynes report goes considerably farther than suggesting relief measures alone as aid to Hungary in the coming months. The three fields for activity it sets forth are:

- (a) The resumption of agricultural production to satisfactory levels,
- (b) The encouragement of deliveries of commodities from the farms, and
- (c) The import of foods and other requirements.

In our opinion, category (a) would seem to be an advanced form of rehabilitation which would assist the Kadar régime. Category (b) practically involves political action since it is the communist system to which the farmers are objecting; we see no reason to give the régime support in crushing farm opposition.<sup>45</sup> It is only in the third category that we see a possibility for true relief assistance since the commodities requested will to a great extent be used to supply urgent needs mainly in urban centres where critical shortages exist and where external assistance can best be justified on humanitarian grounds.

At the present time, however, we do not have funds available for additional relief. The million dollars voted by Parliament has now been allocated and is being used primarily for aid to refugees. While it is true the Treasury Board directive does not prevent the use in Hungary of the funds given the Red Cross, it is naturally at the discretion of the Society whether or not they wish to do so. You may wish to give some thought therefore to whether we should consider a recommendation for aid of this type both in a positive spirit of responding to the United Nations request and also as a practicable alternative to the sale of wheat on credit. Under present circumstances such assistance might well take the form of a Canadian gift of surplus agricultural products. While we have not explored this possibility with other Departments (except that the FAO request was passed to the Departments of Trade and Commerce and Agriculture for any action which they might wish to take and no reply or comments have yet been received). There would seem to be several distinct advantages in such assistance if a further contribution is to be made. After examining de Seynes' report and taking into account those political facts which come immediately to mind, we would suggest that Canadian flour might be the most appropriate form for such a gift to take since the distribution in Hungary would be much easier and less subject to political obstruction, since the timing of Hungarian requirements would more easily permit a gift of flour than most others, since its source would be more likely to be known than in the case of most other products, and since such aid would contribute much to relief of distress but would do little rehabilitate the Kadar régime.

While the latest telegram from the NATO Delegation shows that the difference of opinion between the French and other representatives is less pronounced than had earlier seemed the case, there may be some continued pressure for a more liberal attitude towards Hungary. There are of course additional considerations which we will continue to examine and report to

<sup>45</sup> Note marginale:/Marginal note:

No L.B. Pearson

you if it seems advisable; in the meantime you may wish to give

some thought to the problem of Canadian relief for Hungary and to advise us whether a contribution along the lines described should be investigated.

J. Léger]

I don't think we should take any lead at this time in providing any type of assistance to Hungary.<sup>46</sup> This problem is complicated by the heavy financial burden of the Government in the field of immigration.<sup>47</sup>

52.

DEA/12476-40

*Le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures  
au représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord*

*Secretary of State for External Affairs  
to Permanent Representative to North Atlantic Council*

TELEGRAM E-229

Ottawa, February 12, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL. IMMEDIATE.

Reference: Our S-35, January 18, Canac telegram 202, February 6,+ Candel New York Telegram 514, February 8,+ and others.

Repeat Candel New York (Immediate), Permis Geneva, Washington, Paris, London (Important).

By Bag Vienna, Belgrade, Moscow, Warsaw, Prague, Bonn, Brussels, Hague, Berne, Oslo, Stockholm, Copenhagen, Rome.

#### RELIEF FOR HUNGARY

The question of relief for Hungary has been considered at some length and the conclusion reached that no further action on the part of the Canadian government is warranted at this time. This decision has been influenced both by the extent of government assistance for Hungarians, mainly refugees, already provided - over \$10 million to which must be added several million in private funds -and by the number of refugees being accepted by Canada, probably a total of thirty thousand by mid-year. Another consideration is the nature of the problem in Hungary itself, where rehabilitation seems more critical than relief, thus making the issue political as well as economic.

2. Thus far, as indicated in our S-35 of January 18, we have taken the stand that, for humanitarian reasons, food, clothing and medicines should be provided through the facilities of the International Committee of the Red Cross provided some control over local distribution is retained. Both the original \$250,000 and the \$100,000 just given the Canadian Red Cross Society have been made available for use of the Society in the refugee work and in

<sup>46</sup> Note marginale[spt]:/Marginal note:  
Nor do I! L.B. Pearson

<sup>47</sup> Léger a ajouté ce paragraphe à la main./ Léger added this paragraph by hand.

its *International Relief Programme*; thus a share of this \$350,000 of the Canadian vote of \$1,000,000 of last December could find its way into Hungary. However, what proportion, in fact, the Red Cross has considered it just to spend inside

Hungary we do not know.

3. Beyond such relief, we did not consider it advisable to go. The de Seynes' report, together with the FAO report which forms part one of the former, have been examined as has the ICRC report which portray the extent of assistance which Hungary is said to require. Along with these reports we have received formal or informal requests for Canadian contributions. These are now to be rejected for the time being at least, for the reasons outlined in paragraph 1. As anything beyond traditional relief is bound to assist in some measure in rehabilitating the Kadar régime, we have examined with extreme care suggestions for contributions of agricultural feedstuffs and fertilizers. The dangers inherent together with the extent of aid already rendered dictate against any further assistance now.

4. As far as normal commercial relations are concerned, we have not been asked recently to reconsider the proposed Hungarian trade agreement. Given the existing state of the economy, the Hungarians are hardly likely to be able to meet its terms, nor would we be likely to consider signature at this time even if these economic difficulties did not prevail. *For CANAC* -We agree with the action proposed in the Council and reported in your telegram under reference whereby information will be collated from members with representation in Budapest. Our decision to take no action now is consistent with the view in (b) of paragraph (3) requesting members to refrain from assisting Hungary until such consultation takes place. Our previous information in telegram S-35 of January 18 continues to describe the state of our commercial relations with Hungary and there is nothing further for you to report to the Council.

*For Candell New York* -In view of our attitude towards this problem, there is little value, in our view, for Michel and Meyer of the ICRC to visit Ottawa. Their memorandum which you forwarded has been examined as have all other requests for aid and will be kept in mind should our position be changed. With respect to your telegram 438 of January 31 + and the informal approach made to you by de Seynes' staff, we presume no formal communication is expected of us. If you consider it advisable and the occasion presents itself you may wish to intimate that we do not expect to take any action in the near future. The suggestion in your telegram 514 of February 8 + that a contribution of Canadian flour or wheat might be made to Hungary was one which had previously been considered and brought to the attention of the minister last week. At that time, however, it was considered inadvisable to pursue the matter for the reasons noted previously. Therefore, if you believe there are any new and compelling arguments favouring such a proposal you might wish to mention these to the minister and to report to us any reaction favouring a further investigation of such a gift. However, we should point out that if any item is to be added to the supplementary estimates, and such a gift would require an addition, immediate action must take place as supplementary estimates are being closed probably today.

53.

DCI/555-54-565-9

*Le sous-ministre par intérim de la Citoyenneté et de  
l'Immigration au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Acting Deputy Minister of Citizenship and Immigration  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

Ottawa, February 12, 1957

Dear Mr. Léger:

In Colonel Fortier's absence I am replying to your letter of January 25, 1957, in which you suggest a re-examination of our policy with respect to Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia.

The considerations regarding these refugees as outlined in your letter are appreciated. However, Mr. Pickersgill believes that any action should be in co-operation with other Western countries, rather than on our own, in an attempt to provide the same facilities in Yugoslavia as we have done in Austria. He does not feel that in the circumstances he should take the initiative, but rather that it should come from your Department. In his opinion Canada should not act unilaterally in this situation although he would consider some form of joint action with other Western countries, particularly if the United Kingdom and the United States of America took part.

We are endeavouring to find some means of simplifying the processing of sponsored cases which would help to alleviate the situation in Yugoslavia.

Yours sincerely,  
C.E.S. Smith

54.

PCO

*Extrait des conclusions du Cabinet*

*Extract from Cabinet Conclusions*

SECRET

[Ottawa], March 21, 1957

*Present*

The Prime Minister (Mr. St-Laurent) in the Chair,  
The Minister of Trade and Commerce and Minister of Defence Production (Mr. Howe),  
The Minister of Agriculture (Mr. Gardiner),  
The Minister of National Health and Welfare (Mr. Martin),  
The Minister of National Revenue (Dr. McCann),  
The Minister of Labour (Mr. Gregg),  
Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. Pearson),  
The Minister of Public Works (Mr. Winters),  
The Minister of Veterans Affairs and Postmaster General (Mr. Lapointe),

The Minister of Finance (Mr. Harris),  
 The Minister of Mines and Technical Surveys (Mr. Prudham),  
 The Minister of Fisheries (Mr. Sinclair),  
 The Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney),  
 The Leader of the Government in the Senate and Solicitor General (Senator Macdonald)  
 The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration (Mr. Pickersgill),  
 The Minister of Northern Affairs and National Resources (Mr. Lesage),  
 The Minister of Transport (Mr. Marler),  
 The Secretary of State (Mr. Pinard).The Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Bryce),  
 The Assistant Secretary to the Cabinet (Mr. Martin),  
 The Registrar of the Cabinet (Mr. Halliday)

...

#### IMMIGRATION; ADMISSION OF HUNGARIAN REFUGEES FROM YUGOSLAVIA AND ITALY; IMMIGRATION FROM POLAND

29. *The Secretary of State for External Affairs* pointed out that the problem of Hungarian refugees in Austria was diminishing as the flow into that country had practically ceased and the outflow was continuing. However, with the closing of the Austrian border by the present Russian supported Hungarian government, thousands of refugees were entering Yugoslavia where there was now a total of 18,000. This had led to a serious situation and the Yugoslav government did not understand why western countries were taking more than 120,000 refugees from Austria while doing little for those in Yugoslavia. Only a few of the refugees wished to remain in that country.

Several western countries were now prepared to accept some of these people and the United States was considering the admission of 1,000. The Canadian Embassy in Belgrade had been informed that over 2,000 Hungarians wished to come to Canada, and it had been suggested that up to 1,000 might be admitted.

The Minister felt this would be a useful action to take. The Yugoslav government was standing up vigorously to the U.S.S.R., and this example had a strong influence on the present Polish government and on other satellite governments. There would be important subsidiary benefits in admitting these refugees.

30. *The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration* pointed out that there would be careful selection of any Hungarian refugees that were in Yugoslavia. Probably a better type could thus be obtained. This selection would be on the basis of those who had expressed a desire to come to Canada, with a priority for those who were financially sponsored by friends or relations in Canada and for agricultural and mine workers. They would also have to satisfy the usual health requirements for immigrants.

An explanatory memorandum had been circulated.

(Joint memorandum, Minister of Citizenship and Immigration and Secretary of State for External Affairs, undated -Cab. Doc. 61 57) +

31. *Mr. Pickersgill* said there were two other immigration problems on which he would like the views of Cabinet. One had to do with Hungarian refugees in Italy and the other with persons of the Jewish faith in Poland who wished to emigrate to Canada.

There were some 4,000 Hungarian refugees now camped in various summer resorts in Northern Italy and the owners wanted the places vacated. The government of Italy was

prepared to pay the passage to Canada of 1,500 persons on a selective basis. The proposal would be similar to an ordinary immigration movement and would be advantageous to Canada in increasing the number of Hungarians here who had been picked in accordance with the regular immigration criteria. The same selection team could be used for both the 1,000 refugees in Yugoslavia and the 1,500 in Italy. It would not involve any persons arriving before May or June, and he would propose to make no announcement about it.

In the case of the Polish Jews, strong representations had been made to him to take in more of them by increasing the admissible classes. It appeared that it was now the deliberate policy of the Polish government to allow any Jews to leave who could. He had said he could not consider doing anything for Jews alone, but thought it might be possible to extend the permissible categories to include brothers or sisters of Canadian citizens if they were satisfactorily sponsored financially and were recommended by the Canadian Polish Congress, the Canadian Jewish Congress or the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee, all of whom were strongly anti-communist. These persons would pay their own passage and there would be less than 500 altogether. He would propose to make no announcement.

32. *During the discussion* the following points emerged:

(a) The admission of Hungarian refugees from Yugoslavia would actually make little difference to the numbers entering Canada, as there was only so much transport available. The refugee problem in Austria was being substantially eased and it was understood that the United States were taking some 200 a day without any publicity or controversy, though this seemed to be of doubtful legality.

(b) It might be difficult to justify taking Hungarian refugees from Yugoslavia when Yugoslavs themselves were not able to get into Canada. Against this, it was pointed out that there was no reason why bona fide Yugoslav emigrants could not come in; the difficulty was that exit permits were made available generally only to communists. Canada did take Yugoslavs under 18 and over 60 where there were immediate Canadian relatives, and the main problem was with nephews and nieces.

(c) The admission of Hungarian refugees into Canada was working out far better than had been expected. There had been some concern expressed in labour circles and there had been a few troublemakers among the immigrants.

(d) Austria had indicated quietly that, if there proved to be some troublemakers among the Hungarian refugees from Austria they could be returned to Hungary via that country.

(e) There had always been anti-Jewish feeling in Poland and the government there appeared to be trying to overcome this by getting rid of as many as possible of the Jewish population. Some 100,000 were going to Israel. There seemed to be real fear in the minds of the government of an anti-Jewish pogrom.

33. *The Cabinet* noted the reports of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration on Hungarian refugee problems and Polish Jews and agreed,

(a) that 1,000 Hungarian refugees in Yugoslavia be admitted into Canada; the persons to be selected from refugees who have expressed a desire to come to Canada, with a preference for those who were sponsored by friends or relatives here, and for agricultural or mine workers. All of who must satisfy the usual health requirement for immigrants;

(b) that up to 1,500 Hungarian refugees in Italy be admitted to Canada; the persons to meet the usual immigration criteria and their passage to be provided by the Italian government; and,

(c) that the permissible categories be extended to allow the entry of residents of Poland who are the children or the brothers or sisters of Canadian citizens, together with their immediate families if any, if they were satisfactorily sponsored financially, and were recommended by the Canadian Polish Congress, the Canadian Jewish Congress or the Ukrainian-Canadian Committee;

It being understood that these additional immigration arrangements would be given no undue publicity.

...

55.

DEA/8619-40

*Le représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies  
au sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Permanent Representative to United Nations  
to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

LETTER NO.101

New York, April 2, 1957

CONFIDENTIAL

HUNGARIAN QUESTION - ITEM 67: ELEVENTH GENERAL ASSEMBLY

With this letter I am enclosing a memorandum which was prepared early in March by Mr. Ford before his departure for Colombia. You are no doubt aware that he was concerned with the Hungarian question when it was being considered at the eleventh session of the General Assembly. Mr. Ford has given his impressions of the Assembly exercise. While I do not entirely agree with the conclusions in the memorandum, I suggest that it might be useful to add these views to others which were expressed by the Delegation from time to time.

2. At the same time I am enclosing a copy of Document A/3573 + of April 1 which contains a note verbal dated March 26, 1957 from the Permanent Representative of Hungary to the Secretary-General concerning the report of the Credentials Committee (Document A/3536 together with Resolution 484 of February 21, 1957). The Hungarian note complains because the Assembly "has, up till now, not reached a positive decision on the credentials of the Hungarian Delegation..."

R.A. MacKay

*Comment*

I have doubts like Dr. MacKay's. It seemed to me that the great majority of the Asians and Africans, after some hesitation, reacted quite strongly against Soviet action and that they were deeply affected by the debate. One result was that the Soviet position was considerably weakened during the rest of the Assembly. An important reason for Arab and Asian hesitation on this issue was the realization that the French and British were deliberately trying to divert attention from Egypt to Hungary -a tactic the latter admitted privately.

J.W. Holmes

## [PIÈCE JOINTE/ENCLOSURE]

*Note**Memorandum*

CONFIDENTIAL

## HUNGARY

I have reported from time to time on the developments during the past four months with regard to Hungary at the United Nations. In this brief memorandum I should like simply to record a few impressions and comments on the virtual failure of the United Nations to accomplish anything very concrete.

2. On March 6 a meeting was held under the chairmanship of Mr. Lodge to discuss the possibility of introducing another resolution on Hungary at the end of the Assembly. Most of those present, including ourselves, supported the initiative but with marked lack of enthusiasm, and outside the meeting soundings of other delegations revealed even greater reluctance to become involved in another debate on Hungary. The Irish representative said quite frankly that it would be a kind of "danse macabre" over the corpse of Hungary. The Italian said that we should not confess publicly our failure in the Hungarian question, and Sir Leslie Munro compared it to a Maori "tangi" or wake. Only Mr. Lodge protested that the United Nations had not failed completely. As he said, we had not accomplished our primary aim of driving the Russians out of Hungary, but at any rate we had focussed the attention of the world on their iniquities, and we had established a Committee of Investigation which was functioning efficiently and with remarkable unanimity.

3. Nevertheless I think we must agree that the action of the United Nations on Hungary was largely a failure, even if one concedes that it was never likely to achieve its primary aim of forcing the withdrawal of the Russians. Certainly United Nations action on Hungary stands in very sorry contrast with that taken in the Suez crisis. The one lesson which might profitably have been learned by the Arab-Asian group concerning the nature of the Soviet system has been obstinately refused. Though there are no doubt exceptions, I find it difficult to believe, however, that the majority of the Arab-Asian officials and ordinary people have seriously changed their minds about the USSR as a result of Hungary. The efforts of the United Nations may possibly have helped in some way, but I am not convinced of it.

4. Nor has the concomitant been accepted either by the Arab-Asian group, or by the Western nations, except in a rather academic way -that is, that for all practical purposes the USSR will not accept decisions of the United Nations when its own vital interests are involved. Equally we are unable to draw the necessary conclusion which in theory might have to be drawn. Indeed, it is doubtful that anyone seriously wishes to draw this conclusion, because, first, it is not necessarily in our interests to force the USSR out of the United Nations into isolation, and, second, because almost a third of the present members would be most reluctant to side with the West on such an issue.

5. The question therefore arises: should the United Nations have set its sights lower and attempted some more limited aim? It is difficult to see how we could have acted any differently in view of the passions aroused by Soviet actions last October and November without admitting the impotence of the United Nations from the beginning. The debate served

one purpose, however, and that was to focus the attention of the world on Hungary, and to serve as some kind of brake on Soviet repressive acts. The UN probably never had any real chance of doing more than this, of acting, for example, as a mediator between the Russians and Hungarians, and of moderating the demands of each side. Similarly United Nations actions in condemning the USSR could hardly have altered Soviet aims and methods in Hungary. In other words most of what the United Nations did was irrelevant to the basic fact that the USSR was determined to re-establish its dominant power in Hungary and was in a position to do so irrespective of what the outside world did, barring an act of war. The only thing which might have altered this would have been a unanimous Arab-Asian reaction against the USSR and even this would not necessarily have prevented the Russians from their course of action.

6. In the circumstances, therefore, the establishment of the Special Committee on Hungary was probably the only action the United Nations could take to assert its authority, to keep the issue alive, and to try objectively to present a definitive report on the actual events. Its work so far, and its interim report, are unspectacular but satisfactory. It seems likely that the final report will be a sombre and pretty convincing indictment of the Soviet Union.<sup>48</sup> But, basing myself on the reception of the interim report, it seems probable that it will have very little effect on world opinion.

7. As regards the question of the Hungarian Delegation to the United Nations, we were faced with the dilemma of accepting the credentials of a delegation of a government completely unacceptable to the vast majority of the Hungarian people, or having to deal solely with the Russians over Hungary. In the end the Hungarians themselves solved the question by voluntarily absenting themselves from the work of the Assembly.

8. To sum up, I must repeat my conviction that Hungary was the major failure of this Assembly. It failed to liberate Hungary, and it failed basically to change the Arab-Asian attitude towards the Soviet system, or Soviet colonialism. The first was due at least in part to a refusal to accept the basic premise that the United Nations is not yet in a position to force decisions on the USSR without going to war. The second is more serious because it was within the possibilities of the United Nations. The only mitigating factor in absolving it of this guilt is that the Anglo-French-Israeli attack on Egypt obscured what otherwise would have been easier to present as a clear-cut case of Soviet colonialism. But this must remain speculation, and I do not think we should exaggerate it. The fact that we did fail is a factor of far-reaching importance. It means that the anti-Western colonial bias is still great enough to prevent the Arab-Asian countries from seeing through the rosy haze in which they regard the USSR. But I also think it means that, subconsciously or not, the Afro-Asians are not prepared to take a high, moral line with a country which is in a position to hurt them. This line can be reserved for the “decadent colonial powers of Western Europe.”<sup>49</sup>

R.A.D. Ford

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<sup>48</sup> Voir Nations Unies, Assemblée générale, Rapport du Comité spécial pour la question de Hongrie, Documents officiels: onzième session, Supplément N°189 (A/3592).

See United Nations, General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, Official Records: Eleventh Session, Supplement No.18 (A/3592).

<sup>49</sup> Pour un point de vue plus positif de l'onzième assemblée générale des Nations Unies, voir volume 22, document 366.

For a more positive view of the UN's 11th General Assembly, see Volume 22, Document 366.

